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Abstract
There have traditionally been two views as to what makes it the case that a singular tenn has 
the prepositional content that it does. According to Descriptivism, the content of a term is 
descriptive since it is given by a cluster of descriptive properties commonly associated with it. 
According to Referentialism, the content of a term is singular since it is determined by the 
object it picks out. It follows that empty teims can have descriptive, but not singular*, content. 
If nan*ow content is what intrinsic duplicates have in common, then descriptive content is 
arguably narrow. Singular content, however, is wide since intrinsic duplicates who inhabit 
different environments express different singular contents by the same tenus. On the face of 
it, the arguments against Descriptivisiu and Semantic Internalism - the view that content is 
narrow - seem convincing, but a worry persists, namely how to reconcile Semantic 
Externalism - the view that content is wide - with the Idnd of Privileged Access speakers enjoy 
with respect to the contents of their occurrent attitudes. By thorough examination of those 
arguments I find space for an intermediate position. What we learn is not that reference cannot 
go by properties, but rather which properties luediate reference. Kripke's Modal Argument 
proves that we need rigidified descriptive properties, Putnam's Twin Earth Argument shows 
that we better include causal properties, and Burge's Arthritis Ar'gument highlights that we 
frequently invoke properties involving reference to other speakers. What is more, 
considerations about the behaviour of singular terms in intentional contexts strongly suggest 
that their prepositional contents cannot be exhausted by their referents. By deploying so- 
called Two-Dimensionalism, as developed by Stalnaker, Kaplan, Evans, Davies, and others, I 
argue that singular content is knowable only after relevant empirical information about the 
actual world is in, and so is not subject to Privileged Access. Descriptive content, however, is a 
priori knowable since it is independent of which possible world is actual. But if that is so, then 
descriptive content constrained by rigidity, causality and other-dependence must also be a 
priori. All it takes is knowledge of how to describe various thought experiments. Although the 
latter kind of content is not object-dependent, as is singular content, it is wide in that it fails to 
be shared by duplicates who are embedded in distinct physical or social environments. So, we 
should expect compatibility between Semantic Externalism and Privileged Access only if 
Rigidified Causal Descriptivism is adopted.
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Introduction
It used to be widely acknowledged that meanings were in the mind. What an expression 
meant was a question about what a competent speaker who understood that expression 
could be said to know just by introspective reflection. To grasp the meaning of a referring 
expression was to know a set of associated descriptive conditions that an object had to 
satisfy uniquely in order to be the referent of that expression. No expression could refer to 
an object unless it had certain descriptive properties knowledge of which constituted a 
speaker's grasp of the meaning of the expression. It was no part of the meaning of an 
expression which object, if any, it referred to, and so, no part of understanding such an 
expression that one had knowledge of its reference. The relation between an expression and 
its referent was thus essentially mediated by meaning: to understand a referring expression 
was a matter of knowing the relation between the expression and its associated descriptive 
meaning, and for an object to be the referent of the expression was a matter of satisfying 
the associated meaning. The mind associated certain descriptive conditions with an 
expression independently of any facts external to the mind, and then the expression had a 
reference if and only if there was an object which uniquely met those conditions. Meanings 
were safely in the mind and it was up to the objects in the world to satisfy them in order to 
be picked out by expressions having those meanings.
This Descriptivist picture of meaning and reference goes back to Frege and Russell, 
is often ascribed to Strawson, Searle and Dummett, and has nowadays persistently been 
defended by David Lewis and Frank Jackson. It came under heavy attack a couple of 
decades ago by arguments put forward by Kripke, Putnam, Donnellan and others. 
According to this new Referentialist picture, meanings were now no longer thought of in 
isolation from facts external to the mind, but as determined by the nature of the referents of 
expressions having those meanings. Referring expressions were directly hooked up with 
their referents unmediated by associated conditions. This meant that the meaning of an
expression was exhausted by its referent such that to know its meaning was to know which 
object it referred to. To understand an expression was to know its reference. Knowledge of 
the meaning of a referring expression was no longer equated with reflectively accessible 
knowledge of certain mental associations. To know the meaning of an expression was to 
know which worldly object it picked out and such De Re knowledge was taken to require 
the obtaining of some appropriate causal, or other epistemically relevant, external link 
between the speaker and the object.
The consequences were profound. If semantic contents were determined by facts 
external to the mind, then so were mental contents which are the objects of our 
propositional attitudes. Both Descriptivists and Referentialists have agreed that certain 
consequences about mental content followed from the theory of reference and meaning. 
According to Descriptivism, the prepositional contents of cognitive attitudes are purely 
conceptual propositions consisting of the descriptive meanings under which the objects of 
those attitudes are presented in thought. The descriptive contents of such attitudes are 
narrow  in the sense of being individuated by reference to what goes on only inside the 
individual who has those attitudes. To have an attitude with a narrow content is to have a 
mental property that is necessarily shared by intrinsic duplicates, or doppelgangers, as we 
shall say. For what marks the difference between doppelgangers is their relational 
properties, their different physical or social histoiy. On the Referentialist account, however, 
the propositional contents of cognitive attitudes are singular propositions consisting of, or 
individuated by, the objects and properties themselves that are the referents of the 
embedded content clauses. The singular contents of attitudes are wide in the sense of being 
individuated by reference to what goes on also outside the individual who has those 
attitudes. To have an attitude with a wide content is thus to have a mental property that is 
not necessarily shared by such doppelgangers. In short, Descriptivism and Referentialism 
in the philosophy of language have traditionally been accompanied by Semantic 
Internalism and Semantic Externalism respectively in the philosophy of mind.
I think it is fair to say that the philosophical community, almost without exception, 
was taken in by the arguments brought forward in support of Referentialism and Semantic 
Externalism - indeed to such an extent that those doctrines nowadays rank as the received 
view. But a worry has persisted, namely that of reconciling Semantic Externalism with the 
kind of Privileged Access that we all seem to have to the semantic and intentional 
properties of our own occurrent mental states. How can it be that we all seem to know in a 
special authoritative and non-empirical way what it is we mean when we utter certain 
sentences, or what we believe when we sincerely and on reflection assent to them, when 
what determines what we thus mean or believe pertains to external facts about which we 
have no special authoritative or non-empirical knowledge? This is not just an unpleasant 
consequence of Semantic Externalism which its proponents nevertheless may learn to live 
with. It alludes to deep underlying difficulties. If we did not have Privileged Access to a 
substantial class of semantic and mental contents, then there would be no asymmetry 
between the way we know of our own mental life and the way we know of others' mental 
life. We would, for instance, have to produce grounds provided from our own sayings and 
doings in order to warrant self-ascriptions of basic mental states. In a nutshell, the 
challenge is to accommodate the Semantic Externalist insights that semantic and mental 
contents are individuated, at least in part, by facts external to the individual, yet not 
compromise the Semantic Internalist account of how we can have Privileged Access to 
these contents as if they were individuated by facts internal to the individual. That sounds 
impossible and I think it is. More precisely, if Semantic Externalism is fuelled by 
Referentialism such that mental content is singular, then it is more than hard to see how we 
could possibly have Privileged Access to mental content given that we have no Privileged 
Access to the objects and properties of which singular content is constituted. Once we get 
clear on the semantics which facilitate the expression of such thoughts, this should come as 
no surprise. What Privileged Access is concerned with are only those conditions that we 
associate with an expression such that an object is the referent of that expression if and only
if it meets those conditions. Working under the assumption that if we have a reductio of 
Compatibilism, i.e. the claim that Semantic Externalism is compatible with Privileged 
Access, then we also have a reductio of Semantic Externalism, there has been no shortage 
of ingenious attempts to prove how the Incompatibilist Arguments fail in their intent. But 
hardly any Semantic Externalists have undertaken to meet the more positive challenge of 
actually showing in what the reconciliation could possibly consist. Even though I have no 
knock-down argument that the challenge could not possibly be met, I suspect the prospects 
look less than good and therefore that much energy has been spent in vain.
Instead I propose to discard the assumption that Semantic Externalism - the view 
that mental content is wide - is underpinned by Referentialism - the view that propositional 
content is singular. What the arguments against Descriptivism and Semantic Internalism 
show is not that reference could not possibly go by associated conditions, but rather how 
those conditions should be spelled out. In particular, those ai'guments highlight that not all 
of these conditions could be of a purely descriptive kind, but must ensure that reference is 
also constrained by e.g. appropriate causal connections. What I thus propound is a 
semantics for referring expressions which incorporates Referentialist tenets into a 
Descriptivist framework. It is a hybrid view according to which mental content is bifurcated 
into a narrow and a wide component. This hybrid semantics accommodates the chief 
virtues of both positions while also eschewing their main vices. It concedes with the 
Semantic Externalist that the identity of at least some of our cognitive attitudes depends on 
circumstances in our external, physical or social environment, but it also embraces narrow 
content in one sense of this notion, and so does not assign the kind of prominence to wide 
content that the Semantic Externalist had hoped for. In particular, it gives up on singular 
content and so surrenders the idea that objects and properties themselves are somehow pai*t 
of content. Descriptive content with certain built-in external constraints is all the content 
we need. Unlike traditional Semantic Externalism, this hybrid view is not married to 
Referentialism, and so it paves the way for Compatibilism; or so I shall argue. It can both
be true that meaning is in the mind in the sense of being subject to Privileged Access, while 
also true that meaning is not in the mind in the sense of not necessarily being shared by 
doppelgangers. In short, the kind o f meaning we have in mind determines how the world 
determines the kind o f meaning we do not have in mind. This is the guiding thought. The 
mind associates with a referring expression a set of descriptive as well as non-descriptive 
conditions such that an object is picked out by that expression if and only if it uniquely 
satisfies those conditions. Knowledge of such conditions is necessary and sufficient for 
understanding that expression and is accessible just by introspective reflection. 
Nevertheless, given that some of these conditions involve reference to external 
circumstances, it may well happen that certain mental states have wide content. I shall 
proceed as follows.
In Chapter 11 start off by setting up the basic problem of Incompatibilism. First of 
all, the case for Semantic Externalism is presented. As is familiar, this view is at least in its 
natural kind variant strongly supported by the so-called Twin-Earth Argument first 
advanced by Putnam. Secondly, the case for Privileged Access is presented. This 
phenomenon mirrors an asymmetry in psychological discourse between first-person and 
third-person ascriptions. A competent speaker is authoritative with respect to the contents 
of his own occurrent mental states. In the normal run of things, he sincerely and reflectively 
judges that he is in some basic mental state if and only if he is. Thirdly, a prima facie  case 
for the incompatibility of Semantic Externalism and Privileged Access is discussed. A 
prominent proposal, due to Burge, is found to fall short of a satisfactory response to this 
initial difficulty. Fourthly, what has come to be known as the MC-form, first brought 
forward by McKinsey, is found to pose a serious threat to Compatibilism: I have mental 
property M; if I have mental property M, then I meet external condition C; so, I meet 
external condition C. The first premise is a priori knowable by Privileged Access, and the 
second premise is a conceptual truth according to Semantic Externalism, and so is a priori 
knowable. Hence, the conclusion is a priori knowable. But that is unbelievable given that C
embraces ordinary empirical truths, so something must give way. As Boghossian has 
pointed out, the second premise depends upon a kind of Semantic Externalism which is 
insufficiently supported by the initial Twin Earth Argument, and so a crucial distinction 
between Weak and Strong Semantic Externalism must be born in mind. What the Twin 
Earth Argument shows is that certain contents are individuated by reference to external 
conditions, but what the MC-form requires is that the existence of those contents depends 
upon the obtaining of those conditions.
In Chapter II I begin by showing the intimate connections between Semantic 
Internalism and Descriptivism, and Semantic Externalism and Referentialism. It is 
commonplace that whichever view one takes on the individuation of semantic content will 
have implications for the view one takes on the individuation of mental content. I then turn 
to the anti-Descriptivist, Modal Argument initially due to Kiipke. The Twin Earth 
Argument presupposes that natural kind terms function in much the same way as ordinaiy 
proper names, and that these are purely Referential expressions, i.e. rigid designators 
without descriptive content. What the Modal Argument purports to show is that since 
referring expressions are modally rigid and definite descriptions modally flexible, the 
propositional contribution of the former cannot be identical to that of the latter. If two 
expressions have the same content, then by Leibniz Law, they must have the same content- 
individuating properties, but referring terms and definite descriptions have distinct modal 
properties, so their content must differ. The Modal Argument thus presupposes that modal 
properties are relevant content-individuating properties. Indeed it is often assumed by the 
Referentialist that if a referring expression is a non-empty rigid designator, then sentences 
containing it will only express singular propositions. The Descriptivist could, however, 
reject this assumption. Although prevalent intuitions tell us that referring expressions must 
be modally rigid, there is no straightforward entailment that they must also lack descriptive 
content. It is only if referring expressions are purely Referential that sentences containing 
them must have singular truth-conditions. So, rigidity is one thing, Referentiality another.
7This paves the way for a response to the Modal Argument. Either the Descriptivist accepts 
the hidden premise that any two referring expressions differ in descriptive content if they 
differ in modal properties; in which case he must rigidify the definite descriptions which 
confer descriptive content on the referring expression. Or the Descriptivist simply rejects 
that premise on the grounds that descriptive content is a cognitive notion, individuated not 
by its modal properties, but by its intentional properties. The upshot is that no convincing 
case has been made that referring expressions lack descriptive content.
In Chapter III I present an argument - the Intentional Argument - originally due to 
Frege against Referentialism. Where the Modal Aigument tried to show that two referring 
expressions differ in descriptive content if and only if they aie not intersubstitutable salva 
veritate in modal contexts, the Intentional Argument aims to show that two referring 
expressions differ in descriptive content if and only if they are not intersubstitutable salva 
veritate in intentional contexts. In its strongest form, the Argument is a paradox about 
belief. If Referentialism is right that the meaning of an expression is exhausted by its 
reference, then two expressions should have the same meaning if and only if they have the 
same reference. That is, if 'a = b' is true, then 'a' and 'b' should have the same meaning, and 
so everywhere be intersubstitutable without change in tmth-value. This, however, jars with 
our firm intuition that often 'S believes that a is a' is true, while 'S believes that a is b' is 
false. The Intentional Argument also contrasts with the Twin Earth Argument. Where the 
latter aims to show that belief can change if the world changes even though the way the 
world appears remains fixed, the former aims to show that belief can change if the way the 
world appears changes even though the world remains fixed. I discuss a response to the 
Intentional Argument based on considerations about conversational implicatures, and show 
how the Argument can be strengthened in various ways. An interesting result is that if one 
holds, as the Referentialist does, that the sole propositional contents of beliefs and other 
attitudes are singular propositions, then one is committed to ascribing contradictory beliefs 
even to idealised speakers unless those contents are rendered epistemically opaque in the
sense of not having reflective access to their logical properties. What the Intentional 
Argument shows, if good, is that referring expressions occurring inside the scope of an 
intentional operator must have truth-conditionally relevant descriptive content. But since I 
also hold that referring expressions occurring outside the scope of intentional operators 
have such content, I close the Chapter by some considerations that further support this 
stronger view.
After having resisted the arguments against Descriptivism and sustained the 
ai'guments against Referentialism, I conclude in Chapter IV that we should settle for Causal 
Rigidified Descriptivism. I spend some time explicating how rigidification devices work. In 
particular, I defend an indexical analysis to the effect that 'actually' behaves in much the 
same way that ordinary indexicals like T, 'here' and 'now' do. This analysis emphasises the 
two ways in which a possible world can be conceived of. We can think of a world as a way 
the actual world might have turned out, or given the way the actual world has turned out, 
we can think of a world as counterfactual. This distinction between a possible context of 
utterance and a circumstance of evaluation is crucial to understanding the machinery of 
Two-Dimensionalism - a recently much discussed framework that originates in Davies, 
Evans, Kaplan and Stalnaker. Two-Dimensionalism offers a neat illustration of the two 
views on offer. Speaking in the actual world, the singular content of a referring expression 
can be represented as a function from a world taken as counterfactual to a referent of that 
expression at that world. But knowledge of such a function is clearly a posteriori since one 
must know the relevant empirical facts about the world in which one is speaking. If 
understanding a referring expression requires grasp of its singular content, then 
understanding must therefore be an a posteriori matter. If, on the other hand, understanding 
requires grasp of descriptive content, then understanding comes out as a priori. The 
descriptive content of a referring expression can be represented as a function from a world 
taken as actual to a referent of that expression at that world. But since knowledge of such a 
function is independent of the world in which one is speaking, knowledge of descriptive
content is an a priori matter. In short, the descriptive content o f a referring expression can 
be represented as a function from the world o f the context to the singular content expressed 
in that context which in turn can be represented as a function from  a counterfactual 
possible world to a referent o f that expression at that possible world in that context. I end 
the Chapter by outlining how Two-Dimensionalism offers a neat explanation of the 
Kripkean possibilities of a posteriori necessities and a priori contingencies.
In Chapter V I return to the problems about Incompatibilism set out in Chapter 1. 
But first I consider the consequences of my view for the distinction between wide and 
narrow content. I argue that although the Twin Earth Argument has convinced us that some 
mental properties fail to be shared by doppelgangers, other mental properties will be 
narrow in an appropriate sense. My doppelganger and I can both believe that the watery 
stuff is wet, but only I can believe that water is wet, and only he can believe that twin-water 
is wet. Water and twin-water, remember, have distinct micro-structures, but share all their 
surface, watery properties: being the clear, colourless liquid that falls from the sky, 
quenches thirst, and so on. This reflects the fact that we can share beliefs with the same 
purely descriptive content. Such descriptive content is context-independent in the sense that 
it is shared by doppelgangers across different contexts: one can entertain the thought that 
the watery stuff is wet on Earth and on Twin Earth. Descriptive content, however, is not 
world-independent: there may be far-fetched possible worlds with deviant laws of nature in 
which doppelgangers fail to share even purely descriptive content. But just as my 
doppelganger and I cannot share certain beliefs with the same singular content, we cannot 
share certain beliefs with causally constrained descriptive content. I believe that the watery 
stuff of my acquaintance is wet, but my doppelganger believes that the watery stuff of. his 
acquaintance is wet. Wide content is thus context-dependent in the sense that it may fail to 
be shared by doppelgangers across different contexts. After having characterised narrow 
content as what doppelgangers within the same possible world have in common, I consider 
some objections to narrow content. The Semantic Externalist may try to run the Twin Earth
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Argument on the watery predicates - 'liquid', 'wet', 'thirst-quenching', etc. - to show that 
even my thoughts about the watery stuff have wide content. In response, I suggest the 
assumption that these predicates have a natural kind use be rejected. E.g. 'being thirst- 
quenching' has a superficial use according to which, roughly speaking, any substance is 
thirst-quenching if and only if it plays functional role and elicits a certain
phenomenal feel upon consumption. The second strategy the Semantic Externalist may opt 
for is to show that the watery predicates are subject to Burge-style Arguments which, if 
cogent, apply right across the board. I suggest the same response as with the Twin Earth 
Argument. What these Arguments highlight is not that associated properties fail to mediate 
reference. On the contrary, they emphasise which properties mediate reference: 'water' 
refers to the actual watery stuff of my acquaintance which goes under the name 'water' in 
my speech community. The Social Semantic Externalist Arguments tell us that we often use 
expressions deferentially. The upshot is that although the Semantic Externalist Arguments 
have convinced us that some mental content is wide, that should not lead us into thinking 
that no mental content is narrow. Finally, I return to the MC-form. What one has Privileged 
Access to is the descriptive content commonly associated with a referring expression. It 
takes no empirical investigation to assure oneself that if water exists, then water is the 
watery stuff. Moreover, since we learn from the Twin Earth thought experiment that water 
is the watery stuff of our acquaintance, we can come to know just by conceptual reflection 
that water is the watery stuff of our acquaintance. So, we can know a priori that we 
entertain certain thoughts with wide content. Importantly, whereas both singular content 
and causally constrained descriptive content are wide in the weak sense of being externally 
individuated, only the latter is object-independent content. On Dry Earth, where nothing 
uniquely has the watery properties, utterances of sentences containing 'water' can still be 
assigned causally constrained descriptive truth-conditions. Not so for singular content. 
Utterances of such sentences do not have singular truth-conditions on Dry Earth. Thus if 
the Semantic Externalist sticks to Referentialism, then the second premise in the MC-form
11
is indeed a priori true, but the first premise comes out as a posteriori. The conjunction of 
Semantic Externalism and Referentialism is therefore doomed to struggle with 
Incompatibilism. If, on the other hand. Semantic Externalism is divorced from 
Referentialism, as I recommend, then the first premise is a priori knowable, but the second 
premise is false. Causal Rigidified Descriptivism issues in a kind of Weak Semantic 
Externalism according to which externally individuated, but object-independent, content is 
subject to Privileged Access. So, the MC-form is blocked and Compatibilism is vindicated. 
This, I conjecture, should be the lesson that Twin Eaith has taught us.
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Chapter 1. Incompatibilism
1.1. Semantic Externalism
Semantic Externalism is, in Burge's [1982, p. 149] words, the claim that the "...identity of 
one's mental contents, states, and events is not independent of the nature of one's physical 
and social environment". Or, as Putnam [1996, p. 7] put it, it is a denial of the thesis that 
intentional states such as beliefs and desires, "...do not presuppose the existence of anything 
external to the agent who possesses such states." Semantic Externalism can thus be 
minimally characterised as the thesis that at least certain contents of intentional states fail to 
supervene on intrinsic, physical properties of individuals. Accordingly, it is possible for 
two individuals to be exactly alike in all intrinsic, physical respects yet believe or desire 
different things. Externalist content, or wide content, as I shall call it, is content not shared 
by intrinsic, physical duplicates, or doppelgangers, as we might say. For doppelgangers 
differ only in their relational properties, in how they are related to their physical or social 
environment. Wide content depends instead, at least partly, for its individuation on the 
nature of an individual's physical or social environment in the sense that had that individual 
been in a different physical or social environment, she would have had beliefs and desires 
with a different content. And if we suppose that intentional states aie individuated by their 
contents, the individual would also have had different beliefs and desires. Internalist 
content, or narrow  content, as I shall call it, is, on the other hand, content that does 
supervene on intrinsic, physical properties of individuals such that no matter which 
physical or social environment doppelgangers are embedded in, they will necessarily be in 
the same narrow content intentional states.^
 ^ I assume that both the Semantic Internalist and the Semantic Externalist believe in psycho-physical 
supervenience such that no two individuals can differ mentally without there being some physical difference, 
whether between those individuals themselves, as the former has it, or between those individuals or their
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1.2. The Twin Earth Argument
As is familiar. Semantic Externalism derives credibility from a type of thought experiment 
originally due to Putnam [1996]. One type of experiment goes like this: let Twin Earth be a 
remote planet in the actual world W a just like Earth in every respect except there is no 
water, just a qualitatively indistinguishable substance with the abbreviated micro-structure 
XYZ. Call this substance 'twin-water'. Twin-water has all the superficial, manifest 
properties that water has. It is a clear, colourless, tasteless, potable liquid that fills the lakes, 
flows in rivers and out of taps, falls from the sky, supports life, etc. Although water and 
twin-water are different substances, they are both, in short, watery stuff. Furthermore, my 
doppelganger, i.e. my internal physical duplicate, on Twin Earth is stipulated to be just as 
ignorant about chemistry as I am on Eaith. The claim is then that our respective utterances 
of sentence-types containing 'water' have different semantic properties. On Earth my tokens 
will refer to H2 O, whereas on Twin Earth, my doppelganger's tokens will refer to XYZ. On 
the assumption that meaning determines extension, so that a difference in extension suffices 
for a difference in meaning, my tokens will thus mean water while my doppelganger's 
tokens will mean twin-water. But since we share all intrinsic mental properties - e.g. we 
have the same stereotypical beliefs about the surface properties of water - it follows that 
what we have in mind cannot determine what we mean by utterances of sentences 
containing 'water'.^
external environments, as the latter has it. Although it is commonplace to include physical and, at times, 
functional properties in the supervenience base, there is clearly an issue about whether non-physical 
properties could go into the base. Thus if  one feels no inclination towards physicalism, then one would no 
doubt wish to include non-supervenient non-physical properties in the base or, alternatively, deny 
supervenience altogether. I shall henceforth not consider such views.
^ In setting up the thought experiment it is thus assumed that doppelgangers have certain content-bearing 
mental states in common like the belief that something is a wet liquid. A thorough-going Semantic Externalist 
would insist that this assumption is more o f a dialectical point than a real concession to the Semantic
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Moreover the lesson that certain semantic properties are relational carries over to 
the corresponding intentional properties. That is, although Putnam’s parable focused 
initially on semantic content purporting to shov7 that ""meanings" just ain't in the head" 
[1996, p. 13], Burge [1979] was quick to point out the obvious implications for mental 
content. If, as we suppose, we can normally express the content of our belief that water is 
wet by the sentence 'water is wet', then the content of that belief will be fixed by the 
meaning of that sentence - the sentence which says what the belief is about. Hence, if the 
meaning of that sentence is individuated by external facts, then so will the content 
expressible by means of it. If we moreover suppose that it is partly the content of the belief 
that water is wet that makes it the belief it is, then if that content is individuated by external 
facts, then so will be the belief itself. So, not only do we have different De Re propositional 
attitudes - I believe of water that it is wet whereas my doppelganger believes of twin-water 
that it is wet - we also have different De Dicto attitudes - 1 believe that water is wet whereas 
my doppelganger believes that twin-water is wet. Both assumptions are at least prima facie 
plausible. Perhaps some thoughts are linguistically inexpressible - to the extent that animals 
have thoughts then they presumably are - but for competent speakers most if not all 
thoughts do seem to be in principle expressible in language. It is also plausible that beliefs 
are individuated, at least in part, by the truth-conditions of their content-clauses. If content 
is truth-conditional, then, if the contents of two beliefs are different, then the two beliefs 
will also be different.^ So, my doppelganger and I will be in different wide content mental 
states, since the contents of our beliefs will depend upon the different causal relations that
Internalist: once it has been shown that our tokens o f 'water' have different semantic properties, the same line 
o f reasoning can be used to show that our tokens o f 'wet', 'liquid', etc., also have different semantic properties. 
Wide content mental properties thus fail to supervene on intrinsic physical and, for the sake o f argument, 
narrow content mental properties. I shall evaluate the scope o f the Twin Earth Argument in Sec. 5.3.
 ^ I shall not discuss this assumption here, but simply take it for granted. It will certainly be true that if  the 
semantics for belief ascriptions is compositional, then if  two De Dicto belief ascriptions have different truth- 
conditional contents, then the whole ascriptions will also have different truth-conditions.
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we, or our fellow-speakers, bear to our respective external environments. So, if content is 
wide, then the property of having an attitude with that content cannot be intrinsic. In sum, 
with Burge's words [1996, p. 343], the thought experiments'
"common strategy is to hold constant the history of the person's bodily motion, 
surface stimulations, and internal chemistry. Then, by varying the environment with 
which the person interacts while still holding constant the moleculai* effects on the 
person's body, one can show that some of the person's thoughts vary. The upshot is 
that which thoughts one has [...] is dependent on relations one bears to one's 
environment."
Let me illustrate. Suppose that I on Earth reach out for a cup of water to quench my 
thirst. I have a belief that I would express by saying 'water is thirst-quenching'. Suppose 
also that my doppelganger on Twin Earth reaches out for a cup to quench his thirst. He also 
has a belief he would express by using the sentence-type 'water is thirst-quenching'. It is 
still true that chemistry is unknown to us and that we share a set of stereotypical beliefs 
about the superficial properties of water. Everything is the same except that I drink H2 O, 
whereas my doppelganger drinks XYZ. Now, my utterance on Earth of 'water is thirst- 
quenching' is true iff water, i.e. H2 O, is thirst-quenching, whereas my doppelganger's 
utterance is true iff twin-water, i.e. XYZ, is thirst-quenching. Our respective tokens of the 
same sentence-type have different truth-conditions. But if our utterances have different 
truth-conditions, then they must also express different contents if we think content is 
individuated by its truth-conditions. It will of course also be tme that different De Re belief 
ascriptions are true of us: I believe of water, i.e. H2 O, that it is thirst-quenching, but my 
doppelganger believes of twin-water, i.e. XYZ, that it is thirst-quenching. A De Re belief is 
trivially a relational property of an individual, because it is individuated by an object other 
than the individual who has it and so involves standing in an appropriate epistemic relation 
to this res. The interesting claim is that also different De Dicto belief ascriptions will be 
true of us - provided again that such ascriptions are individuated by the truth-conditions of
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their content-clauses. My doppelganger and I are in different De Dicto belief states: I 
believe that water is thirst-quenching, whereas my doppelganger believes that twin-water is 
thirst-quenching. For how could my doppelgdnger possibly believe that water is thirst- 
quenching when his environment contains no water for his belief to be about? Moreover, to 
the extent that ascriptions of beliefs containing embedded occurrences of 'water' were 
interpreted as beliefs involving the concept water, my doppelganger's beliefs would all be 
false, but it would surely be more charitable to ascribe to him true beliefs involving the 
concept twin-water. The important point is that even such De Dicto attitudes are relational 
properties of individuals, because the individuating contents are wide. Hence, the Semantic 
Internalist's claim that all mental content supervenes on intrinsic physical properties of 
individuals is false. Were that supervenience claim true, two individuals exactly alike in all 
intrinsic respects would also be exactly alike in all mental respects, i.e. any difference in 
mental properties would entail a difference in intrinsic properties, but we have seen that 
two individuals may differ in mental properties while sharing the same intrinsic properties. 
We can put the Twin Earth Argument like this:
(A) Suppose Twin Earth is a remote planet in W a just like Earth except that XYZ, and not 
H2 O, is the watery stuff, and suppose also that my doppelganger on Twin Earth and I on 
Earth both assent to 'water is wet'.
(B) Then, my utterance of 'water is wet' is true iff H2 O is wet, whereas my doppelganger's 
utterance of 'water is wet' is true iff XYZ is wet.
(C) But given that a difference in truth-conditions entails a difference in content which 
cannot be explained by a difference in intrinsic properties, the content of 'water is wet' is 
wide.
(D) If the content of 'water is wet' is wide, then my belief that water is wet is a relational 
property.
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(E) My belief that water is wet is a relational property.^
Do (A)-(E) refute Semantic Internalism? Not on the face of it. Even Putnam [1996, 
p. 19] admitted that, strictly speaking, all we have is a disjunctive conclusion: either 
content is not narrow or content fails to determine extension. Having found the second 
disjunct unacceptable he concluded that content is wide. The thought seems to be that if 
content determines extension, then if extensions differ, then so must content. But 
extensions do differ, hence so must content. But on the assumption that the content of 
'water’ is given by 'the watery stuff, content does not differ, so either that assumption is 
false or content does not determine extension. To save the assumption, the Semantic 
Internalist could allude to the fact that we already have a range of referring expressions 
whose contents do not determine their extension in a context-independent way. Take 
indexical expressions like T, or descriptions like 'the mayor', which pick out different 
objects when uttered in different contexts. In support, it may be pointed out that since H2 O 
and XYZ equally have all the watery properties, there is also a sense in which our 
respective utterances coincide in truth-conditions: 'water is wet' is tme iff the watery stuff is 
wet. Such truth-conditions are descriptive in that the right-hand side of the bi-conditional 
merely stipulates a descriptive condition under which the sentence on the left-hand side is 
true. In contrast, the truth-conditions given in (B) above - Earthly tokens of 'water is wet' 
are tme iff H 2 O is wet - are singular in that they involve mentioning the particular state of 
affairs under which the sentence is true. Descriptive truth-conditions are narrow as they do 
not supervene on our relational properties, but are contents my doppelganger and I have in
 ^ There is a difficult issue about the ontological implications for belief states: does the Semantic Externalist 
claim that beliefs and other attitudes are not internal mean that they are external to the mind like tables and 
chairs are? I don’t think this has to follow. The Semantic Externalist can maintain that cognitive states are 
located within subjects, indeed being identical to physical states o f subjects, and yet admit that any adequate 
specification o f what it is to be in such states must necessarily advert to circumstances external to the subject. 
What makes my beliefs about water wide is not that they are located where the water is, but that they cannot 
be described without reference to water.
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common. There is no claim that such truth-conditions somehow fall short of constituting a 
coherent notion of content. The content expressed by a token of the sentence-type 'water is 
wet' specifies determinate conditions under which it is true or false, and the fact that in 
different contexts different tokens are true in virtue of different states of affairs does not 
show that somehow those conditions are incoherent or not fine-grained enough; or so the 
thought goes. The Semantic Internalist thus suggests (B) replaced with:
(B*) My utterance of 'water is wet' is true iff the wateiy stuff is wet, and my doppelganger's 
utterance of 'water is wet' is true iff the watery stuff is wet.
There is no difference in truth-conditions, hence no difference in content, which cannot be 
explained by a difference in intrinsic properties. So, if our beliefs are individuated at least 
partially in terms of the content given by the watery predicates, then we both believe that 
water, i.e. the watery stuff, is wet. It is true that different De Re belief ascriptions are true 
of us, but nothing prevents us from sharing the narrow content De Dicto belief that water is 
wet. To presuppose that a difference in the kind of stuff that make our beliefs true entails a 
difference in the contents of our beliefs, is to presuppose that 'water is wet' does not have 
descriptive truth-conditions. So, the Twin Earth Argument does not pose a non-question- 
begging threat to Semantic Internalism.
Nevertheless, this Semantic Internalist response does seem to have counter-intuitive 
consequences. If 'water' simply means the watery stuff, and different kinds of stuff are 
watery within W a, then not only does 'water' pick out different kinds of stuff within Wa, 
water is different kinds of stuff within Wa- With the meaning 'water' has here on Earth, it is 
true to say that on Earth water is H2 O and on Twin Earth XYZ is water. The Semantic 
Internalist may of course bite the bullet and accept these consequences. In support, it could 
be adduced that such a view turned out true for some natural common nouns. The extension 
of 'jade' comprises both jadeite and nephrite, and the extension of 'vitamin' includes a 
variety of distinct nutritious compounds. But widespread intuition has it that manifest 
natural kind terms like 'water', 'gold' or 'aluminium' are different. If water is H2 O on Earth,
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then water is everywhere H2 O. In particular, water is not XYZ on Twin Earth. The stuff on 
Twin Earth is not water, but merely an epistemic counterpart of water: twin-water appears 
to be water in that it shares all the watery properties with water, but due to its distinct 
micro-structure twin-water is not water.
This claim needs support. Why is it impossible that water is XYZ given that water 
is H2 O? Consider what happens when physical science uncovers so-called theoretical 
identifications. Take a macro-physical property like temperature. An object's temperature is 
functionally defined in terms of the causal roles it play in relation to its other properties as 
well as its interaction with objects in proximity: if a lump of iron is heated by a burner, then 
it glows, its magnitude increases, and it melts wax in its vicinity, etc. An object's 
temperature is the property which occupies this causal role, i.e. the property causally 
responsible for this cluster of laws. As a matter of fact, science discovered that in our world 
it is the micro-physical property of gases of having a certain mean molecular energy which 
uniquely fills this role. So, we conclude that temperature is mean molecular energy.^ But 
why not stick to the weaker claim that, as it turns out, temperature and mean molecular 
energy are invariably correlated? Because such identifications enable us to explain why 
certain observed macro-physical regularities hold in terms of underlying micro-physical 
structures given the physical laws and constitution of our world. The thought is that nothing 
short of micro-physical reduction would do the job. The same is presumably true of 
identifications between water and H2 O. We can give reductive explanations of facts about 
water in terms of facts about H2 O, e.g. that the boiling point of water is 100° C at 1 
atmosphere is due to the molecular changes that set in under those conditions. But if a 
number of different micro-physical properties within the same possible world were equally 
good candidates to fill the causal role that water plays in our world, then no such micro­
reduction could be carried out, and so no reductive explanation of observed macro­
properties in terms of underlying micro-properties would be achievable. The fact that such
 ^For an account o f theoretical terms and identifications along these lines see Lewis [1970, 1999c].
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theoretical reductions have been so pervasive in science - think of light and electromagnetic 
radiation or the gene and the DNA molecule - has, I suspect, formed our intuitions about 
Twin Earth cases. Twin Earth aims, as any other thought experiment, to clarify conceptual 
relations by appeal to more or less well-entrenched intuitions. What it puiports to show is 
that our concept of water and our concept of the watery stuff aie distinct since the correct 
way to describe Twin Earth is as a place where something is watery without being water. 
On Twin Earth where the governing laws of physics are identical to those on Earth, it is 
simply wrong to call XYZ 'water' in light of the fact that H2 O is the sole occupier of the 
causal roles that water play on Earth.^ XYZ share with H2 O all the watery properties, true 
enough, but all that means is that XYZ is an epistemic counterpart of water; XYZ is not 
water. What constitutes water is not its surface properties, but its micro-stmcture.
Consider some other possible cases. Suppose that Twin Earth is a far-off planet in 
our galaxy where there is a kind of stuff the inhabitants call 'gold'. It has all the manifest 
properties gold has on Earth: yellow, hard, precious, rare, soft if pure, used in jewellery, 
extracted from fossils in mines, melting point 1063° C, and so on. Now suppose I were to 
travel to Twin Earth in a space-ship and came across this stuff. Would it be correct to call it 
'gold'? Surely not. Gold is all and only stuff that occupies the causal role that gold plays on 
Earth: Au as it turns out. The stuff on Twin Earth is an epistemic counterpart of gold, twin- 
gold, or better, fool's gold. Or suppose these course of events took place on Earth. By a 
stroke of genius, a corrupt scientist invents a chemically complicated compound which 
passes whatever test best science deploys to determine whether something is gold. Later the 
compound is distributed with big profit throughout criminal circles as 'stolen gold'. 
Although the compound is not found naturally, it is next to an epistemic counterpart of 
gold. But it is not gold. Once the fraud is revealed, it looses its market value. Or suppose
 ^ Bear in mind that XYZ was supposed to be an abbreviation for a chemical compound radically different 
from H 2 O. It is not ruled out that isotopes o f water, e.g. D 2 O, or 'impure' water o f some kind may fall within 
the extension o f 'water'.
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that an anthropologist discovers a civilised tribe which uses a white, fine-grained, water- 
soluble stuff extractable from sea-water and with the same nutritious effects that we use 
common salt. It tastes of salt, is called 'salt', and is in every way indistinguishable from salt 
yet turns out not to be NaCl at all. Although this stuff plays the functional role salt plays in 
our lives, it is cleaily not common salt.
On this background, it is easier to appreciate what is amiss with the descriptive 
truth-conditions in:
(B"*') My utterance of 'water is wet' is true iff the watery stuff is wet, and my doppelganger's 
utterance of 'water is wet' is true iff the watery stuff is wet.
Importantly, the claim is not that only the singular tmth-conditions in:
(B) My utterance of 'water is wet' is true iff H2 O is wet, and my doppelganger’s utterance of 
'water is wet' is true iff XYZ is wet,
gets things right with respect to Earth. Water is H2 O because H2 O fills the watery role on 
Earth. The problem arises only on Twin Earth. According to QB*), my utterance of 'water is 
wet' is true at Twin Earth because, on Twin Earth, the watery stuff is wet.^ Following (B*), 
'water' picks out whatever 'the watery stuff picks out, regardless of its micro-structure. But 
in light of those considerations just mentioned, it is incorrect to call the watery stuff on 
Twin Earth 'water'. There is no water there, and so it is false that Earthly tokens of 'water is 
wet' are true at Twin Earth. And, the Semantic Externalist continues, only (B) can 
accommodate this fact. The condition under which my tokens of 'water is wef are true at 
Twin Earth is that the wateiy stuff on Eaith, i.e. H2 O, is wet. And since that condition does 
not obtain on Twin Earth, my tokens are false at Twin Eaith.
But if Earthly and Twin Eai'thly tokens of sentences containing 'water' have singular 
truth-conditions, as in (B), then what my doppelganger and I mean by 'water' is thus not 
solely a function of our shared internal make-up, but depend on unknown different facts
 ^ Let me stress that by saying that a sentence is true a t Twin Earth I mean that the proposition it expresses on 
Earth is true at Twin Earth, and not that it would express a true proposition were it uttered on Twin Earth.
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about our physical environments. In pai'ticular, what I mean by 'water' depends on which 
kind of physical stuff occupies the causal role that water plays. And if semantic content is 
wide, then so is mental content: I have the concept water so I can entertain thoughts 
involving that concept, whereas my doppelganger who has the concept twin-water can 
entertain thoughts involving that concept.
This completes the Twin Earth Argument. There is a lot to say and I shall come 
back to the Argument in Chapter 2, 4 and 5, but this will suffice for present purposes. Let 
me now turn to the Privileged Access Thesis.
1.3. Privileged Access
Privileged Access is the thesis that a competent thinker S can have a priori knowledge of 
the intentional properties of the contents of his own thoughts. By a priori knowledge I mean 
knowledge arrived at introspectively, hence independently of any empirical enquiry into the 
thinker's external environment.^ S need not consult his physical or social surroundings by 
deploying his perceptual apparatus in order to determine the contents of his own cognitive 
attitudes. Other speakers, in contrast, are left with no choice but to attain adequate 
empirical knowledge of S's linguistic and physical behaviour if they wish to know of such 
contents. S knows what he thinks or feels before he speaks or acts, and even if he could 
invoke such behavioural evidence, there is hardly ever any reason to. S has a Privileged 
Access to his own psychology that other speakers lack. They always have to appeal to such 
evidence by means of observation or testimony to back up their third-person ascriptions.
 ^ I shall henceforth use 'a priori' to characterise the kind o f knowledge involved in Privileged Access, One 
may prefer the label 'non-empirical' to distinguish it from a priori knowledge o f non-empirical subject- 
matters, e.g. knowledge o f mathematics and logic. I seems to me, however, that whether a piece o f knowledge 
is a priori or not, is a question about the way in which it is arrived at, and not what it is knowledge of. 
Another option is to call knowledge a priori only if one’s justification does not derive from 'outer' perceptual 
experience or from 'inner' awareness o f one's mental life.
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Knowledge of one's own inner goings-on is accessible in a special first-person manner, 
whereas knowledge of others' mental life is constrained by whatever epistemic standards 
govern knowledge in general. This issues in an asymmetry in ordinary psychological 
discourse between first-person and third-person utterances. The latter are characterised by 
avowals which are claims about, or expressions of, one's own occurrent mental or 
sensational states. One may distinguish between phenomenal avowals like 'I have a 
headache' or 'I feel great today' and attitudinal avowals like 'I hope the weather stays dry' or 
'I reckon that apples are wholesome'.^ Both have three characteristic marks:
They are received as Authoritative, that is, if a speaker S understands the claim that 
he is F, where F is some occurrent mental state, and is sincere in making it about himself, 
then there is a strong prima facie case that S is not wrong about him being F. Indeed if S's 
claim is of the phenomenal kind, it is hard to see how the combination of conceptual 
competence and honesty could fail to guaiantee the truth of his self-ascription. If S avowed 
'I am tired' and there was no reason to doubt his proficiency or sincerity, it would normally 
be inappropriate to question the correctness of his utterance. Not so for attitudinal avowals. 
First of all, there are second-order beliefs in which one engages in interpretation of one's 
first-order attitudes and, as is well-known from the Freudian literature, in such cases one 
may be radically mistaken about one's own intentional life. But there are also basic 
attitudinal cases which do not involve self-deception or other illusions. If S sincerely and 
understandingly uttered I believe that water quenches thirst’, then S has thereby provided a 
third-person with a reason for thinking that S presently believes that water is thirst- 
quenching. Of course, the truth of S's avowal is answerable to future behaviour: if S refused 
to drink water if thirsty and presented with water, then, other things being equal, a third- 
person S* would make better sense of S's overall psychology if he did not take S's avowal 
at face value, indeed such behaviour would be a reason not to. Perhaps something similar 
could happen with certain phenomenal avowals. It is conceivable that S subsequently
9 Cf. Wright [1991, 1998].
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discovers that on a given occasion he has mistaken, say, an itch for a tickle without being 
insincere or conceptually incompetent. Anyway, the point is that the mere defeasibility of 
most, if not all, avowals provides no reason to think that the presumption in favour of their 
tiTithfulness is actually defeated. Even if both first- and third-person ascriptions are fallible, 
only avowals are accredited with authority. The fact that S is sincere and apprehends the 
relevant concepts provides no reason for thinking that his ascription of a phenomenal or 
attitudinal state to someone else is tme, unless he can produce some evidence originating 
from that speaker's behaviour. For an observer S* to have a reason to believe that S is 
sincere and understands his avowals is eo ipso to have a reason to believe S's avowals, but 
S*'s competence and sincerity is no reason to believe her corresponding third-personal 
claim, absent additional information concerning S's sayings and doings.
The second characteristic concerns the Non-inferential nature of avowals. A speaker 
S may justifiably assert that he is in some basic mental state F without being required to 
adduce grounds to support his assertion. Unlike third-person ascriptions, it would ordinarily 
be misplaced to demand of S evidence in support of his claim that he is F. Suppose S 
sincerely and competently avows Tve a sore throat' in the presence of an observer S* who 
later reports to another speaker S**'S has a sore throat'. Then suppose S** replies: 'How do 
you know?' We are inclined to think that this question is appropriate only if addressed to 
S*. S knows directly by introspection how things presently are with him and that is why 
there is no need for him to back up his self-ascriptions of basic mental states. S does not 
infer from his own verbal and physical behaviour that he is F. Even in cases in which such 
evidence is available, he does not consult it - he need only reflectively attend to his state F. 
Other speakers, however, have no such immediate access to S's basic mental states, but 
must rely on his sayings and doings as their inferential justifying basis.
The third and last distinctive mark is the Transparency of the objects of avowals. A 
basic mental state F is salient to the speaker who has it. This means that if, in normal 
circumstances, F occurs in S, then it would seem to be necessary that S knows that F
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occurs. In similai' circumstances, if F does not occur, then it cannot seem to S in every way 
as if  F occurs. Although not infallible. S's 'inner sense' is not hostage to the kind of 
perceptual illusions that afflict his 'outer sense', since its subject-matter does not exhibit the 
same kind of appearance-reality distinction. Unless S suffered from some cognitive or other 
disabling malfunction, it would be very odd for a basic state like a headache or a desire for 
chocolate to occur in S without S being aware of its presence and disposed to give the 
thought that he is in such a state expression. In the normal run of things, it is hard to see in 
what S's ignorance of the truth-values of his own self-ascriptions could consist. Not so for 
other speakers. It is possible for to know all relevant facts about S's recent behaviour yet 
be ignorant of features of his basic psychology. S's beliefs and desires are not salient to 
anyone but S.
The foregoing features - Authority, Non-inferentiality and Transpaiency - should be 
commonplace. There is, however, also a stronger and less uncontroversial sense in which 
S's phenomenal and intentional mental contents are transparently available to him. 
According to this line of reasoning, it is also a consequence of Privileged Access to such 
contents that a competent speaker S knows introspectively, hence a priori, whether any two 
intentional contents towards which he has a cognitive attitude are the same or different. 
Why is that? Well, for S to have a priori knowledge of an occurrent belief is not merely to 
know that he has a certain belief - it is also to know which belief that is. It involves a priori 
knowledge of what it is to have a belief with the content p, e.g. how that belief is 
inferentially related to other beliefs, how having it disposes him to behave in various ways 
given various desires and physical stimuli, etc. But to have such knowledge must 
presuppose an ability to introspectively discriminate between p and other contents. If that 
were not so, it would be impossible for S to reflectively determine the inferential and 
behavioural consequences of his belief that p. If a speaker S thus believes that p and also 
believes that p '\  and p and p* aie the same mental contents, then S must know a priori that 
they are the same contents, and so must know a priori that his belief that p and his belief
26
that p* are identical, given our assumption about individuation of beliefs by their contents. 
Conversely, if S believes that p and also believes that q, and p and q are different mental 
contents, then S must know a priori that they are different contents, and so must know a 
priori that his beliefs are different. In this sense, mental content is E pistem ica lly  
Transparent, This idea was captured by Dummett [1978, p. 131], cf. also [1973, p. 95], 
[1991, 126]:
"It is an undeniable feature of the notion of meaning - obscure as that notion is - that 
meaning is transparent in the sense that, if someone attaches a meaning to each of 
two words, he must know whether these meanings are the same."
Although Dummett speaks of meaning and not mental content, the point is the same. Had 
meaning not been transparent in this sense, it would be possible for S to believe that p and 
to believe that p*, yet profess ignorance as to whether he believes the same or different 
things. But since we are inclined to think that S must know a priori whether he believes the 
same or different things, if he is fully attentive and conceptually competent, it does seem 
plausible that meaning should be Epistemically Transpaient; or so the thought goes. It is, to 
repeat, important not to lump these two senses of transparency together. It is clearly 
possible to hold that content p is transparent in the weak sense that, very roughly, if p 
occurs, then S believes that p occurs, without it being transparent in the stronger sense that 
S is able to tell whether p is identical to, or distinct from, some other content q that S 
grasps.
A speaker S thus standardly credits himself with a Non-inferential Authority as 
regards the Transparent contents of his own mind, and, importantly, this authority issues in 
a priori knowledge of those contents. In contrast, a third-person S* cannot justifiably assert 
that S is in a mental state without producing grounds provided by inference from S's 
linguistic or physical behaviour. Roughly speaking, we may sum up Authority by saying 
that if S judges that S has p, then S has p, and Transparency by saying that if S has p, then
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S judges that S has p, where p is some occurrent mental state. So, S has p iff S judges that S 
has p. Clearly, as formulated this bi-conditional calls for ceteris paribus clauses given the 
various ways in which knowledge of our own mind is defeasible. But if we could write 
down the relevant clauses - clauses ruling out self-deception, inattention, incompetence and 
what not - then it should come out a priori. It is no empirical discovery that the 
epistemology of mental self- and other-ascriptions reflect asymmetries between the way I 
know my own mental life and the way I know others’ mental life. As regards the latter, a 
corresponding bi-conditional is not even close to being true. In any case, it is illustrative of 
what is to come. 10
1.4. Incompatibilism
The foregoing provides sufficient background for setting up at least a prima facie  case 
against Compatibilism, i.e. the view that Semantic Externalism and Privileged Access are 
consistent doctrines. It is easy to see the worry. How can we be authoritative about the 
contents of our own minds if, as Semantic Externalism tells us, those contents depend for 
their individuation on external circumstances that we have no special authority about, or 
may even lack knowledge of? In other words, how can we have Privileged Access to what
A different and a very deep philosophical problem is how to explain what makes it the case that avowals 
exhibit Privileged Access, i.e. what it is in virtue o f which each one o f us enjoys this kind of privilege. I shall 
not try to sketch such an account here; it suffices for my purposes to note the existence of an asymmetry. The 
most promising account that I know o f is Wright's response-dependence analysis: S's psychological self­
ascriptions are in the best cases constitutive o f their subject-matter; see his [1991, 1998]. An alternative 
approach is to opt for projectivism: avowals are not truth-apt assertions that purport to represent inner reality, 
but simply expressions o f one's psychology. The difficulty that any satisfactory analysis must face is to find 
middle ground between the Cartesian who views the truth-conferring mental states o f affairs as occurrences in 
a private arena exclusively accessible to the speaker and constitutively unrelated to any outer goings-on, and 
the Rylean who, in reaction to the misconceived Cartesian account, overplays the role that public behaviour 
plays in constituting mental states, and thereby jeopardises not just our intuition that at least phenomenal 
states like pains are genuine mental occurrences, but also the very thesis o f Privileged Access.
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our thoughts are about if what makes it true that our thoughts are about what they are about 
resides in external facts that we have no Privileged Access to? Take our Twin Earth story. 
The fact that on Earth my tokens of sentences containing 'water' express water thoughts is 
pai'tially due to certain causal relations that I bear to my physical environment on Earth. 
Had I been on Twin Eaith, my tokens of the same type of sentences would have expressed 
twin-water thoughts due to the different causal relations I would have borne to my physical 
environment on Twin Earth. What goes on inside me thus falls short of fully fixing such 
thoughts. Yet it is what goes on inside me that I can access just by introspective reflection; 
the fact that I sustain particulai' causal relations does not seem reflectively available. So, the 
worry is how I could fully know just by introspection which wide content thoughts I am 
entertaining? It is all the same to me from the inside, as it were, whether I think water 
thoughts or twin-water thoughts. Would I not need to consult my external environment? 
Could someone who knew the relevant external facts not be in a better position than I am to 
know the wide contents of my thoughts?
It is important not to confuse this prima facie worry with this line of argument: (i) 
in order to know a priori that I think water thoughts, I have to know a priori that I do not 
think twin-water thoughts, since had I thought twin-water thoughts, I would not have 
thought water thoughts; (ii) to know a priori that I do not think twin-water thoughts is to 
know a priori that I am not on Twin Earth; (iii) but I cannot know a priori that I am not on 
Twin Earth; so, by modus tollens on (ii) and (iii), (iv) I cannot know a priori that I do not 
think twin-water thoughts; so, by modus tollens on (i) and (iii), (v) I cannot know a priori 
that I think water thoughts, (i) is flawed. Compare with (i*) In order to know that I have 
two hands I have to know that I am not a brain-in-a-vat, since had I been a-brain-in-a-vat I 
would not have had two hands. By substitution throughout we get that I cannot know I have 
two hands, (i) and (i*) presuppose that in order to know a proposition p, one must know 
any proposition q whose falsity is inconsistent with the tmth of p. But such a - Cartesian - 
principle is highly dubious. In many cases, I can know p whether or not I know q as long as
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q is in fact true. Thus I can know, just by looking, that I have 20 pence in my hand although 
I am ignorant of the causal conditions that enable my perception and cannot rule out the 
possibility of counterfeit coins. Presumably, for each p the number of inconsistent false qs 
is very high and it seems that I am standardly entitled to disregard them unless a specific 
reason is provided why that would be illegitimate - unknown to me a large number of fake 
coins have just been put into circulation. In any case, even if such a principle could be 
vindicated, the Incompatibilst would have to rely on an explicit sceptical line of reasoning 
which did not initially motivate her concern.
The worry is thus not that one has to know all the individuating conditions q of 
mental content p prior to one’s knowledge that p, but how one could as much as know p a 
priori in the first place given that those qs are a posteriori knowable. This prima facie  
tension between Semantic Externalism and Privileged Access is widely acknowledged, 
even by Compatibilists like Burge [1996, p. 343]i^:
"Our problem is that of understanding how we can know some of our mental events 
in a direct, non-empirical manner, when those events depend for their identities on 
our relations to the environment. A person need not investigate the environment to 
know what his thoughts are. A person does have to investigate the environment to 
know what the environment is like. Does this not indicate that the mental events are 
what they are independently of the environment?'
Nevertheless, two points are often put forward to show that the appearance of tension is 
illusoiy. Consider this version of our proximate bi-conditional: S believes that he believes 
that p iff he believes that p. It follows from left-to-right that S cannot believe he has a belief 
he does not have, and from right-to-left that S cannot believe he does not have a belief he 
does have. If S believes he has a belief, then he has it, and if S has a belief, then he believes
 ^  ^ See also Davidson [1996, p. 330].
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he has it.i2 What the first point - Burge's point^^ _ says is that this bi-conditional holds 
trivially in certain basic cases. Suppose:
(1) S is  thinking that water is thirst-quenching,
is true. By 'thinking' is meant entertaining the thought expressed by 'water is thirst- 
quenching'. In order to have that thought S must at least partially understand the sentence 
that expresses it. Now suppose:
(2) S judges that (1),
is also true, i.e. S accepts the thought expressed by (1) as true. But to do that S must engage 
in the thought expressed by 'water is thirst-quenching'. So, if S judges, or merely entertains 
the thought, that S is currently thinking that water is thirst-quenching, then S is currently 
thinking that water is thirst-quenching. (1) is true if (2) is, no matter which empirical 
evidence S has or lacks. (2) is akin to Descartes' Cogifo-thought I  am thinking in that both 
are self-verifying. Cogito~l\k& thoughts are self-verifying judgements about thoughts in the 
sense that the mere judging guarantees the truth of what is being judged. There is no need 
to support the judgement with empirical evidence even if available. In other words, in 
thinking knowledgeably that one is thinking that P, one is eo ipso also thinking that P. In 
such episodic cases there can be no error based on a gap between the first-order thought 
and the second-order thought - no possibility of misfit - because the first-order thought is 
simply contained as the object of the second-order t h o u g h t . ^ ^  Burge's point is thus fairly
Again, as stated this bi-conditional is clearly defeasible both ways and so should be taken with a grain of 
salt. For instance, it should only embrace occurrent belief states: I have standing beliefs I do not occurrently 
believe I have,
13 Cf. Burge [1996,1998].
1  ^Burge [1996, 1998, p. 251] calls such errors 'brute'. A perceptual judgement may be wrong in ways that 
has nothing to do with observational conditions, rational failures, cognitive malfunctions, etc., but simply 
because the objects o f perception are independent o f our perceptual judgements in a way that the objects o f 
our reflexive judgements about our occurrent thoughts are not. Look-alike feet are episitemically possible, 
look-alike present-tense thoughts are not. The fact that second-order judgements about thoughts are self­
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restricted. It is only in the very act of thinking that one is thinking that P that one can know 
that one is thinking that P. But this quasi-logical point about self-verifying judgements 
about thoughts only seems to account for a minor and rather insignificant portion of 
knowledge of our mental life. Reflect first that Privileged Access never was meant to be a 
commitment to infallibility or incorrigibility in the domain of first-person psychological 
utterances. Not only do mental states now and then have properties I am unaware of, it also 
happens that I judge them to have properties they, in fact, lack. Moreover, although less 
likely, mental states can occur without my awareness, and I can judge them to occur when, 
as it happens, they do not. But if Privileged Access is generally accounted for by the model 
of self-verification, then how do we explain these possible mismatches between judgement 
and what is being judged? On this model, judgement about mental states should never err. 
More precisely, only judgements of occurrent thoughts are self-verifying. Judgements of 
standing mental states or occurrent events are not. S's judgement that S believes that Scots 
are mean is not self-verifying since S can entertain the thought that all Scots are mean 
without believing it. Nor is S's judgement that S has a red afterimage self-verifying. Such 
non-content bearing events are not guaranteed to occur if one judges that they do. The 
reason why it is possible for S to judge falsely that he is in some standing belief state or 
that some mental event has occurred, is that the mere judging fails to make it true that he is 
in that state or that that event has occurred. But since we saw that Privileged Access 
extends to such non-Cogito-lik& states and events as well, an alternative model to that of 
self-verification must be found. Moreover, a second-order judgement is self-verifying only 
if the time at which it occurs is coincident with the time at which the first-order mental 
episode occurs. In no other case is the object of judgement self-referentially contained in 
the judgement. No self-verifying thought about what S was thinking yesterday is available 
to him now. Whenever S's first-order thought occurs prior to his second-order judgement,
verifying implies that there is a necessary relation between the judging and its subject-matter that has no 
correlate in perceptual judgements.
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the latter does not contain the former as its subject-matter. But cases in which S knowingly 
attends to his thoughts after having entertained them do seem essential to Privileged 
Access. So, the model of self-verification not only cannot accommodate a range a mental 
phenomena that we intuitively think fall within the domain of Privileged Access, it also 
offers no explanation of how we can know our own thoughts immediately after we have 
had them. That is, we have Privileged Access to first-order thoughts that are not part of 
second-order thoughts, indeed most of our empirical first-order thinking is not 
accompanied by second-order thinking, since we are not always self-reflectively thinking 
about our thoughts in the very act of thinking them. In most cases we attend only 
subsequently to our empirical thoughts,
A different, although closely related, point - Davidson's point^^ - concerns the self- 
referential nature, not of the act of occurrent thinking, but of the content of such an act. 
Where Burge's point is that the mere judging that one is thinking that P guarantees the truth 
of what one is judging, Davidson's point is that the content of one's thought that P - that P - 
automatically carries over to one's judgement that one is thinking that P. The content of the 
thought in (2) is self-referentially fixed by the content of the thought in (1). It is thus not 
possible that S judges that he is thinking that water is thirst-quenching when, as a matter of 
fact, he is thinking that twin-water is thirst-quenching. The second-order thought simply 
contains the content of the first-order thought as its subject-matter. This point is more 
general than Burge's. It can embrace different kinds of propositional attitudes and allow for 
fallibility. If I believe that I desire a glass of water, then maybe I am wrong. I need not 
desire a glass of water in order to believe that I do - suppose I really desire a jar of water. 
But I could not be wrong for the reason that, in actual fact, I desire a glass of twin-water. 
So, my second-order judgement may be wrong for various reasons except that I have 
misidentified the externally individuated content of my first-order attitude. Whatever
For more discussion see Boghossian [1989]. 
Cf. Davidson [1996].
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external individuation conditions hold for my first-order attitude will also hold for my 
second-order attitude. The possibility of having the second-order belief is thus partially 
grounded in the possibility of having the first-order belief. So, the present point is that 
external individuation does not by itself give rise to additional difficulties in explaining 
how we can have knowledge of our own minds.
Given what was said in response to the (i)-(v) argument, maybe we can now rescue 
Privileged Access. Note first that part of the individuation conditions for thinking first- 
order thought in (1) are external to S, and therefore only ascertainable by empirical means. 
But this does not mean that S needs to know that those external conditions obtain in order 
to think the thought in (1), as long as they in fact do obtain. If S thinks that water is thirst- 
quenching, then S sustains adequate causal connections with water, but S need not know 
that he so interacts. The enabling conditions need only be presupposed, not known to be 
satisfied. The same applies at second-order: S's thinking knowledgeably that S is thinking 
that water is thirst-quenching is grounded in an ability to think that water is thirst- 
quenching, which in turn, is conditioned on the possibility of physical interaction with 
water. The reason for this is, as we have already seen, that the second-order thought 
comprises the object of the first-order thought, and not merely the first-order thought as its 
object. Hence, the same enabling conditions that must be presupposed, but not necessarily 
known to be satisfied, at first-order thinking must equally be presupposed, but not 
necessarily known to be satisfied, at second-order knowledgeable thinking. The upshot is 
supposedly that we can have knowledge of thoughts without knowing the relevant facts 
about the individuation conditions of those thoughts.
Does this meet our prima facie worry? If good, this line of reasoning shows that it 
is feasible to have a priori knowledge of occurrent wide content thoughts. It thus proves 
that Incompatibilism better not be construed as the claim that Semantic Externalism and 
Privileged Access are inconsistent. But consistency is one thing, full-fledged compatibility 
another. And it is certainly doubtful whether all cases of Privileged Access can be
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accounted for in the manner just sketched. Suppose S were unwittingly to undergo a series 
of switches between Earth and Twin Earth sufficiently slow to acquire the concepts 
appropriate to each place. Imagine a future in which space travels by the speed of light 
between the planets in our solar system are commonplace. How long exactly S would have 
to stay at each place to make for the relevant conceptual changes is unclear. All we know is 
that were he slowly enough shifted back and forth, he would be able to sustain sufficient 
causal links with his environments to effect changes in his wide content thoughts. So, 
suppose S is on Twin Earth at ti long enough to acquire twin-water thoughts, then on Earth 
at t2  long enough to acquire water thoughts, and so on. The question is: could S tell just by 
introspection which thoughts he entertains when the two places and the switches between 
them are subjectively indistinguishable? One might think the answer is negative for how 
could S introspectively discriminate between thoughts - water thoughts and twin-water 
thoughts - which from the inside, as it were, seem identical. It looks as if nothing in S's 
understanding of the contents of those thoughts would enable him to tell them apart. But 
this presupposes that S at t2  is able to entertain both sets of thoughts and so at t2  retains the 
twin-water thoughts acquired at ti. If all of S's thoughts at t2 , including the ones acquired at 
ti, are water thoughts, then it is no wonder that S cannot explicate the difference between 
water thoughts and twin-water thoughts. S cannot discriminate between two sets of 
thoughts if he can only grasp one of them. The problem with this account of slow switching 
is that S's beliefs about his beliefs at ti come out false. Suppose that at ti S forms the true 
belief that he drinks twin-water. At t2  S tries to recover his belief - a belief he would 
express with 'I drank water', but if what S now remembers is that he believed that he drank 
water, then his belief is false. So, S better retain his twin-water thoughts at t2 . But if that is 
how we should understand slow switching, then it is not clear how Davidson's point is 
helpful in cases involving memory of past thoughts. Suppose S* knew of S's predicament 
and asked S: 'Did you entertain water thoughts or twin-water thoughts at ti?  ' Having both 
sets of thoughts available yet no introspective means by which he could discriminate
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between them, it is hard to see how he could answer the question. The worry is thus that at 
least Epistemic Transparency (cf. Sec. 1.3) is compromised: the difference between water 
thoughts and twin-water thoughts is epistemically opaque to S in that S could have both 
sets of thoughts and yet lack introspective knowledge of their difference. Another worry 
relates to Authority: S would be in no epistemically advantageous position with respect to 
this aspect of his thought-activity, indeed S* who had knowledge of S's recent 
transportations would be more suitable to ask than S himself.
I shall not adjudicate this dispute. Maybe the Semantic Externalist has the resources 
to accommodate slow switching. Three things are worth keeping in mind. First of all, there 
is no inference from the mere fact that water thoughts and twin-water thoughts are 
subjectively indistinguishable to the claim that water thoughts are not knowable unless the 
environmental differences that individuate them are brought out empirically. One must 
show that both sets of thoughts are simultaneously accessible, and one must provide 
reasons for thinking that the uncongenial twin-water thoughts pose a relevant alternative 
that needs to be ruled out; whence the travelling story. Only then can slow switching be 
used to get the (i)-(v) argument up and running: if S, quite unawares, underwent a series of 
such transportations and was now thinking water thoughts, then he would have to rule out 
the relevant alternative that he was not now thinking twin-water thoughts. Hence, he would 
have to know what he could not possibly know, namely that he was not now on Twin 
Earth. Secondly, even if slow switching were to found a successful Incompatibilist 
argument, it may be that nothing intuitively valuable would be lost. If all slow switching 
would show is that Epistemic Transparency is false, then maybe that is for the best. Maybe 
Privileged Access should encompass only the contents of our contemporary mental states 
and not the identity conditions of the contents of states had over time. Thirdly, it is not
I shall not pursue this line any further. For elaboration see Boghossian [1989, 1994], and response in Burge 
[1998]. The issue depends on exactly which type o f 'relevant alternative' epistem ology the Semantic 
Externalist is committed to. For a recent development o f the Switching Argument see Goldberg [1999, 2000], 
and Brueckner's response in [1999, 2000].
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generally true that one cannot have beliefs involving a content one has an incomplete 
understanding of: I can falsely believe that I have arthritis in my thigh. So, even though S is 
in the rather awkward situation that he can know, in a special self-referential way, that he 
thinks water thoughts when he is on Earth, and can also know that he thinks twin-water 
thoughts when he is on Twin Earth, yet cannot introspectively discriminate between them, 
these considerations do not undermine the quasi-logical nature of thinking knowledgeably 
about thoughts. S can know his thoughts without knowing much about them.
Now, someone might object that my criticism is misplaced. Neither Burge's nor 
Davidson's point was supposed to provide a uniform model of all cases of Privileged 
Access. I agree and I also think their points are fine as far as they go. All I claim is that 
Compatibilism cannot be vindicated by adopting and extending such models, and so the 
prima facie difficulty still stands.
1.5. The MC-Form
It is, however, worth trying to bring out this apparent tension in a more cogent fashion. The 
most promising way of doing that is a reductio - due to Me Kinsey [1991] - of the following 
MC-formi^:
(3) I have mental property M,
(4) If I have mental property M, then I meet condition C,
(5) So, I meet condition C,
where C is an 'external proposition' that makes M a wide content mental state. For instance, 
if M is the state I am in when I think that water is wet, then C might be the proposition that 
I have causally interacted with instances of the natural kind water. In general, the Semantic 
Externalist could endorse the following constraint on concept-possession:
Cf. Boghossian [1997], McLaughlin & Tye [1998] and Davies [1998].
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If the concept of X is a natural kind concept, then one cannot possess it unless 
one has causally interacted with instances of X.
Or perhaps it is preferable not to require actual encounters by each and every possessor of
the concept. Maybe it would suffice that one be a member of a linguistic community in
which other members have causally interacted with such-and-such instances. The following
is less demanding:
If the concept of X is a natural kind concept, then one cannot possess it unless 
one has causally interacted with instances of X or one is a member of a 
linguistic community in which other members have causally interacted with 
instances of X.
In any case, both proposals have it that instances of X exist in the person's environment to 
whom the wide concept is ascribed. Now, suppose the mental property is possession of the 
concept water and that water is a natural kind concept. Then we get the following instance 
of the MC-form:
(3*) I have the concept water
(4*) If I have the concept water, then water exists.
(5*) Water exists.
The line of reasoning seems intuitively valid and both premises warranted. (3)/(3*) is a 
priori knowable by Privileged Access. (4)/(4'‘0 is a conceptual truth according to Semantic 
Externalism, so a priori knowable. Hence, (5)/(5*) can be deduced on purely a priori 
grounds and is therefore itself a priori knowable. Yet this is incredible since C embraces 
statements about the existence of ordinary, external objects about which, intuitively at least, 
I have no a priori access. So, provided the inference is cogent^^, one or both of the warrants 
cannot be a priori.
9^ Martin Davies [1998, 2000], has argued that the MC-form illicitly trades on a subtle question-begging line 
o f  reasoning. Similarly, Crispin Wright [2000] has argued that the warrant for the first premise fails to 
transmit across the entailment to the conclusion on the grounds that we must already presuppose entitlement 
to accept the conclusion. To deal satisfactorily with their epistemological diagnosis would take me too far
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To get a successful mn of the MC-form, it is crucial that the conditional in (4)/(4*) 
be not only necessary, but conceptually necessary. Since we know that knowledge of 
metaphysical necessities can be a posteriori, it would be possible to block the reductio if 
the major premise could be shown to be at best a posteriori warranted.^o No a priori 
warrant transmits across a necessary a posteriori warranted conditional. The problem with 
this response to the MC-form is twofold. First of all, if the conditional were metaphysically 
necessary, then the mental states in question would be dependent upon irrelevant facts. For 
instance, my belief that water is wet metaphysically necessitates the (timeless) existence of 
my mother, but the reason why the content of that belief-state is wide has nothing to do 
with my biological origin. In contrast to conceptual necessity, metaphysical necessity 
cannot rule out irrelevant external dependencies.^! Secondly, the dependency between the a 
priori knowable contents of our mental states and their external individuation conditions is 
established by thought experiments or other conceptual reasoning carried out from the 
philosophical armchair, so to speak, and is therefore best seen as a priori, yielding 
conceptual truths. Semantic Externalism and its claim about content individuation is not an 
empirical thesis.
Another objection that one may want to raise is to question the incredibility of the 
conclusion that (5)/(5*) is a priori knowable, i.e. to endorse the a priori status of certain 
empirical existence-claims. It is clear that the MC-form has no bite if nothing is genuinely 
reduced ad absurdum. That there can be a class of a priori knowable empirical statements 
is shown not only by uninformative examples like T exist', but also by the very mental
away from the semantic considerations I wish to highlight, so I shall simply take the reasoning for granted in 
the following.
Thus Brueckner [1998] has argued that the MC-form misfires, hence that Compatibilism can be vindicated, 
if  the major premise is seen as an a posteriori metaphysical necessity. For a response, see McKinsey [1991].
The reason for this is that nothing conceptually necessitates anything except under certain descriptions. My 
mother's (timeless) existence, i.e. Anna's existence, is in itself metaphysically necessitated by my existence, 
but her existence is conceptually necessitated by my existence only under the description 'my mother'. In this 
way it does not follow that Anna exists if  I do, but it does follow that my mother exists if I do.
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contents that we standardly credit ourselves with in Privileged Access: I can know a priori 
that I now entertain the proposition water is wet even though I might not have done just 
that. So, maybe we should embrace certain informative aspects of the outer world as well. 22  
The problem with this line is clearly its lack of intuitive appeal. This is best appreciated 
when the range of conditions E is taken into account. Bear in mind that we can run the 
argument on any non-theoretical natural kind term such as 'water', 'gold', 'aluminium', 
'mackerel', 'tiger' or 'elm'. And if social Semantic Externalism^^ is allowed for, one may 
include terms for artificial kinds such as 'sofa' or 'football'. Finally, we can also construct 
Incompatibilist arguments with conclusions about our internal architecture, where the 
conditions E will consist in a specification of the appropriate internal, cognitive make-up of 
the subject to whom the state in question is ascribed. It is simply not plausible that we can 
carry out chemical studies or cognitive science from the philosophical armchair!
1.6. Weak or Strong Semantic Externalism
A more serious objection is that (4)/(4*) seems to be insufficiently supported by the Twin 
Earth Argument. As the contra-positives of (4)/(4*) make clear, it is not enough to show 
that certain contents of intentional states depend for their individuation on the nature of 
their physical environment. What must be shown is, moreover, that such contents depend
This bullet-biting strategy has been adopted by Sawyer [1998]. It is also implicit in Putnam's [1981] 
argument that if  I were a brain-in-a-vat, then I could not have thoughts about brains-in-vats, but I do have 
thoughts about brains-in-vats, so I am not a brain in a vat. The combination o f philosophical theorising and 
reflective introspection yields empirical knowledge that I am not a brain-in-a-vat. For discussion see also 
Davies [1998,2000].
23 This extension o f Putnam's natural kind Semantic Externalism is familiar from Burge [1979, 1982]. The 
thought experiments are the same. One fixes all descriptions o f the physical, behavioural, phenomenalistic 
and functional histories o f individuals. Then, by varying either micro-physical facts or linguistic use-facts in 
their respective external environments, one can change the contents o f their propositional attitudes. See 
Chapter 5 for discussion.
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for their existence on the existence of appropriate objects in that physical environment. And 
clearly all the Twin Eaith Argument shows, if good, is that in cases where a natural kind 
concept has an extension, it is individuated externally in terms of that extension. It teaches 
us that having a natural kind concept is a property that fails to supervene upon intrinsic 
physical properties of thinkers, that is, otherwise identical thinkers may fail to share a 
natural kind concept if embedded in relevantly different physical environments. But the 
Argument is silent about how those concepts are individuated in circumstances in which 
the relevant physical facts go missing - it simply does not speak to the issue of whether 
natural kind concepts could be had were there no natural kinds to fall under them. In order 
to sustain the a priority of (4)/(4*), however, it has to be shown a priori that the very 
existence of such concepts is dependent upon the existence of an extension, i.e. that they 
are object-dependent?-^
Paul Boghossian [1997, 1998] has shown that such additional argument is 
forthcoming once we consider empty cases: imagine Dry Earth as a remote planet in Wa 
where, despite all appearances, the lakes, rivers, taps, etc. all run bone dry. The claim is 
that, following Semantic Externalism, on Dry Earth where massive reference-failure
24 It is important to emphasise the difference between what I call 'object-dependence' and what Evans [1982] 
and M cDowell [1984, 1986] have referred to under the same name. As is familiar, they held a 'no referent - no 
thought' view with respect to so-called De Re senses, i.e. essentially Fregean senses - modes of presentation - 
that could not exist in the absence o f  a referent of the expression with which they are associated. What they 
had in mind, at least in the case o f perceptual demonstrative thought, was a type o f thought o f which no 
tokens could exist were it not for the existence in the immediate environment o f appropriate contextually- 
determined objects. What I call 'object-dependence' is, however, a type o f thought o f which only some tokens 
need have that kind o f dependency, but o f which all tokens depend for their existence on the existence of 
instances o f the appropriate natural kind in the global environment. Consequently, what Evans and McDowell 
had in mind, as I read them, was a type o f object-dependency that allowed for local cognitive illusions of 
content, whereas the type o f object-dependency I have in mind is consistent with the possibility o f a thought 
token surviving such local illusions; on my view, it is possible to have an object-dependent thought as long as 
one does not inhabit Dry Earth where global hallucinations prevail.
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prevails, there could be no determinate conditions under which tokens of 'water'-sentences 
are true or false, and so no concept of water to be had. For what concept could be expressed 
by tokens of 'water' on this Dry Earth? Two options appear. Maybe such tokens express (1) 
a compound concept like the concept of the watery stuff, or maybe such tokens express (2) 
an atomic concept. The worry is that neither will do given the commitments of Semantic 
Externalism. Suppose that (1) is true. Then bear in mind that Earthly and Twin Earthly 
tokens of 'water' did not express such a compound concept as that would have implied what 
the story was supposed to dispute, namely that those tokens were co-extensional. It was 
presupposed in non-empty cases that 'water' expresses an atomic concept. But then it is 
difficult to see how one and the same word can express an atomic concept under conditions 
of successful reference and a different, compositional concept under conditions of 
unsuccessful reference. The compositionality of concepts cannot be a function of external 
circumstances in this way, but must be an a priori fact about the internal syntax of a 
concept. Suppose instead that (2) is true. One should now ask: what proposition, i.e. truth- 
condition, is expressed by such empty tokens of 'water is wet' as uttered on Dry Eai th. One 
can begin by ruling out the candidate that it should be the atomic concept water as 
expressed by non-empty tokens of 'water' that is expressed by empty tokens of 'water' for 
that would simply contradict the thesis that such atomic concepts are externally 
individuated. Yet no other candidate could fare better, since on the Semantic Externalist 
account, when there is no referent of 'water', there is no fact of the matter what proposition 
is expressed by 'water is wet'. So, even if such sentences aie false in all possible worlds, 
nothing really gets said by those empty tokens. Boghossian [1998, p. 255] concludes:
"If there is no kind denoted by a given natural kind term - say, 'water' - then no 
satisfaction conditions for that term will have been pinned down. The actual kind of 
stuff at the end of the relevant causal chain is supposed to fix the kind of stuff that is 
denoted by 'water'. If there's nothing there, then, it would seem, there is no fact of the 
matter what kind of stuff there would have to be for the extension of the term not to 
be empty."
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The train of thought behind Boghossian's argument thus seems to be that if one could have 
a wide content belief without the existence of appropriate external objects, then that belief 
cannot essentially be individuated by reference to those objects, since were that belief thus 
essentially individuated, reference would have to be made to those objects in order to have 
that belief. In short, if understanding is indifferent to the existence of water, then it is also 
indifferent to the substitution of water for twin-water. But since it is not indifferent to the 
substitution of water for twin-water, neither is it indifferent to the existence of water. The 
upshot is that even if the Twin Earth Argument only licenses external individuation, the 
Twin Earth Argument in conjunction with the Dry Earth Argument entails object- 
dependence. This is obviously a Strong form of Semantic Externalism; if there is no fact of 
the matter what the referent of a given concept is, then there is no fact of the matter what 
the concept is. If this is right, then natural kind concepts are object-dependent.25 The 
argument is thus that merely Weak Semantic Externalism is an unstable position that 
invaiiably will collapse into its stronger counterpait.
Now, I suspect the most intuitive response to the Dry Earth challenge is to opt for 
(1): what is said by use of 'water' on Dry Earth is that there is a stuff that uniquely has the 
watery properties. Although nothing falls under it, this - default - concept can be expressed 
even on Dry Earth. The problem is how the Semantic Externalist could meet those 
intuitions. Reflect that what supposedly happens on Dry Earth with respect to water
25 Cf. Boghossian [1997, p. 174]. This means that on the Semantic Externalist account, occurrences o f natural 
kind tenns in the embedded sentences in De Dicto belief ascriptions allow for existential generalisation. If I 
have the wide content D e Dicto belief that water is thirst-quenching, then I also have a corresponding D e Re 
belief involving water, i.e. there is something - water - o f which I believe that it is thirst-quenching. Indeed it 
is only in virtue of having the De Re belief that I can have the De Dicto belief. In contrast, a narrow content 
belief is given by a De Dicto belief ascription whose embedded sentence contains no expression which allows 
for existential generalisation. This follows from the quantificational treatment o f 'the watery stuff: to believe 
that the watery stuff is thirst-quenching is not necessarily to believe of anything that it is watery. One can 
have this belief on Earth, Twin Earth or Dry Earth. I shall return to this point later.
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actually happened on Earth with respect to Phlogiston. For a while it was common opinion 
that phlogiston was a natural kind, but it turned out not to be - in fact and despite 
appearances, it turned out not to exist. Had phlogiston existed as a genuine natural kind, 
and had 'phlogiston' aimed at naming that kind, our concept of phlogiston would have been 
externally individuated. In actual fact, it turned out not to exist, and the question is how 
best to make sense of speakers' linguistic behaviour involving 'phlogiston'. My hunch is 
that this is best done if 'phlogiston' is associated with a compound concept of the kind of 
substance that is present in all combustible materials, is released during burning, etc., since 
such a concept is not object-dependent. In case nothing uniquely has all the superficial 
properties, there are still determinate conditions under which sentences containing 
'phlogiston' are true or false. So, there is no question a compound concept can be retained 
after the discovery that the natural kind it aimed at picking out was not in fact part of the 
fabric of the world. In other words, what was discovered was not that we had all been 
victims of a massive illusion of content, but that the world had let us down by failing to 
provide us with the relevant entities. But what account can Semantic Externalism offer of 
possession conditions for concepts which lack external individuation conditions? It is haid 
to accept that we should all be hostage to such illusions of content, that in fact we believed 
nothing when we sincerely assented to 'phlogiston is a gas', and so on.
For such reasons, I imagine, Burge [1982] has tried to envisage a Dry Earth 
scenario that purports to underpin that it is logically possible to have, say, water thoughts 
without the existence of water. What he has in mind is not only a case in which an 
individual has a belief involving the concept water even though there is no water in his 
local environment of which he holds this belief, but a case in which an individual has a 
belief involving the concept water even though there exists no water at all in his global 
environment (cf. fn. 24). What we have is thus a candidate counterexample to Boghossian’s 
Dry Earth. However, care is needed in stipulating the case. What must be required is that 
there exists sufficient knowledge of chemistry amongst the more informed members of that
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individual's community to distinguish the concept water from various twin-concepts. If the 
community possessed a chemical analysis of water showing it to be composed of two 
hydrogen atoms for every oxygen atom, both of which they were causally related to, there 
would be no obstacle to regarding that individual as in possession of the concept water. 
Likewise, we can stipulate a situation in which the individual could form the concept water, 
even if there were no other speakers in his environment. What would be required is that he 
had causally interacted with instances of the natural kind water and furthermore held a 
minimum of chemically relevant beliefs to distinguish water from other candidate twin- 
substances. What we cannot have, according to Burge, is a combined situation in which an 
individual has the concept water even though neither water nor other speakers exist in his 
environment.
Burge’s Dry Earth story is unfortunately contingent upon the assumption that 
although the concept water is atomic, water itself is a composite natural kind: water is H2 O. 
It is namely presupposed that the concept water functions in much the same way a 
composite natural kind concept, e.g. the concept H2 O, functions. It is required that those 
more skilled fellows of his have had causal encounters with the constituent natural kinds, 
oxygen and hydrogen, of which water is composed, and then construed a chemical theory 
about water deploying those atomic, conceptual constituents. Yet this can easily be 
circumvented: just pick a real atomic natural kind concept, like the concept oxygen, or 
supposedly any other concept of the natural elements, and then set up a Dry Earth scenario. 
In that case, the necessary causal encounters with the constituent substances would not be 
available to the experts to build the chemical theory, and there would be no concept at hand 
for the individual. What really has to be shown is not that one can have an atomic natural 
kind concept of a non-existing composite natural kind, but that one can have an atomic 
natural kind concept of a non-existing atomic natural kind, given what Semantic 
Externalism says about concept individuation. The former can be made plausible provided 
the component natural kinds exist and that the individual or his fellow speakers are clever
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enough. The latter, however, seems impossible given Semantic Externalism and yet 
nothing prevents us from running a Dry Earth Argument on such atomic natural kind
concepts.26
Let me take stock. I have presented an argument - the Dry Earth Argument - which 
purports to show that once external individuation in allowed for, object-dependence must 
also be endorsed. But object-dependence is a form of Semantic Externalism sufficiently 
strong to sustain the second premise in arguments like (3*)-(5*) of the MC-form. Given 
that the first premise is a priori warranted and that the second premise is properly 
interpreted as a conceptual entailment, an a priori warrant for the conclusion can then be 
deduced. But since we agreed only to accept an a posteriori warrant for the conclusion, we 
aie forced to give up the a priori knowability of either or both of the premises. So, what we 
effectively have is a reductio of Compatibilism, i.e. the view that Privileged Access and 
Semantic Externalism are compatible doctrines. The problem is that, as we saw in Sec. 1 
and 2, both doctrines are independently justified. It would thus be theoretically 
unsatisfactory if we left the dialectic at this stage. As with any paradox, what is called for is 
not just negation of one or more of the premises, but diagnosis of why they all seem 
justified and simultaneously lead to paradox by a seemingly cogent line of reasoning. What 
must be provided is thus some account of why both doctrines seem so plausible when their 
conjunction appears to lead to absurdities. I shall be occupied with developing such an 
account in the following. A close look at the literature indicates that most Semantic 
Externalists agree that if we have a reductio  of Compatibilism, then we also have 
something very close to a reductio of Semantic Externalism. They have therefore spent
26 The point is conceded by Burge [1982] and McLaughlin & Tye [1998, pp. 300-2]. I shall have more to say 
in the follow ing about why Weak Semantic Externalism looks like an unstable position. Note also that 
Putnam's characterisation o f Semantic Externalism from Sec. 1 seems to be in accord with this claim: a wide 
state is a state that presupposes the existence o f objects other than the individual who is in that state. If we 
suppose that proposition p presupposes proposition q iff p entails q, then other appropriate objects must exist 
if  the individual is in a given wide state.
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much energy explaining why Compatibilism holds after all.27 My contention is that once 
we get clear on the semantic underpinnings, there is a forthright explanation of why 
Compatibilism has seem so hard to come by. The bad news is that the MC-form has 
convinced us that Strong Semantic Externalism and Privileged Access are incompatible. 
But the former is only sustained by the view I called Referentialism. So, if Semantic 
Externalism is detached from Referentialism, then Compatibilism looks less futile. Weak 
Semantic Externalism incorporates the Twin Earth lesson without renouncing 
Compatibilism, and the good news is that it is sustained by an appropriately constrained 
form of what I called Descriptivism; or so I shall argue.
27 See for instance Burge [1988], Davidson [1987], Brueckner [1992] and McLaughlin & Tye [1998].
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Chapter 2. The Modal Argument
2.1. Semantic and Mental Content
We saw in Chapter 1 that Semantic Internalism and Externalism are theories about how 
content is individuated. In the first instance, they disagree about how propositional or 
semantic content is individuated. We can understand the propositional content of a sub- 
sentential expression as the contribution it yields to determine the propositional content 
expressed by an assertoric utterance of a sentence^ in which it occurs, and we can 
understand the propositional content of a sentence as its truth-conditions. If we call the 
latter the proposition associated or expressed, we can say that the propositional content of 
an expression is the contribution it yields to determine the proposition associated or 
expressed by a sentence containing that expression. But since ordinaiy speakers have and 
deploy sufficient means to express their propositional attitudes by assent or dissent to 
sentences, what they thus believe or desire will partially be a function of the propositions 
associated or expressed by these sentences. What is true about semantic content is true 
about mental content. It follows, as we saw in Chapter 1, that if Semantic Internalism and 
Externalism disagree about how semantic content is individuated, they will also disagree 
about how mental content is individuated. Moreover, we are inclined to think that the 
mental states themselves aie partially individuated by their contents. What makes my belief 
that p the state it is, is partially that it is a belief with the content that p. Had my belief that 
p had a different content q, I would have had a different belief - the belief that q - and so 
been in a different belief state.
In order to give a thorough evaluation of the arguments for Semantic Internalism 
and Externalism respectively, one would thus have to consider the question of how the 
propositional content of an expression is determined on the two views. I said above that the
In Fregean style, we might say the propositional content o f complete complex expressions.
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propositional content of a sub-sentential expression is its contribution to determining the 
propositional content - the proposition - of sentences containing it. Now, for non-referring 
terms that may be all there is to say about its propositional content, but for referring terms, 
we can give an independent characterisation that pertains to their referents or extensions. 
The issue about how such terms refer is thus intimately connected with the issue of what 
constitutes their propositional content. One cannot assess a theory of meaning in isolation 
from a theory of reference for referring terms.
But before I turn to this task, let me make a notational comment. By 'expression' or 
'term' I shall in the following focus exclusively on singular terms, e.g. proper names, and 
general terms, e.g. natural kind terms. There are mainly two ways of handling natural kind 
terms. One is to treat them as singular terms: 'water' refers to the abstract kind H%0 or to 
the collection of entities which uniquely have the watery properties. The other is to treat 
them as general terms: 'water' applies to all and only instances of the kind H2 O or to all and 
only entities which uniquely have the wateiy properties. General terms are predicative and 
have extensions, whereas singular terms are referring and have referents. I shall not 
distinguish between the two ways and nothing I say hangs on which is adopted.^
2.2. Semantic Internalism and Descriptivism
We saw in Sec. 1.1 that Semantic Internalism held that sentences containing natural kind 
terms have associated with them descriptive truth-conditions: 'water is wet' is true iff the 
watery stuff is wet. We called such tmth-conditions descriptive, because the common noun 
phrase 'the watery stuff is shorthand for a list of stereotypical, manifest properties - the 
clear, potable liquid that falls from the sky, flows in rivers, supports life, etc. - that 
uniquely describe par adigmatic samples of water. It follows on this view that the sentence 
'water is wet' is associated with the descriptive proposition that the watery stuff is wet,
2  For more on this, see Salmon [1982, pp. 42-75].
49
given that we have identified the truth-condition of a sentence with the proposition 
associated. We also saw that to believe such a descriptive proposition is to have a narrow 
content belief in the sense we defined that term: despite our environmental differences, my 
doppelganger and I both believe that the watery stuff is wet. That is, to believe a 
descriptive proposition is to have a mental property which supervenes on one's intrinsic 
properties. On this view, the natural kind term 'water' thus has as its propositional content 
the descriptive content of 'the watery stuff. 'Water' is simply a shorthand for 'the watery 
stuff.
Why does the Semantic Internalist hold this view? Well, it is essential that meaning 
be in the mind in the way opposed by Semantic Externalism. As a first approximation we 
can take this dictum to mean that the meaning of an expression is exhausted by what a 
competent speaker knows when she fully understands that expression. ^  In this sense, 
meaning and understanding are correlative notions such that no ingredient in meaning can 
outrun the content of the knowledge possessed by a speaker who has full competence with 
the relevant bits of language.^ The Semantic Externalist, however, need not disagree that 
meaning is cognitive in this sense. The disagreement arises only over the kind of 
knowledge involved. On the Semantic Internalist's account, the kind of knowledge 
involved is first and foremost explicit, descriptive De Dicto knowledge. If queried what the 
meaning of 'water' is, a competent speaker will on reflection be able to cite sufficiently 
many watery properties to enable ordinary identification of water, and an ideal speaker will 
be able to give the entire list. Such identifying knowledge will be introspectively available 
to the speaker. But implicit or practical knowledge may also play a role. To grasp the 
meaning of an expression could partially consist in having an inarticulate yet manifestable 
recognitional capacity. In some cases, like concepts for secondary qualities - red, sweet or
3 I shall use 'meaning', 'propositional content' and 'semantic content' interchangeably in the following.
 ^ This is familiar from Dummett's writings who seemed to think that this correlation claim was a platitude 
governing natural language that any viable theory o f meaning should respect, see for instance [1978, p. 129; 
1991, p. 83].
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loud - knowledge of meaning may consist primarily in an ability to recognise a referent if 
presented with one.5 The important point is that the referent of an expression is no part of 
the meaning of that expression, hence, no De Re knowledge of the referent is constitutively 
involved in understanding that expression. There are two parts to this: (i) knowledge of 
reference is not necessary for knowledge of meaning since it is perfectly possible for 
someone to fully understand an expression without knowing its referent, indeed without 
there being one; (ii) knowledge of reference is not sufficient for knowledge of meaning 
since it is not possible for someone to fully understand an expression without knowing 
more than its reference. Take 'water'. Just as we can imagine a speaker who does not know 
that 'water' refers to H2 O yet knows enough of the watery properties in order to grasp 
'water'-sentences, we can imagine a speaker who does know that 'water' refers to H2 O yet 
does not know enough of the watery properties in order to grasp 'water'-sentences. 
Someone ignorant of chemistry may be said to be in possession of the concept water 
provided she knows enough of the watery properties, and someone ignorant of the watery 
properties may be said to lack the concept water even if she knows the underlying 
chemistry. It is no part of the meaning of 'water' that it picks out all and only H2 O on Earth, 
since on Twin Earth the very same concept picks out XYZ, and on Dry Earth it fails to pick 
out anything. What referent or extension an expression has is a question about which if any 
entities in the world happen to satisfy the descriptive conditions that speakers commonly 
associate with that expression as its meaning. All understanding takes is knowledge of 
those conditions, but given that they jointly determine reference, understanding will 
typically issue in an ability to identify a referent were one presented. Competent speakers 
normally have sufficient - explicit or implicit - means to determine a referent were there to 
be one. The crucial point is that, on this view, meanings are not essentially hooked up with 
their referents. Had it turned out that nothing uniquely had the watery properties, we would
 ^ Cf. Dummett [1973, pp. 110-1]. For a caveat, however, see fn. 19.
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still have had the concept water. Descriptive content is thus object-independent.^ The 
meaning of an expression is therefore that by which the referent or extension is determined; 
it is a mode o f presentation, or a way o f thinking, of the referent or extension. Although 
they are different substances, water and twin-water are subjectively or qualitatively 
indistinguishable. Both appear in the same watery manner which is to say that my 
doppelganger and I think of twin-water and water respectively in the same way. And, the 
Semantic Internalist continues, it is how the world appears to us that is relevant when we 
individuate the contents of our mental states; it is states thus identified which have causal 
power to explain behaviour. I reach out for a glass in front of me because I desire a glass of 
water and truly believe there is one in front of me. But had I been confronted with a glass 
of twin-water, the same narrow content mental states suffice to explain why I also would 
have reached out for that glass.^
But if 'water' simply abbreviates 'the watery stuff, then 'water' must apply to 
whatever 'the watery stuff is true of. The wateiy properties thus play a dual role: they 
constitute what someone knows when she understands 'water' and they uniquely determine 
the reference of 'water'. The reference (or extension) of 'water' is determined by its 
descriptive content to be (the members of) the class of things, of whatever kind, which 
uniquely have the watery properties. 'Water' picks out all and only watery stuff such that on 
Earth, where H^O uniquely has the watery properties, 'water' picks out H2 O, and on Twin 
Earth, where XYZ uniquely has the watery properties, 'water' picks out XYZ. This 
referential mechanism can be made clear if 'the watery stuff is given the well-known 
quantificational treatment of definite descriptions. 'The watery stuff picks out a kind of 
stuff k iff k is watery and nothing else is. So, 'water is F' is true iff (3x)(Wx & (Vy)(Wy 
y = x) & Fx). It is thus possible that different x uniquely has the watery properties and also
6 Accordingly, Descriptivism can accommodate what we intuitively wanted to say about empty cases like 
phlogiston, namely that truth-conditional content can be retained when the world fails to provide us with an 
extension o f  our concepts. This point shall prove important.
2 There is a lot to say and I shall get back to this issue in Chapter 5.
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is F.^ Descriptive tmth-conditions are not essentially about any particular kind of stuff but 
whatever happens to be watery.^ And what someone knows when she understands 'water is 
wet' is just those descriptive truth-conditions. We can take the descriptive content of 'water' 
to be given by some such meaning-conferring stipulation:
(S) Let 'water' refer to whatever stuff has watery properties Pi, P2 , Ps-.Pn-
Now, in the Twin Earth Argument we took Twin Earth to be a remote place in the actual 
world Wa- So, on this view, 'water' will refer to different substances even within W ^. But 
we can also take Twin Earth as a counterfactual possible world Wp. Thus understood, 
'water' will apply to whatever stuff is watery at the counterfactual Twin Earth. For all Wp, 
'water' refers to whatever stuff is watery at Wp. 'Water' is thus a flexible designator, i.e. it 
refers to different kinds of stuff at different Wp.^^ This follows from the quantificational 
analysis in that a definite description that contains purely general, qualitative expressions is 
a flexible designator. Its reference at a Wp depends solely upon whatever or whoever 
uniquely satisfies the descriptive condition at Wp. We might thus say that 'water' is 
constant in content, but world-relative in reference. 'Water' means the same - the watery 
stuff - but has a different extension on Earth and (counterfactual) Twin-Earth. So, on Earth
 ^ Here I take definite descriptions in their attributive use where an object uniquely has to satisfy the 
descriptions in order to be successfully picked out by them; cf. Donnellan [1966].
 ^ Similarly for other natural kind terms. If 'tiger' is short for a conjunction o f descriptive conditions 'the 
ferocious creatures that have four legs, are black-striped, are cat-like in appearance...', then 'tiger' refers by 
way o f satisfying these conditions to all and only creatures with the 'tigery' properties, i.e. the class o f actual 
tigers.
Alternatively, we could follow Dummett and call 'water' a quasi-rigid designator, because, at any Wp, it 
refers to any epistemic counterpart o f the referent o f 'water at W^. So, 'water' is flexible with respect to which 
kind o f micro-physical stuff it picks out across Wp, but not flexible with respect to which kind o f superficial 
stuff, as it were, it picks out across Wp.
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my tokens of ’water’ refer to H2 O and on a counterfactual Twin-Earth they refer to XYZ. 
Water is H2 O on Earth and XYZ on Twin-Earth.
Let us call the view just sketched Descriptivism. In general, Descriptivism says that 
a singular referring term N refers to an object o at a possible world Wp iff o uniquely 
satisfies a set of descriptive conditions ^  at Wp which are standardly associated by 
competent speakers with N as its descriptive content. We can think of (|) as a cluster of 
descriptive properties like the stereotypical ones we listed for water. N is simply an 
abbreviation of (j), and since it can happen that different objects uniquely satisfy (j) at 
different Wp, it can also happen that N refers to different objects at different Wp; N is 
flexible d e s i g n a t o r . ^2 To understand N, as in sentences in which N occurs, is to possess 
knowledge of <[) and know how (|) jointly determine a referent at a Wp. Descriptivism is thus 
both a theory o f  reference', the reference of N is determined only by virtue of the 
satisfaction by o of (j); and a theory o f meaning: the commonly associated (j) which a speaker 
must know of if she is to understand N constitutes the meaning of N. In that case, we shall 
say that N is purely descriptional. The reference relation is thus an indirect relation 
between o and N essentially mediated by (|). We can therefore separate descriptive reference 
into two parts. First, the relation between N and (j) is a relation o f conceptual association 
performed by competent speakers. (S), remember, was a meaning-conferring stipulation. 
Secondly, the relation between (|) and o is a relation o f fit: o is the referent of N iff o
1   ^ W e shall see in Chapter 4 that there are ways of relaxing this uniqueness condition.
^2 One may object with Russell [1994] and friends Neale [1990] that if  N  is short for a cluster o f definite 
descriptions, and such descriptions are treated quatificationally, then N is not really a referring expression, 
since a quantified phrase is not a referring expression. One could follow Russell and say that N  denotes o in 
the sense that N describes or is satisfied by o. Proper referring expressions are those that serve merely to 
designate an object unmediated by descriptive conditions; in Russell's terminology 'logically proper names’. I 
think, however, that it would be tendentious to reserve the phrase 'referring' to non-Descriptivist designation. 
The Descriptivist may want to resist the quantificational analysis and instead treat definite descriptions (The 
F: Fx) as referring expressions in their own right. I shall not give any o f 'denote', 'designate' or 'refer' a 
technical application, but merely use 'refer' throughout to cover all cases o f denotation.
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uniquely satisfies ({). To understand N is exclusively a question about grasping the first 
relation regardless of whether any o uniquely fits (j). To be the referent of N, however, is 
exclusively a question about o satisfying an independently fixed (j)45
So far we have assumed that the conditions (j) are purely descriptive, that is, consist 
of definite descriptions given in (i) general, qualitative terms: the F, the G, the H, etc4^ 
But nothing prevents the Descriptivist from embracing other kinds of definite descriptions: 
(ii) meta-linguistic descriptions which are given in the form of 'the bearer of N'; (iii) 
secondary descriptions which are those fallen back on when the primary descriptions fail to 
pick out a unique object: 'the object I have in mind' or 'the individual believed to be the F'; 
(iv) other-dependent descriptions which defer to more competent speakers' use of N: 'the 
object which my linguistic community use N to refer to; (v) essential descriptions which 
are such that they are necessarily satisfied by any object which uniquely satisfies them: 'the 
object which has biological origin x’; (vi) rigidified descriptions which contains indexical 
devices: 'the actual F' or 'the F at this w o r l d ' J ^  Take our test case. We have assumed so far
I shall not embark on any exegesis as to who may fit my characterisation o f Descriptivism. It is clear that I 
have a motley o f  views originating in Frege's theory o f sense [1994a, 1994b], and Russell's theory o f  
descriptions [1994], in mind. A  modern protagonist is Dummett. See for instance [1973, pp. 110-1] where he 
characterises Fregean sense as an associated criterion for recognising a given object as the referent o f  an 
expression; the referent, if  there is any, being whatever object satisfies that criterion.
I have bypassed the single-description version o f Descriptivism: N is simply short for the F. I do not know 
of anyone who holds this view anymore. It is, to say the least, very hard to hit upon a single descriptive 
property F such that anyone who understands N  knows that if  N  refers then N  refers to the F. More plausible 
is the cluster-of-descriptions version originating in Wittgenstein [1953, § 79] and Searle [1958]: N is short for 
a cluster o f descriptions, the F, the G, the H, etc. Modern proponents o f Descriptivism, e.g. Lewis [1999a, 
1999b] and Jackson [1998b], take their starting point in this version.
5^ I shall not deal with (ii)-(v) in detail. Note, however, that if  the Descriptivist relied entirely on descriptions 
o f type (ii) and (iii), she would violate Kripke's Non-Circularity Condition [1980, p. 68]. The fact that N  is 
associated with descriptive conditions was supposed to answer the question 'what is it in virtue o f which N  
refers to o?' To say that N  refers to o in virtue o f o being the bearer o f N  or that N  refers to o in virtue o f being 
the object I believe to be the referent o f N, is not to give an informative answer to that question. Note also that 
although we often, for good reasons, resort to descriptions of type (iv), they cannot, on pain o f infinite
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that all the watery properties be of the general, qualitative kind - what we have called 
stereotypical properties. But it is open to the Descriptivist to incoiporate descriptions of the 
other types into the cluster, e.g. the stuff that goes under the name 'water' in my speech 
community.
Let me give another example of a Descriptional term. According to Descriptivism, 
an ordinary proper name like Bill Clinton' is commonly associated with a cluster of 
descriptions: the current US president, the Democrat ex-senator in Arkansas, the guy who 
had an affair with Monica Lewinsky, the person known as 'Bill Clinton', the politician 
married to Hillary Clinton, etc.; in short, the Clinton-properties. To understand 'Bill 
Clinton' is to know sufficiently many of these conditions to be able to identify Bill Clinton. 
No knowledge of reference is part of knowledge of meaning: one need not know of Bill 
Clinton that 'Bill Clinton' refers to him in order to understand 'Bill Clinton', and someone 
could know of Bill Clinton that 'Bill Clinton' refers to him without understanding 'Bill 
Clinton'. Moreover, these descriptive conditions are at the same time what uniquely 
determine the reference of Bill Clinton', not only at W a, but at every Wp. Bill Clinton is 
whoever uniquely has the Clinton-properties, and anyone who uniquely has the Clinton- 
properties is Bill Clinton. The name 'Bill Clinton' can be taken as a shorthand for the 
cluster of definite descriptions of the Clinton-properties.
Since, in general, the descriptive content of N is that by which the reference of N is 
determined at a given Wp, we can represent this content by a function from Wp to 
extensions:
Fi: Wp —> Extension/Reference
regress, constitute our ultimate means o f  determining reference. Descriptions o f  type (vi), o f  which 
descriptions o f type (v) is a sub-class, will, however, prove very important for the Descriptivist as we shall 
see in a short while.
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To say that N is a flexible designator is to say that the values of Fi differ as it takes 
different Wp as arguments. The reference of N at a Wp - be it actual or counterfactual - 
solely depends upon how things are at Wp. Ignoring descriptions of type (vi), 'water' refers 
to natural kind k at Wp iff k has the watery properties at Wp. 'Bill Clinton' refers to 
individual i at Wp iff i has the Clinton-properties at Wp. The (traditional) Descriptivist thus 
endorses Descriptivist Reference:
(DR) N refers to o at Wp iff o satisfies (|) at Wp.
In sum, we have seen that Semantic Internalism and Descriptivism are tightly 
connected in that the former presupposes some version of the latter. What we shall now see 
is that there is a correspondingly close connection between Semantic Externalism and 
Referentialism. Traditionally, Semantic Externalism has been taken to stand to 
Referentialism as Semantic Internalism stands to Descriptivism, At first blush, this seems 
right, but I shall eventually ai'gue that the picture is more blurred. It is true that Semantic 
Externalism follows from Referentialism, but the former does not presuppose the latter: an 
adequately constrained version of Descriptivism upholds a version of Semantic 
Externalism.
2.3. Semantic Externalism and Referentialism
We saw in Chapter 1 that the Twin Earth Argument showed that my doppelganger's tokens 
of sentences containing 'water' and my tokens of the same type of sentences had different 
truth-conditions. My doppelganger's utterance of 'water is wet' is true iff twin-water, i.e. 
XYZ, is wet, whereas my utterance of 'water is wet' is ti'ue iff water, i.e. H2 O, is wet. We 
dubbed such truth-conditions singular due to the occurrence on the right-hand side of the 
bi-conditional of the very referent of 'water' - as opposed to a set of descriptive conditions
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an object has to satisfy in order to be the referent of 'water'. It followed, given our 
assumptions, that if mental content is individuated by truth-conditions, and mental states by 
their contents, then the property of having the belief that water is wet is not intrinsic. What 
can the propositional content of 'water' consist in according to the Semantic Externalist? 
Well, if an utterance on Earth of a sentence containing 'water' has truth-conditions which 
are singular with respect to H2 O, then such an utterance must express a singu lar  
proposition, given that we have identified the truth-condition of a sentence with the 
proposition it expresses. A singular proposition is a proposition which is essentially about a 
particular object in the sense that the proposition is individuated by that object. Earthly 
tokens of sentences containing 'water', for instance, are essentially about H2 O. Descriptive 
content is no part of the content of a singular proposition. The constituents of a singular 
proposition are the referents of the terms that make up the sentence that expresses that 
proposition. The singular proposition expressed by an Earthly token of, say, 'water is wet' 
consists of the stuff water, i.e. H2 O, and the property of being wet: <H2 0 ; w e t - h o o d > . ^ 6  
follows straightforwardly that had H2 O not existed, 'water is wet' could not express a 
proposition which is singular with respect to H 2 O. Singular content is thus object- 
dependent. To see why the Semantic Externalist appears to be committed to singular 
propositions, suppose an Earthly token of 'water is wet' did express some descriptive 
property, say, the F. Since we assume that 'the F' expresses a non-singular property that 
invokes no environment-specific entities, it will be possible for doppelgangers to share 
beliefs with 'the F' in the embedded clause. So, to the extent that 'water is wet' expresses 
descriptive properties, one would have to allow for narrow content belief with 'water is wet' 
as the embedded sentence. It would therefore seem as if a thorough-going Semantic 
Externalist must endorse the claim that the propositional content of 'water is wet' is nothing
6^ One could adopt a similar notation when assigning singular truth-conditions: 'water is wet' is true iff <H20; 
wet-hood>, and thereby emphasise that what occurs on the right-hand side is the stuff - H^O - and the 
property - wet-hood - themselves, and not some preferred, or even canonical, mode o f presentation o f them.
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but singular. This means in particulai' that the natural kind term 'water' cannot be associated 
with descriptive content, but must refer directly, i.e. pick out its referent unmediated by any 
descriptive condition. We shall call such a term purely Referentiaf'^ and the view that all 
singulai* and general terms are purely Referential for Referentialism. A purely Referential 
general term has as its extension objects of the same kind, or, one might say, it refers 
directly to the abstract kind. The term 'water', for instance, applies to all and only things 
that are members of the kind H2 O, and not to the class of watery things as Descriptivism 
would have it. This means that the contribution a purely Referential term yields to 
determining the proposition expressed by sentences containing it is its referent: its meaning 
is its referent. The term 'water' does not abbreviate a conjunction of definite descriptions 
that express the watery properties; it functions semantically as a mere referring device. If 
the correlation claim - the meaning of an expression is what someone knows when she 
understands it - is accepted, it follows that someone who understands a purely Referential 
term as it occurs in sentences, must have knowledge of its referent that the term refers to it. 
In order to understand an utterance of, say, the sentence 'water is wet' one has to grasp its 
singular ti'uth-conditions and to grasp them is to have De Re knowledge of water, i.e. H2 O, 
that it is wet. What is more, the having of such knowledge seems to require as a necessary 
condition that one stands in suitable epistemic relations to H2 O, since we know that unique 
identifying knowledge will not suffice. What exactly such knowledge amounts to is unclear 
and probably varies from concept to concept. However, a minimal constraint must be that
Also known in the literature as directly referential or Millian terms. With Kripke's words [1994, p. 353], a 
proper name is Millian if  "It sim ply refers to its bearer, and has no other linguistic function. In particular, 
unlike a definite description, a name does not describe its bearer as possessing any special identifying 
properties."
It is o f course possible that a Referential term, as well as a Descriptional term, has other non-semantic 
ingredients in its meaning: connotations, tone, colour and what not. By 'meaning' and 'propositional content' I 
understand semantic content, content which is truth-conditionally relevant.
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one, or at least a fellow speaker, sustains adequate causal links with instances of the kind 
H 2 O, e.g. that one has had perceptual contact with such instances.
The same is true of purely Referential singular terms. The proper name Bill 
Clinton' does not refer to Bill Clinton by satisfaction of the Clinton-properties - it refers 
directly to him. 'Bill Clinton is not short for 'the individual with the Clinton-properties’. 
This means that the referent of 'Bill Clinton' must enter into propositions expressed by 
sentences containing the name, i.e. that such sentences express singular propositions. An 
utterance of 'Bill Clinton is kind' expresses the proposition <Bill Clinton; kindness>, since 
it has the singular truth-conditions: 'Bill Clinton is kind' is true iff Bill Clinton is kind. It 
follows that had Bill Clinton not existed, that sentence could not have expressed the 
proposition it does express. The propositional content of the name 'Bill Clinton' - its 
meaning - is its referent, since this is its contribution to determining the proposition 
expressed by sentences containing it. The semantic function of a purely Referential proper 
name is merely to pick out a referent. Again, if the Clinton-properties do not constitute the 
meaning of the name, then knowledge of these properties can be no part of what one knows 
when one understands the name. To understand an utterance of 'Bill Clinton is kind' is to 
grasp its singular truth-conditions; it is to.know of Bill Clinton that he is kind and to 
possess such De Re knowledge requires, in turn, that one be - more or less - epistemically
The difficulty o f spelling out what such D e Re knowledge consists in corresponds to the difficulty from 
Sec. 1.5. o f making explicit the external condition E on wide concept possession. The main point is, with 
Russell [1980], that knowledge by description, or propositional knowledge, will not suffice. One must have 
knowledge by acquaintance and it seems that one cannot in this sense know which object is being referred to 
if  one has had no epistemic contact with the referent, if, in particular, one lacks discriminating knowledge. For 
discussion see Evans [1982, pp. 89-100], Davies [1981b, p. 97] and Neale [1990, pp. 16-19]. Note how this 
parallels the fact that singular content is object-dependent and descriptive content is object-independent. One 
cannot have knowledge by acquaintance if  there is nothing o f which one is acquainted, but one can have 
knowledge by description even if nothing happens to satisfy the description(s). The Descriptivist should thus 
beware o f embracing a kind o f knowledge or epistemic ability that could not be attained were the world not to 
co-operate with our linguistic stipulations.
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linked up with Bill Clinton. To know the meaning of a name is thus to have knowledge of 
reference in the sense that one knows of the referent that the name refers to it. 2 0  But if our 
stipulation from Sec. 2.2.:
(S) Let 'water' refer to whatever stuff has watery properties Pi, P2 , Ps-.Pn,
is not meaning-conferring, what semantic work does it do? According to Referentialism, all 
descriptive conditions can accomplish by way of determining meaning, is to fix the 
reference once and for all of a term being introduced. (S) is a device for introducing 'water' 
into language - it facilitates the baptising of a kind of substance. The reason that descriptive 
conditions can play no role in determining reference on subsequent occasions or in 
counterfactual circumstances is that they confer no propositional content upon the term. (S) 
is a mere reference-fixing stipulation. Once the reference of 'water' has been determined by 
satisfaction of the watery properties to be H2 O on Earth, then 'water' refers to H2 O on all 
subsequent occasions and with respect to all counterfactual circumstances. In other words, 
the natural kind term 'water' rigidly picks out the kind of stuff that has the watery properties 
at the actual world Wa- On Earth 'water' is a rigid designator of the natural kind H2 O, and 
on Twin Earth, 'water' is a rigid designator of the natural kind XYZ .21 As opposed to 
Descriptivism, we may say that 'water' is variant in content, but world-bound in reference. 
On Earth 'water' is set up by my use of (S) to refer rigidly to H2 O. Hence, my tokens of 
'water' do not refer to XYZ on Twin Earth even if XYZ equally has all the watery
2 0  Thus suppose I say: let 'Newman 1' refer to the first child born in the 22nd century. Given that I am not 
now informationally - or causally - linked up with the referent of 'Newman 1', I am not now in a position to 
have beliefs that I would express using 'Newman T. For disagreement see Kaplan [1989] who thinks that it is 
possible for a speaker to entertain a singular proposition although its constituents are not epistemically salient 
to her,
2^  Donnellan [1966], Kaplan [1989], Putnam [1990, 1996] and Kripke [1980] have all argued that natural 
kind terms are rigid designators. The claim is almost universally accepted nowadays.
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properties, and so 'water' means water on Earth. On Twin Earth, however, 'water' is set up 
by my doppelganger's use of (S) to refer rigidly to XYZ. Hence, his tokens of 'water' do not 
refer to H2 O on Earth even if H2 O equally has all the watery properties, and so 'water' 
means twin-water on Twin Earth.
In general, Referentialism is thus a denial of the claim that there is one thing - 
descriptive content - such that it is both what someone knows when she understands a 
referring term N and is what determines the reference of N with respect to Wp. No single 
entity plays this dual role in the theory of meaning and the theory of reference. Descriptive 
content can be dispensed with in a theory of meaning: to understand N as in sentences in 
which it occurs is to have De Re knowledge of the referent of N and to meet whatever 
epistemic constraints that involves. The role of descriptive content in a theory of reference 
is restricted to that of reference-fixing: once the reference of N is fixed at an initial episode 
of dubbing an object o, there is no further question about what the referent of N is; N 
directly picks out o at all Wp - unmediated by any descriptive condition <j).22 N is modally 
rigid in that the object N picks out at W a is the object it picks out at all Wp. We can thus 
define modal rigidity in terms of possible worlds:
(Wp-Rigidity) N is rigid designator iff N refers to the same object o at every 
Wp at which o exists and not to something else at Wp at which o does not 
exist.23
2 2  There are in fact two separate issues here. One concerns the descriptive-sem antic  question about what 
semantic value N has in our language; another concerns the foundational-sem antic  question about what 
makes it the case that N  has the semantic value that it has; cf. Stalnaker [1997]. Descriptivism tells us that the 
semantic value o f N  is its descriptive content, and answers the second question by saying that descriptive 
content is what someone knows - implicitly or explicitly - when she understands N. Referentialism, on the 
other hand, tells us that the semantic value o f N  is its referent, and answers the second question by a causal 
theory o f reference: my present use o f N  goes back by some causal chain o f communication to an original act 
of baptising; cf. Kripke [1980] and Evans [1996a].
23 This leaves it open whether N  is a persistent rigid designator that refers to o at Wponly if  o exists at Wp or 
an obstinate rigid designator that refers to o at Wp even if  o does not exist at Wp. I shall not take a stand on
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Thus if we represent singular content by our function Fi from Wp to extensions/referents, 
then the values of Fi will remain constant as it takes different Wp as arguments. To say that 
N is a rigid designator is to say that the reference of N at a Wp - be it actual or 
counterfactual - solely depends upon how things are at W a - bracket questions about 
existence at Wp (cf. fn. 22). The Referentialist endorses Referentialist Reference:
(RR) N refers to o at Wp iff o satisfies (j) at Wa -
With our examples, 'water’ refers to natural kind k at Wp iff k has the watery properties at 
Wa - Likewise, if we suppose 'Bill Clinton' to have been introduced by analogy to (S), 'Bill 
Clinton' refers to individual i at Wp iff i has the Clinton-properties at Wa -^ ''^  Note also that 
on both the Descriptivist and the Referentialist accounts, reference at Wa is uniquely 
determined by how things are at Wa - They will thus agree on the reference-conditions for 
N with respect to W a '
(WA-R) N refers to o at Wa iff o satisfy (j) at Wa -
this issue. Kiipke [1980, pp. 21, 78] assumed that ordinary proper names were o f the latter kind: if  I say 
'suppose Hitler had never been born', I refer to Hitler at a Wp at which he does not exist. See also Kaplan 
[1989] and Salmon [1982, pp. 32-40]
2“^ The Referentialist need not claim that all names necessarily are rigid designators. As Kripke [1980, pp. 79, 
91, 94] says, we could take 'Jack the Ripper' to refer flexibly to whoever was the murderer o f several 
prostitutes in 1890's London, such that if  Jones was the actual murderer, he would be Jack the Ripper, but had 
James been the murderer, he would have been Jack the Ripper, etc. I shall henceforth use 'Jack the Ripper' in 
this manner. If the reader disagrees, assume the name has such a use for the sake of argument. Kripke's 
contention is merely that Descriptional names actually  form a minor sub-class o f ordinary proper names the 
majority o f which are purely Referential.
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'Water' refers to natural kind k at W a iff k has the watery properties at W a, and 'Clinton' 
refers to individual i at W a iff i has the Clinton-properties at Wa. (Wa-R) highlights the 
fact that the reference of N, taken as purely Descriptional, and the reference of N, taken as 
purely Referential, coincide when it comes to Wa.^^ The class of watery things at W a is 
identical to the instances at W a of the natural kind H2 O, and the individual who has all the 
Clinton-properties at W a is the individual who bears the purely Referential name 'Bill 
Clinton'. This point will prove important: the difference between Descriptivism and 
Referentialism with respect to reference only arises when it comes to counterfactual 
worlds.
Let me finally emphasise how Referentialism underpins, not only the assumption 
made in the Twin Earth Argument that Earthly and Twin Earthly tokens of 'water'- 
sentences have different singular truth-conditions, but also object-dependence: were I on 
Dry Earth, my tokens of such sentences would lack singular tmth-conditions. Under these 
imagined circumstances there is no answer as to which kind o f stuff - which kind of micro­
physical conditions - would make my tokens true or false, and so no answer as to which 
proposition  I could thereby have expressed. This strongly suggests that our Dry Earth 
Argument is sound, or more precisely, that if Semantic Externalism is backed up by 
Referentialism, then there is no stable intermediary position between Semantic Internalism 
and Strong Semantic Externalism.
25 It may be objected that Referentialism is neither committed to (RR) nor to (W^^-R) given that there are 
versions o f  causal theories o f reference which account for reference-fixing without invoking descriptive 
conditions. Maybe so. The point is that, following Kripke [1980] and others, it is clearly a possibility that a 
term may have its reference fixed by satisfaction o f some descriptive condition without that condition 
entering into the propositional content o f the term.
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2.4. The Modal Argument
In the previous two Sections we have seen the close connections between Semantic 
Internalism and Descriptivism, and Semantic Externalism and Referentialism. Which 
doctrine about mental content is adopted will depend on which doctrine about semantic 
content is viable. This is not much news to anyone. Putnam [1990, 1996], for one, was 
explicit that his attack on Semantic Internalism was paralleled by the range of arguments 
that Ki'ipke [1980] almost simultaneously had launched against Descriptivism. To assess 
whether to take the conclusion of the Twin Earth Argument into account, one should 
evaluate the arguments that support the presuppositions of that Argument. To this task I 
shall turn in a moment. But before that, consider what kind of arguments may be brought to 
bear on either Descriptivism or Referentialism. We are interested in arguments that puiport 
to show what the propositional content of a referring term is. One way to do that is to have 
an ai'gument that says something about the proposition expressed by an atomic sentence - a 
sentence free from intentional and modal vocabulary - containing that expression. Then we 
could use;
{Compositionality o f Content) The propositional content of a sentence is uniquely 
determined by the content of its constituent expressions and their syntactic manner of 
combination.
to deduce a conclusion about the content of the contained expression. Again, by proposition 
I shall understand what is expressed by an utterance of an atomic sentence, and what is thus 
expressed is both what someone knows when she understands the sentence and also the 
conditions under which it is true. In the following I will be concerned with the question of 
which properties of what is expressed by an utterance of a sentence are relevant for 
determining the propositional content of that sentence. It is striking that the same line of 
argument is adopted by both doctrines: the Content - Property (CP)-Argument. The CP-
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Argument is a reductio and runs like this: suppose that two singular terms a  and P coincide 
in content Then, by (Compositionality o f Content), two atomic sentences
(1) S(a)
(2) S(P),
whose only difference is that (1) contains a  and (2) contains p, would also coincide in 
content. Consequently, if the content expressed by (1) were identical to that expressed by
(2), they would both, by Leibniz's Law, have a certain property \|/. But, ex hypothesi, the 
content expressed by (1) has \\f, i.e.
(3) 'S(a) has \)/'
is true, while the content expressed by (2) does not, i.e.
(4) 'S(P) hasxj/'
is false, and so the content expressed by (3) is not identical to that expressed by (4). Hence, 
by (Compositionality o f  Content), the contents of (1) and (2) must differ, hence, the 
contents of a  and p must differ.
Now, the dispute between Descriptivism and Referentialism concerns which 
instances of the CP-Argument are persuasive, i.e. which \jf are the relevant content- 
individuating properties. To begin with, the truth-value of an atomic sentence, or for its 
sub-sentential expressions, extension or reference, is a minimal i|/ that any satisfactory 
account of content must respect. Given the identification of content with truth-conditions 
for such sentences, (1) and (2) must express different contents if they receive different 
truth-values, and likewise for (3) and (4) provided \j/ is a relevant content-sensitive 
property. Or if two terms refer to different objects in the same context, then they must 
differ in content. It is equally obvious that there are which can be excluded out of hand 
such as ’is expressed by linguistic expression %\ 'gives rise to conversational implicature v', 
or 'is infoiTnative to an incompetent speaker'. Let me illustrate. Suppose it is claimed that:
(5) Vixens are female foxes, 
and
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(6) Vixens are vixens,
which intuitively have the same truth-conditions, coincide in content. Surely we would 
want to rule out instances of the CP-Argument to the effect that (5) and (6) express 
different contents for the reason that the two contents are expressed by different sentences, 
or that some conceptually ignorant speaker might take different cognitive attitudes towards
(5) and (6). If such \\r were relevant content-individuating properties, no two terms would 
ever have the same content. Between platitudinous \|/'s and irrelevant \|/'s, there is room, 
however, for argument that some instances of the CP-Argument are p l a u s i b l e . 2 6  in 
particular, Referentialism claims that modal semantic value is one such content-sensitive 
property. First some background.
We have seen that according to Descriptivism, natural kind terms like 'water' or 
'tiger' are shorthand for a list of definite descriptions which we abbreviated as 'the watery 
stuff and 'the tiger-properties'. It follows that if that list contains descriptions of type (i) - 
(iv) only, the terms 'water' and 'tiger' will be modally flexible, i.e. they will apply to 
different kinds of objects at different Wp. Take the Twin Earth Argument from Chapter 1, 
but now think of Twin Earth as a counterfactual Wp. The claim would then be that 
Descriptivism gets the truth-conditions wrong with respect to such a counterfactual Twin 
Earth. According to Descriptivism, Eaithly utterances of 'water is wet' are true at Wp iff the 
watery stuff at Wp is wet, so in particular, they are tme at Twin Earth iff the wateiy stuff on 
Twin Earth is wet.27 But these are not the conditions under which Earthly tokens of 'water'- 
sentences are true; only the obtaining of H20-facts can make such tokens true. The 
intuition is thus that 'water' is a rigid designator of H2 O, for had 'water' referred to XYZ at
26 It is also striking that most if  not all CP-Arguments are negative in their intent. It is well-known that it is 
very hard to give necessary and sufficient conditions for two expressions to coincide in content. Co- 
extensionality, for instance, is clearly no good as ’creatures with heart' and 'creatures with kidney' illustrate, 
and, as we shall see in the next Chapter, even necessary co-extensionality may not suffice.
27 Again, by 'water is wet' is true a t Wp, I mean that the proposition actually expressed by 'water is wet' is true 
at Wp, and not that 'water is wet' would express a true proposition were it uttered in Wp.
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some Wp, one would have to consider XYZ-facts when evaluating the truth-values of 
Earthly utterances of ’water'-sentences with respect to those Wp. What the modal rigidity of 
an expression shows seems to be that associated descriptive properties constitute neither a 
sufficient nor a necessary condition for determining the reference at Wp. The former is 
illustrated by our counterfactual Twin Earth: XYZ has all the watery properties and yet is 
intuitively not water. Or imagine a counterfactual Wp where there are no tigers, but a 
qualitatively indistinguishable species of felines who nevertheless are genetically different 
from tigers. Such twin-tigers are not tigers. The latter is also conceivable. Imagine a 
counterfactual Twin Earth on which H2 O lacks the watery properties. Given that H2 O 
uniquely has the watery properties on Earth, intuitions have it that even H2 O on this Twin 
Earth is water. Similarly, we can imagine a Wp at which something is a tiger while not 
having the tiger-properties. In both cases, I take it, our intuitions are informed by the kind 
of micro-physical reductions I mentioned in Sec. 1.2; once physical science discovers that 
H 2 O occupies the causal role played by water, it discovers the necessary identity that water 
is H 2 O .2 8
In fact, as Putnam [1970] pointed out, it may well happen that the stereotypical 
properties are defeated at W a. We know of, or could easily imagine without change in the 
laws of physics, abnormal members of natural kinds, e.g. green lemons that never turn 
yellow, or non-striped, three-legged tigers, etc. There is, however, an important difference 
between what can happen at W a and at counterfactual Wp. At W a it is - next to - 
physically impossible that something can be a member of a natural kind and yet lack all 
typical descriptive properties. The Descriptivist could therefore insist that for something to
Putnam [1996] did not rest content with possibilities grounded in such theoretical identifications. He 
thought that pencils could have turned out to be organisms, cats could have been robots, paediatricians might 
have been a Martian species. It is not cleai* that we have firm intuitions about how to describe such possible 
cases. For scepticism see Dummett [1973, pp. 143-6]. In any case, note that also the Descriptivist has the 
conceptual resources to accommodate such possibilities: 'being human’ need not be a cluster-property 
associated with 'paediatrician'. Cf. also Schwartz [1996].
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be a member of a natural kind, it need only have sufficiently many of these properties in 
order to count as a member of that kind. This move would get around problems with 
uniqueness at W a - provided we knew how many properties were enough. But the 
Referentialist can push her case: at counterfactual Wp we can imagine instances of natural 
kinds that lack every single standard characteristic, e.g. an H2 0 -sample which has none of 
the watery properties is nevertheless water. Due to the modal rigidity of natural kind terms, 
they pick out at every Wp whatever stuff is substance-identical with the stuff that has the 
associated descriptive properties at W a, whether or not it, or anything else, has those 
properties at those Wp. So, since there are Wp at which something is, say, water without 
having the watery properties, and Wp at which something has the watery properties without 
being water, these properties do arguably not enter into the prepositional content of 'water'. 
It can be no part of the prepositional content of such terms to have associated any such 
properties; their referents, if they have any, seem to provide all their content.29
The same is true of proper names. Suppose 'Aristotle' is a flexible designator, 
because simply short for 'the teacher of Alexander', etc. Then suppose Wi is a world just 
like W a except Plato taught Alexander, etc., and suppose W2  is a world just like W a 
except nobody taught Alexander, etc. According to Descriptivism, 'Aristotle' would then 
refer to Plato at W%, and not to Aristotle at W2 . But that has highly counter-intuitive 
consequences. Suppose I utter 'Aristotle was born in Stagira'. Then what I have said would 
be tme at W 1 because of the fact that Plato was born in Stagira at W i, and what I have said 
would lack a truth-value at W2  because of the fact that nobody taught Alexander, etc. at 
W 2 . Surely, what I have said is false both at W i and W2 . So, 'Aristotle' cannot be a 
shorthand for 'the teacher of Alexander', etc. The fact that 'Aristotle' rigidly picks out its
The Referentialist need not render descriptive content altogether redundant in a theory o f meaning for 
natural kind terms. Putnam [1970, 1978, 1990, 1996] and McGinn [1999] have proposed hybrid theories 
which incorporate such stereotypical, but not semantically relevant, information; see Chapter 4 for more.
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referent seems to imply that it can have as no part of its propositional content any 
associated descriptive properties; its referent, if it has any, provides all its content.
The last two paragraphs contain what has come to be known as the M oda l 
A r g u m e n t . It is an instance of the CP-Argument which deploys modal properties as 
content-individuating: if  N were short for the F, the G, the H, etc., in short (j), then N and (j) 
would have the same modal properties. In particular, 'N might not have been (j)' would be 
false since equivalent to '(j) might not have been (])' which is false. But 'N might not have 
been (j)' is true due to the different modal properties that N and (|) have - N is modally rigid 
whereas <j) is modally flexible. So, N and (|) must differ in content. In other words, were N 
simply an abbreviation of (j), one should be allowed to substitute the two expressions in 
modal contexts salve veritate. But widespread intuition has it that such substitution fails to 
preserve truth-value when those expressions are actually, but not counterfactually co- 
referring, and so N does not abbreviate (}). More formally, the CP-Argument runs as 
follows: suppose the propositional content of N is given by the definite descriptions (j) - N is 
just a convenient shorthand for (j). Then, by (Compositionality o f Content), the two atomic 
sentences
(7) N is N,
(8)Nis4^
should also coincide in content. If so, then, by Leibniz Law [a  = P & E(a)] E(P), the
contents expressed by (7) and (8) must have the same content-individuating properties. In 
particular, they should have the same modal properties where this is understood to mean 
that the sentences that express those contents must embed similarly inside the scope of a 
modal operator. Hence,
(9) N might not have been N, 
and
Originally due to Kripke [1980]. For a forceful recent statement o f the Modal Argument see Soames 
[1998].
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(10) N might not have been <j),
should also coincide in content. Yet we are strongly inclined to say that (9) is false while 
(10) is true, since there are Wp at which N is not <j), but no Wp at which N is not N. We 
know that there will be Wp at which N and <j) are not co-referential, because we know that 
N is modally rigid and (j) modally flexible. It follows that a difference in truth-value entails 
a difference in content, and so that (9) and (10) must differ in content, hence, so must (7) 
and (8), and therefore also N and (j>. The Modal Argument applies to all referring terms: 
substitute N and <|) for ’Aristotle' and 'the teacher of Alexander', etc., 'water' and 'the watery 
stuff, 'tiger' and 'the tiger-properties', and so on.
The Modal Argument seems - on the face of it - persuasive. What could the 
Descriptivist say in response? The first worry that comes to mind concerns an operator- 
shift fallacy. It is clear that the validity of the Argument depends on whether N takes the 
same scope in (9) and (10) with respect to the modal operator 'might not'. Suppose first 
that, as we normally do, N is read as taking wide scope with respect to 'might not'. Thus
(10) is true on that reading: 3x(x = N & -^<{)N). Is (9) true on that reading: 3x[x = N & 
0 -(N  = N)]? It seems not, but the Descriptivist will insist that (9) is semantically 
equivalent to:
(11) (j) might not have been (j),
which is true if read with wide scope: 3x[Vy ((j)y o  x = y) & <>-(|)x]. There are Wp at 
which (j) at W a is not ^ at Wp. Thus read (9) is in fact true. Compare with 'the survivor 
might have died' which is true if read (of the survivor, possibly, he died), but false if read 
(possibly, the survivor died). So, there is no way (9) can be false and (10) true on a wide 
scope reading. So, perhaps N in (10) should have narrow scope with respect to 'might not': 
^3x(x  = N & ~<|)N). Thus read, (10) seems tme. Is (9) then false on a narrow scope reading: 
03x[x  = N & ~(N = N)]? It clearly is. Even the Descriptivist who maintains that (9) is 
equivalent to (11) must accept that (11) is false if the description-operator <|) takes narrow 
scope: 03c[Vy ((|)y x = y) & -(|>x]. There are no Wp at which (j) at Wp is not (j) at Wp.
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But the Descriptivist will object that so is (10). On a narrow scope reading, (10) says that 
there is a Wp at which N is not (j). But given that at Wp N picks out whatever (j) picks out, 
there can be no Wp at which N is not (j). It follows, or so runs the thought, that there is no 
way (9) and (10) can differ in truth-value on a naiTow scope reading either. So, unless the 
Modal Argument is to trade on an illicit shift of scope, there is no way (9) and (10) can 
receive different truth-values, and so no reason has been provided why they should not 
have identical contents.
I think this response is consistent on the part of the Descriptivist. To presuppose 
that (9) has no true reading is to presuppose that N picks out the same referent inside as 
well as outside the scope of the modal operator, i.e. that N is a rigid designator. To make 
this presupposition against someone who thinks that N is modally flexible is clearly 
question-begging. So, we are trapped in a deadlock. The Referentialist uses the modal 
rigidity of N to show that N and (j) must differ in content. The Descriptivist denies that N is 
modally rigid and insists on its descriptive content (j). What must be proved, and not just 
presupposed, is therefore that N is a rigid designator. To provide a knock-down argument 
is, however, notoriously difficult. Nevertheless, I think the intuitions in favour of rigidity 
are overwhelming. It is just highly counter-intuitive to say that (9) has a reading on which it 
is true and that (10) has a reading on which it is false. How can an utterance of 'Aristotle 
might not have been Aristotle' be understood as tme? Even if put this way: (of Aristotle, 
possibly, he is not Aristotle), (9) is still false. There is no Wp at which Aristotle at Wa  is 
not Aristotle at Wp, and the reason we are inclined to say this is our feeling that 'Aristotle' 
is modally rigid. And how can an utterance of 'Aristotle might not have been the teacher of 
Alexander, etc.' be understood as false? Even if put this way: (possibly, Aristotle is not the 
teacher of Alexander, etc.), (10) still seems true. There is a Wp at which all things true of 
Aristotle at Wa  are false of Aristotle at Wp. Again, it flies against intuition to say that we 
do not speak about the same man. It is granted that if Descriptivism is true, then they can be 
understood in these ways, but so much the more reason to think it is not. In other words,
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were Descriptivism true, (9) would be ambiguous between a true wide scope reading and a 
false narrow scope reading in the way (11) is, but (9) is - we all agree - unambiguously 
false.
The foregoing squares with what Kripke said about rigidity. He never presented an 
explicit and cogent argument to the effect that referring terms were modally rigid, but 
appealed to speakers' intuitions about the behaviour of such expressions in modal contexts. 
To decide whether any given term is modally flexible or rigid, Kiipke [1980, pp. 48-9] 
proposed an intuitive test - the Godel-Schmidt Test - which, slightly modified, says:
If N is a referring term and (j> is an associated descriptive condition, then if 'N 
might not have been (j)' is false, when N takes narrow scope with respect to the 
modal operator, then N is modally flexible.
Thus 'Jack the Ripper might not have been the murderer of several prostitutes in 1890's 
London' is false, when 'Jack the Ripper' takes narrow scope with respect to 'might not', i.e. 
63x(x  = j & ~jM) is false, and so is modally flexible. The scope-constraint on N is 
important for without it 'Jack the Ripper' would fail the test: 3x(x = j & <>~jM) is true. Not 
so for 'Godel'. 'Gddel might not have been the discoverer of the incompleteness of 
arithmetic' is true when 'Godel' takes narrow scope, 03x(x = g & ~gD); indeed one may 
take the fact that the wide scope reading, 3x(x = g & 6-gD ), is also true as evidence that
Our intuition is, in other words, that referring expressions are scopeless, i.e. do not exhibit a D e Re - De 
Dicto distinction in modal contexts; cf. Peacocke [1975]. There is a well-known Descriptivist response in the 
literature due to Dummett [1973]. The idea is to reduce our intuitions about rigidity to syntactic scope- 
conventions: referring expressions are shorthand for a cluster o f wide-scope definite descriptions. A s I have 
tried to show, this view has counter-intuitive consequences, but I shall not argue here that it is simply a non­
starter. Let alone the problems posed by non-modal sentences where there is no room for scope-manoeuvres. 
W e have the intuition that (9*) 'If N  exists, then N  is not N' is necessarily false, but that (10*) If N  exists, 
then N  is not (j)' is possibly true, but how can such basic sentences differ in Wp-truth-value on this view when 
there is no modal vocabulary about which to make scope-distinctions? This Strengthened M odal Argument 
was advanced by Kripke [1980, pp. 10-2], as a reply to Dummett's lengthy and very subtle discussion, and has 
been developed by Stanley [1999a] and Soames [1998].
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'Godel' always semantically takes wide scope. Accordingly 'Godel' satisfies (Wp-Rigidity): 
'Godel' refers to Godel at Wp where Gddel exists, and does not refer to anyone else at Wp 
where Gddel does not exist. At a Wp where, say, Schmidt uniquely invented the 
incompleteness of arithmetic', Gddel, and not Schmidt, will be the bearer of 'Gddel', and at 
a Wp where Gddel failed to discover anything, 'Gddel' still refers to Gddel.32
Do natural kind terms pass the test? No! An utterance of 'water might not have been 
the watery stuff is not false when 'water' takes narrow scope with respect to 'might not', and 
so 'water' is a rigid designator. Formally: ^3x(x = w & ~Wx), where 'W' stands for 'being 
watery' and 'w' for 'water', is true. To say that there is a Wp at which water - the watery 
stuff at W a - is not watery is to say that something might be H2 O and yet lack the watery 
properties. To repeat, this should carry little conviction as an incontestable proof of the 
rigidity of 'water'. Someone - with admittedly rather deviant intuitions - may deny the truth 
of 'water might not have been the wateiy stuff when read narrowly on the grounds that if 
'water' is short for 'the watery stuff then our rendition is semantically equivalent to ^3  
x[Vy (Wy X = y) & ~Wx] which is false.
Why do we think referring terms aie modally rigid? What grounds our intuitions 
that, say, 'Bill Clinton' is a rigid designator? Well, suppose I say:
(12) Had Bill Clinton died at birth, Bill Clinton would not have slept with Ms. Lewinsky.
If 'Bill Clinton' had been modally flexible with respect to the Clinton-properties, then it 
would be unclear what the reference of the second occurrence of 'Bill Clinton' was. But the 
fact that it is not shows that we use 'Bill Clinton' to talk about Bill Clinton even under 
circumstances in which he failed to do what he actually did. Or consider an utterance of:
32 As I said in fn. 24 I have assumed that 'Jack the Ripper’ is modally flexible, but that 'Godel' is modally 
rigid. I am sympathetic to someone who disputes the former; the example is only supposed to illustrate how  
the Godel-Schmidt Test could be passed. To be sure, Kripke [1980] never claimed that our referring terms 
must be purely Referential or anything like that; 'Godel', for instance, is actually a rigid designator, but we 
might have stipulated otherwise.
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(13) Had Plato done all the famous things Aristotle did, Aristotle would not have taught 
Alexander.
It is clear that the second occurrence of 'Aristotle' does not refer to Plato despite the fact 
that Plato - under these counterfactual circumstances - accomplished many of the things 
Aristotle did at W a- The fact that we deploy proper names to talk about their actual 
referents with respect to counterfactual circumstances strongly suggests that the purpose of 
rigid designation in natural language is to facilitate counterfactual reasoning. Such 
reasoning is essential inter alia to the practice speakers engage in when they rationalise 
about their own behaviour and evaluate that of others. Take our examples. The reason Bill 
Clinton had an affair with Ms. Lewinsky was that, say, given his oppressed childhood, he 
could take advantage of his position in the White House when his wife paid him 
insufficient attention. Had Bill Clinton had a different upbringing, wife and job, he would 
not have had the affair. And the reason Aristotle taught Alexander was, say, his position at 
the Academy and his fame as a philosopher. Had someone else had Aristotle's job and 
written Aristotle's books, then he would have been Alexander's teacher. Without rigidity 
we could not be sure we were talking about the same individual under counterfactual 
hypotheses about what might happen to an individual we had descriptively identified at 
W a. If those conjectures involved substantial changes in what is tme of the individual at 
W a, it would be a genuine possibility that either reference failed or changed under such 
circumstances, and the explanatory power would be lost. The same is true of natural kind 
terms. Consider an utterance of:
(14) Had water not fallen from the sky and flowed in lakes and rivers, water would not 
have had a global impact on vegetation.
The truth of this subjunctive conditional depends on the two occurrences of 'water' being 
co-referential. Modal rigidity enables us to fix on the same kind o f stuff under various 
hypotheses about what would have happened had water not had the stereotypical properties 
it has at W a. That way, we can provide causal explanations: water has a global impact on
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vegetation because it falls from the sky and flows in lakes and rivers. Without rigidity we 
could not envisage how the world would have looked had water not had those watery 
properties, since we would not know exactly which kind of stuff we were talking about 
under those counterfactual circumstances.
As we noted earlier, the rigidity of 'water' presupposes that some sort of sameness- 
relation obtains. Some fact must make it the case that we are talking about the same stuff 
under these hypotheses, i.e. that something is called 'water' at Wp only in virtue of being 
substance-identical to what we call 'water' at Wa- But what are the criteria for sustaining 
this same-substance relation across Wp? Given what we have said about counterfactual 
cases, what constitutes the criteria must be the theoretical identifications of manifest 
natural kinds with underlying micro-physical kinds. If water is H2 O at W a, then it is not 
possible that water is not H2 O. What is possible is that some epistemic counterpart of water 
- some watery stuff - turns out not to be H2 O, but that is not to say that water, if H2 O, 
might turn out not to be H2 0 .33 It is the micro-physical identification of water which 
allows for the possibilities that something non-watery could be water and something 
wateiy not water. So, if 'water' is rigid with respect to its micro-structure, then one can 
safely make counterfactual changes in various manifest properties without losing the 
identity of the stuff reasoned about since it is simply fixed by its micro-structure. Micro­
structure is important, as I said in Sec. 1.2., because of the scientific role of a natural kind 
concept. We think that manifest natural kinds like water, tiger or gold have their micro­
physical structure with necessity, because we think it is their underlying structure which
33 Note an interesting implication o f this: if  the Descriptivist allows for descriptions o f type (v) to enter into 
the cluster, i.e. if  she writes in essential properties in conjunction with the superficial ones, then a 
Descriptional natural kind term will satisfy the condition for modal rigid behaviour. W e can imagine such 
modally neutral terms, Dummett [1981, p. 585], set up to refer to whatever stuff has micro-physical property 
P regardless o f whether the stuff exhibits descriptive symptoms. The drawback, however, is a commitment to 
the view that knowledge o f micro-stiucture is part o f what someone knows internally when she understands 
natural kind terms, and that seems hard to accept. For more on the whole issue about whether any substantial 
form o f essentialism flows from Referentialism, see Salmon [1982].
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causally explains why they have the particular macro-physical properties they have: why 
they obey certain physical laws and why certain physical law-like behaviour can be 
predicted, etc.34 If natural kind terms are rigid with respect to the micro-structures of the 
kinds they pick out, they can serve such purposes of our scientific practice. 35
2.5. Rigidifîcation
Let me sum up. We have seen that no viable account of referring terms N can render them 
modally flexible. To deny the modal rigidity of N squares badly with speakers' intuitions 
about their behaviour in modal contexts and such intuitions are informed by the purposes of 
our linguistic practices involving N. But it seems to follow from the Modal Argument that 
if N is modally rigid, then N cannot have descriptive content cj) given by a cluster of definite 
descriptions, since there would then be Wp at which N and (j) were not co-referential, hence 
not inter-substitutable salva veritate in all modal contexts. So, given that N and (j) have
34 In [1996] Putnam took micro-structure as the criterion for substance-identity, but later [1990] he included 
physical law-like behaviour. Presumably, physical behaviour supervenes on micro-structure such that if  two 
substances obey different physical laws, e.g. have different boiling points at sea level, then the two substances 
must have different micro-structures; at least if  they are in nomologically identical Wp. This is compatible 
with two substances obeying the same laws while having different micro-structures, Putnam [1990, p. 69], 
however, accepts the stronger claim that "...differences in micro-structure invariably (at the actual world) 
result in differences in lawful behaviour." Depending on what is meant by 'lawful behaviour', this claim, 
unlike supervenience, could threaten the coherency o f the Twin Earth story: if the physical behaviour o f HgO 
and XYZ is sufficiently different, then twin-water is no longer an epistemic counterpart o f  water, and so my 
doppelganger and I would no longer hold the same narrow content beliefs with respect to the watery 
properties. In Putnam's story, remember. Twin Earth was supposed to be a remote planet at W^, and so the 
laws o f  nature should be the same as on Earth, but H 2 O and XYZ were also supposed to be different 
substances. He did think [1990, p. 70], however, that if  Twin Earth was taken as a counterfactual Wp which 
obeyed different laws o f nature, then the criterion for substance-identity would just be micro-structure.
35 Although the Modal Argument is conceived as the most forceful Referentialist argument against 
Descriptivism, it is often advanced in conjunction with other CP-Arguments. I shall briefly discuss the 
Semantical Argument in Sec. 4.4 and the Epistemological Argument in Sec. 4.5.
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different modal properties, they must also differ in content. What the Modal Aigument thus 
purports to show is that if two expressions differ in modal properties, then they must eo 
ipso differ in content, i.e. that modal semantic value is a relevant content-individuating 
property. So, it seems to follow from the Modal Argument that i fN  is modally rigid, then N  
is non-Descriptional, i.e. purely Referential. It goes without saying that this result is good 
news for Referentialism. As we saw in Sec. 2.3., this view endorses the claim that an 
utterance of a sentence containing a non-empty rigid designator has singular truth- 
conditions. Referential terms serve merely to refer, they are rigid designators devoid of 
descriptive content.
The Descriptivist should at first blush be reluctant to accept any straightforward 
entailment from modal rigidity to lack of descriptive content. The fact that language 
contains de facto  rigid definite descriptions provides counter-examples to this entailment. 
Consider: 'the smallest even prime' which happens to be true of one and the same object at 
every Wp. Mathematical and logical descriptions do all satisfy:
(Wp-Rigidity) N is rigid designator iff N refers to the same object o at every 
Wp at which o exists and not to something else at Wp at which o does not exist,
but they aie clearly purely Descriptional e x p r e s s i o n s . ^ ^  What the Referentialist has in mind 
by a 'rigid designator' is not really (Wp-Rigidity), but what Kiipke [1980, p. 21] calls de 
jure  rigidity, "...where the reference of a designator is stipulated to be a single object, 
whether we are speaking of the actual world or of a counterfactual situation...". Take an 
utterance of the sentence:
(15) Aristotle was fond of dogs.
The Referentialist contention is, with Kiipke's words [1980, p. 6], that:
3^ Since I take it that if  mathematical objects exist, then they necessarily exist, a description like 'the smallest 
even prime' will refer de facto  to the number 2 at all Wp tout court.
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"...there is a certain man - the philosopher we call ’Aristotle’ - such that, as a matter of 
fact, [15] is true iff he was fond of dogs. The thesis of rigid designation is simply... 
that the same paradigm applies to the truth conditions of [15] as it describes 
counterfactual situations. That is, [15] truly describes a counterfactual situation if and 
only if the same aforementioned man would have been fond of dogs, had that 
situation obtained."
Or consider a very recent, concise statement of the same line of thought, Soames [1998, p. 
2]37:
"...our ultimate ground for thinking that the name Aristotle is a rigid designator is our 
conviction that there is a certain individual x, such that for every possible world w, 
the proposition that Aristotle was [fond of dogs] is true at w iff x was [fond of dogs] 
at w...".
What is in play here is thus a notion of rigidity defined not in terms of Wp as (Wp- 
Rigidity), but in terms of singulai* content:
(Singular-Rigidity) N is a (non-empty) rigid designator iff there is an object o such 
that for every Wp the proposition expressed by 'N is F' is true at Wp iff o is F at Wp.
It follows trivially that if N is modally rigid by (Singular-Rigidity), then N is purely 
Referential, since the propositional content of N will be provided by its referent if it has 
any. It also follows that if N is purely Referential, then N contains no descriptive 
information that could be true of different objects at different Wp; N would serve merely to 
refer to the same object at all Wp. So, if N is rigid by (Singular-Rigidity), then N is also 
rigid by (Wp-Rigidity). It is not true, however, that if N is rigid by (Wp-Rigidity), then N 
is also rigid by (Singular-Rigidity).38 De Facto rigid descriptions are counter-examples to
32 See also Peacocke [1975], Davies & Humberstone [1981a] and Neale [1990, Chapter 2].
38 See also [1981, pp. 559-60] where Dummett distinguishes between two Kiipkean thesis: proper names are 
rigid designators and proper names lack descriptive content.
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that entailment. So, (Singular-Rigidity) is a stronger notion of modal rigidity than (Wp- 
Rigidity), and a notion that the Descriptivist better not endorse. The problem is, however, 
that (Singular-Rigidity) seems to be well motivated. The truth-condition of an utterance of
(15) does seem to be singular: (15) is true at Wp iff Aristotle was fond of dogs at Wp. It 
certainly does not have these descriptive truth-conditions: (15) is true at Wp iff the teacher 
of Alexander at Wp was fond of dogs at Wp. To see why not, suppose Plato taught 
Alexander but disliked dogs at W p Then (15) is false at W% because of Plato's distaste for 
dogs at W i. Although we have the intuition that (15) is false at some Wp, this is never due 
to anyone but Aristotle's opinions about dogs at Wp. What anyone else thought of dogs is 
utterly irrelevant when evaluating the truth-value of (15) at Wp; only Aristotle - the man 
himself - enters the picture. Or take 'water'. The reason we think 'water' is a rigid designator 
is that - modal - sentences containing 'water' always depend upon how things are with H2 O. 
That is. Earthly utterances of 'water'-sentences express truth-conditions which are singular 
with respect to H2 0 -stuff, i.e. they are essentially about H2 0 -stuff: 'water is wet' is true at 
Wp iff H2 O is wet at Wp. In contrast, had 'water' been a flexible designator, 'water'- 
sentences would have had descriptive truth-conditions: 'water is wet' is true at Wp iff the 
watery stuff at Wp is wet at Wp. Such truth-conditions are not essentially about any 
particular kind of stuff but whatever happens to be watery. But the fact that XYZ is watery 
and wet on a counterfactual Twin Earth does not render Earthly tokens of 'water is wet' 
true. So it seems that only singular truth-conditions get things right with respect to 
counterfactual Wp, and thus that 'Aristotle' or 'water' should be modally rigid by (Singular- 
Rigidity).
I think this line of reasoning is fine as far as it goes. The lesson is that referring 
terms N cannot have descriptive content (j) encapsulated in definite descriptions of type (i) - 
(iv), since that would make N modally flexible with the result that we would get the truth- 
conditions wrong with respect to counterfactual Wp for tokens of sentences containing N. 
But what is to prevent the Descriptivist from invoking descriptions of type (vi) as part of
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the cluster that make up (|)? Rigidified descriptive truth-conditions will get things right with 
respect to such Wp: (15) is true at Wp iff the teacher of Alexander at Wa was fond of dogs 
at Wp. W i is no counterexample as Plato did not teach Alexander at W a- All the 
Descriptivist needs is thus a rigidification device which transforms the modally flexible 
descriptions that constitute the cluster into rigid designators. The notion of rigidity 
embraced by the Descriptivist should therefore be that of (Wp-Rigidity). One such device is 
an 'actuality'-operator.39 if  'Aristotle' is short for 'the actual teacher of Alexander', etc., then 
both N and (j) are rigid designators by (Wp-Rigidity). 'Aristotle' will pick out at every Wp 
the individual who taught Alexander at W a regardless of whether Aristotle or anyone else 
taught Alexander at Wp. So, 'Aristotle' is still Descriptional in the sense that it picks out its 
referent at Wp by means of satisfaction of some descriptive condition that also constitutes 
what someone knows when she understands 'Aristotle'. Or consider our standing example 
'water is wet'. If 'water' is rigid by (Singular Rigidity), then an Earthly utterance of 'water is 
wet' is true at Wp iff H2 O is wet at Wp. But the Descriptivist will insist that 'water' can be 
rigid by (Wp-Rigidity) and yet have descriptive content given by 'the watery stuff: 'water is 
wet' is true at Wp iff the watery stuff at Wa is wet at Wp. These rigidified descriptive truth- 
conditions gets things right with respect to every Wp: Earthly tokens will not be tine at a 
counterfactual Twin Earth, because the watery stuff on Twin Earth - XYZ - is not the 
watery stuff at W a - H2 O.
The important point is that, pace  the Referentialist, there is no straightforward 
entailment from rigidity to singulai* content. If N is shorthand for 'the actual (])', then N is 
Descriptional yet modally rigid by (Wp-Rigidity). So, it is not true that if N is modally 
rigid, then N is non-Descriptional. It is true that if N is non-Descriptional, then N is 
modally rigid by (Singular-Rigidity), hence by (Wp-Rigidity), but the Descriptivist will of 
course deny the antecedent of that conditional. So, it appears that neither (Singular-
39 I shall take the 'actuality'-operator to be an indexical tliat always refers to the world o f  the context - even 
inside the scope o f  a modal operator. For more on 'actually' see Sec. 4.2.
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Rigidity) nor (Wp-Rigidity) can be used against Descriptivism: to assume the former in an 
argument against Descriptivism is question-begging, to assume the latter, as in the Modal 
Argument, is harmless once rigidification is available. That is, the Descriptivist may 
concede that (9) - N might not have been N - is false, but maintain that so is: (10*) N might 
not have been the actual (|).
There are Wp at which N is not but if N is (j) at Wa , then there are no Wp at which N is 
not (|) at Wa - Similarly:
(10**) The actual (j) might not have been the actual (j),
is unambiguously false. There aie Wp at which whoever is the unique <|) at W a is not (j), but 
there are no Wp at which whoever is the unique (|) at W a is not the unique ^  at W a - By 
rigidification (j) acquires the same modal properties as N, and so there is no basis for setting 
up a CP-Argument deploying differences in modal properties to individuate content. What 
the Referentialist must argue is that we have independent reasons to accept (Singular- 
Rigidity) as opposed to (Wp-Rigidity). But if our intuitions about the truth-conditions of 
sentences containing N with respect to Wp can equally well be accounted for by the truth- 
conditions of corresponding sentences containing 'actualised cj)', then it is hard to see where 
those reasons should come from.
2.6. The Rigidity Principle
We have seen that the Modal Argument can be blocked by rigidification of the descriptive 
condition cj) that, on the Descriptivist account, constitutes the content of a referring term N. 
This Descriptivist response thus accepts the Referentialist assumption that modal properties 
are relevant content-individuating properties: if N and cj) had different modal properties, 
then N and <j> would differ in propositional content. But if (j> is rigidified, then N and cj) share 
modal properties, and so N and cj) do not differ in content. This response thus tacitly 
endorses the Rigidity Principle:
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(RP) If N is modally rigid and (j) modally flexible, then N and cj) must differ in propositional 
content.
The Modal Aigument cmcially hangs on the tenability of (RP). What it says is that ifN  and 
(j) coincided in propositional content, then N and <j) should be inter-substitutable in all 
modal contexts salva veritate. In other words, if N and (j) are not co-referring in all Wp, 
then N and (j) are not co-propositional. But (9) - N might not have been N - and (10) - N 
might not have been (j) - show that substitution fails, and so N and cj) must differ in content. 
In particular, since 'If N exists, then N is N' is a necessary truth, and ex hypothesi N and (j) 
have the same content, then 'If N exists, then N is <j)' should also be a necessary truth. But 
the truth of (10) shows that it is not, so the hypothesis is false. The argument thus 
presupposes a Referentialist Content Assumption:
(RCA) If N and <|) have the same propositional content, then 'If N exists, then N is (j)’ 
expresses a necessary tmth.^o
What the Modal Argument thus shows is that if modal properties like necessity or 
rigidity are relevant content-individuating properties, then if N is modally rigid and (j) is 
modally flexible so that 'N is (j)' expresses a contingency, then N and (}) cannot have the
4^ It is natural to think that (RP) and (RCP) rule that two distinct expressions have the same content only if 
they are rigid designators o f the same thing. But that does not follow. Contraposition on (RP) says that if  N  
and (j) have the same content, then it cannot be that N  is modally rigid and (j) is modally flexible. So, (RP) does 
not rule out that, say, the flexible designators 'The individual called 'Cicero" and 'The individual called 'Tully" 
coincide in content. But (RCA) does. 'The individual called 'Tully' is the individual called ’Cicero" expresses 
a contingent truth. So, one may think that only true identity statements flanked by rigid designators - Cicero is 
Tully - are necessary, hence coincide in content. But there are examples o f necessary identities between 
distinct flexible designators; 'The individual denounced by Tully is the individual denounced by Cicero'. 
Although both descriptions pick out different individuals at different Wp, they will always pick out the same 
individuals at those Wp.
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same content. But no reason has so far been advanced why the Descriptivist must accept 
the antecedent. Neither (RP) nor (RCA) has been given any substantial support, but the 
assumption that any difference in modal properties eo ipso entails a difference in 
propositional content is surely in need of such. Descriptivism holds that meaning and 
understanding are correlative notions. The propositional content of N is what a competent 
speaker knows when she understands N, and to have such knowledge is primarily a matter 
of grasping certain descriptive conditions that are commonly associated with N. Content is 
essentially a cognitive notion; it is something that can be internally accessed if asked. But 
if this is how content is thought of, why should an assumption that stems from a view on 
which meaning and modality are correlative notions be accepted? What someone knows 
when she understands N is not a function from Wp to referents or extensions as it would be 
were propositional content simply individuated by its modal properties. We saw in Sec. 2.2 
that descriptive content could be represented by such a function, namely (DR), but it is not 
identical to (DR). To understand N is not to grasp (DR), although someone who did 
understand N might have knowledge that issued in correct instances of (DR). Someone 
who had an impeccable ability to track the right reference of N across Wp could be said to 
operate (DR), but would not know the content of N if she did not also grasp the associated 
descriptive conditions. So, given the nature of propositional content on the Descriptivist 
construal, there is every reason not to accept (RP) or (RCA). To my knowledge, Evans 
[1996b, p. 182] was the first to contest these principles:
"I agree that sentences containing names embed differently under modal operator 
than do sentences containing descriptions, but [...] the conclusion which Kripke 
draws from this fact follows only upon a questionable view of the connection 
between the content of an utterance and its modal properties."
It is true that a notion of content can be defined such that two expressions have the same 
content iff they behave similarly in modal contexts. Evans called such a notion a 
'proposition’, and he distinguished 'proposition' from 'content' as he took content to be a
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cognitive notion in the manner just sketched. Evans' point was that just as two sentences 
can have different contents while expressing the same proposition, two sentences can have 
the same content whilst expressing different propositions. An example of the former is 
'Hesperus is F' and 'Phosphorus is F', and an example of the latter is 'the teacher of 
Alexander is F' and 'the actual teacher of Alexander is F'.^i If so, then [1996b, p. 201]:
"...sentences with the same content might embed differently inside the scope of modal 
operators."
In light of this, it is cleai* that the Modal Argument has no bite: why should someone who 
questions the individuation of propositional content by modal properties accept a line of 
reasoning that presupposes that content is thus individuated? What needs to be shown, and 
not just assumed, is that (RP) and (RCA) are correct, i.e. that modal rigidity is a relevant 
property of propositional content, so that Leibniz Law can be used to show that a difference 
in modal properties always entails a difference in content. The Modal Argument, by itself, 
provides no reason to think so.42
The Referentialist may rejoin with Kiipke [1980, p. 6], cf. Soames [1998, p. 2],
that:
"A proper understanding of [(15) Aristotle was fond of dogs] involves an 
understanding both of the (extensionally correct) conditions under which it is in fact 
true, and of the conditions under which a counterfactual course of history...would be 
correctly...described by [(15)]."
4^  Note that when one is not engaged in modal discourse, the difference between an utterance o f 'the G is F' 
and 'the actual G is F' seems to be one o f conversational implicature, e.g. to stress one's surprise.
42 A  similar line o f resistance can be found in Stanley [1997] and [1999a]. He points out [1997, p. 153], for 
instance, that not all modal differences can be o f relevance to propositional content: there are (metaphysical) 
Wp at which our words have meanings which differ from the meanings they have at W^, and surely such Wp 
are irrelevant.
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We agreed that propositional content is truth-conditional so that in order to understand an 
utterance of:
(15) Aristotle was fond of dogs,
one must know the conditions under which it is true. Now, if (RP) and (RCA) are 
discarded, as on the proposed view, then an utterance of (15) must have purely descriptive 
truth-conditions. But we have seen that such truth-conditions are adequate only when it 
comes to Wa . Non-rigidified descriptive truth-conditions get things wrong with respect to 
counterfactual Wp. But, as Kripke says, an understanding of (15) cannot consist merely in a 
grasp of the conditions under which such an utterance is true at Wa . (15) and
(16) The teacher of Alexander was fond of dogs,
have the same tmth-conditions with respect to W a - the same WA-truth-conditions - in the 
sense that Aristotle's affection for dogs at W a would make utterances of both true at Wa.^^ 
But, the objection goes, that cannot be right, since proper understanding must also involve 
knowledge that the conditions under which utterances of (15) and (16) are true at various 
counterfactual Wp are different, i.e. that they have different Wp-truth-conditions. Someone 
who thinks that (15) is tme at Wp iff the teacher of Alexander at Wp is fond of dogs at Wp 
has an incorrect understanding of (15), and someone who is agnostic about the Wp-truth- 
conditions of (15) has only a partial understanding of (15). The point is that if propositional 
content is tmth-conditional, as we suppose, then since utterances of (15) and (16) differ in 
truth-value in some Wp, their truth-conditions must differ at some Wp, so their content 
must differ. In other words, if (Wp-Rigidity) is accepted, then propositional content must 
be individuated by a modal notion of truth-conditions. But understanding is knowledge of 
propositional content. So, mere knowledge that the very same state of affairs make both
43 Someone might say that they have different W^-truth-conditions: (15) is true iff  Aristotle was fond o f  
dogs, whereas (16) is true iff  the teacher o f  Alexander was fond o f dogs. The point is merely that the very 
same state o f affairs - Aristotle's affection for dogs at - make both true at W^; not that those state of 
affairs cannot be given different descriptions.
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(15) and (16) true at W a  falls short of constituting everything a speaker has to know if she 
is to have full understanding of them.
Or take another example. Utterances of the sentences 'Animals with hearts have 
kidneys' and 'Animals with hearts have hearts' coincide WA-truth-conditions, but clearly 
have different contents. Co-extensionality at Wa is too coarse-grained a criterion for 
content-individuation. One must also know various counterfactual conditions under which 
such utterances would be true or false, e.g. that some animals could have had hearts 
without kidneys but not hearts without hearts. If all a speaker knows is that 'animals with 
kidneys' and 'animals with hearts' are co-extensional at Wa , without appreciating their 
distinct modal properties, then she will be ignorant of essential aspects of their correct 
assertoric usage. So, the Referentialist objection is that sameness of WA-truth-conditions 
cannot be what individuates propositional content without remainder.
The question is whether this point - essentially that 'truth-condition' is a modal 
notion - vindicates Referentialism. Kiipke [1980] clearly thought so. After the quotation I 
gave above he goes on to define modal rigidity in terms of (Singular-Rigidity).^^ it is of 
course true that the singular truth-conditions - 'Aristotle was fond of dogs' is true iff 
Aristotle (the man himself) was fond of dogs - give the right conditions under which (15) is 
true both at Wa  and at counterfactual Wp. So, if a speaker grasps those singular truth- 
conditions, then she knows both its WA-truth-conditions and its Wp-truth-conditions. 
Nevertheless, once rigidification is available, the Descriptivist can easily accommodate the 
claim that full understanding requires knowledge of WA-truth-conditions as well as 
knowledge of Wp-truth-conditions without endorsing singular truth-conditions. There is no 
need to have knowledge of reference since knowledge of - rigidified - descriptive content 
will suffice. Consider what Dummett [1991, p. 47], says about truth-conditions:
"To grasp the content of an assertion, one needs to know only what possibilities it 
rules out, or, positively expressed, under what conditions it is correct."
44 See the other quotation from Kripke [1980, p. 6] I gave in Sec. 2.5.
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By content Dummett understands what an assertoric utterance of an atomic, i.e. 
unmodalized, sentence expresses. If there were widespread consensus amongst competent 
speakers that 'Aristotle' picked out whoever was the teacher of Alexander at W a, then (15) 
and (16) would express the same contents.45 'Aristotle' and 'the teacher of Alexander' would 
determine their referents at W a in the same way, and so (15) and (16) would say the same 
thing about how W a is. But how can that be if what someone knows when she grasps the 
content of an assertion is which possible state of affairs would render it correct and which 
incorrect - different possible state of affairs make (15) and (16) true? Well, it is clear from 
the context in which this quotation occurs,46 that Dummett does not take 'possible' to mean 
counterfactual possibility. The claim is rather that the same possible circumstances at W a 
would make (15) and (16) true. It is impossible to conceive of actual circumstances under 
which the one, but not the other, is true. At W a it is Aristotle's fondness for dogs which 
makes (15) and (16) true. But suppose that Plato had been the teacher of Alexander at Wa- 
Then if 'Aristotle' simply refers to whoever 'the teacher of Alexander' picks out at W a, then 
'Aristotle' would refer to Plato. If Plato moreover had been fond of dogs, then (15) would 
have been tme at W a due to Plato's fondness for dogs. But the very same state of affairs 
would have made (16) tme. No matter how W a had turned out, (15) is true at W a iff (16) is 
true at W a- So, we may say that someone who knows the purely descriptive content of 
'Aristotle' knows the WA-truth-conditions of sentences containing 'Aristotle': she knows not 
only what makes them true in W a, but also what would make them true had W a been 
different in various ways.42
45 The example is in fact not very plausible and Dummett [1981, p. 562] rightly complains that it has a 
prejudice against Descriptivism. I shall discuss Evans' example, which is very similar to Dummett's, at some 
length in Sec. 4.3.
46 [1991, pp. 47-8], cf. also Dummett [1973, pp. 134-5; 1981, pp. 564-8].
42 I shall get back to this point in Chapter 4.
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What about counterfactual possibilities then? Well, just as Evans distinguished 
between content and proposition, Dummett makes a distinction between (assertoric) 
content and ingredient sense: the ingredient sense of a sentence is the contribution the 
sentence yields to determine the content of more complex sentences of which it is a sub- 
sentence.48 Just as on Evans' account, (15) and (16) coincide in content, but differ in 
ingredient sense/propositions. They coincide in WA-truth-conditions in the sense just 
described, but they differ in Wp-truth-conditions in that they embed differently inside the 
scope of a modal operator. So, although both Evans and Dummett would dispute (RP) and 
(RCA) as principles pertaining to what they call 'content', (RP) and (RCA) are sustained by 
what they call 'proposition' or 'ingredient sense'. The crucial point is that 'proposition' or 
'ingredient sense' need not be notions of singular content. This is where rigidification kicks 
in. Sentences containing 'Aristotle' and 'the teacher of Alexander’ have the same WA-truth- 
conditions, but sentences containing 'Aristotle' and 'the actual teacher of Alexander' have 
the same Wp-truth-conditions. That was how we responded to the Modal Argument: 
'Aristotle' and 'the actual teacher of Alexander' are intersubstitutable salva veritate in modal 
contexts. So, Kripke is right that full understanding requires knowledge of Wp-truth- 
conditions, but he is wrong that only knowledge of singular truth-conditions will fit the bill. 
All it takes is knowledge of rigidified descriptive truth-conditions, i.e. that 'Aristotle' is a 
rigid designator of whoever taught Alexander at Wa* Someone who knew that would know 
that, say, 'Aristotle might not have been the teacher of Alexander’ is hue at Wp iff whoever 
taught Alexander at W a did not teach Alexander at Wp. No knowledge of reference is 
called for.
The picture I have in mind can be illustrated by Dummett's distinction between two 
grades of understanding.49 A speaker who grasps the purely descriptive truth-conditions of
48 Cf. Dummett [1973, pp. 446-7; 1981, pp. 558-73; 1991, p. 48]. See also Forbes [1989] for a distinction on 
much the same lines between the sense o f  an expression and its cognitive significance.
49 Op. cit.
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an atomic sentence has knowledge of its WA-tmth-conditions. She has a grade-one 
understanding of that sentence. As Dummett suggests, it is presumably feasible to have a 
mere grade-one understanding, that is, to know under which conditions an atomic sentence 
is true at W a without knowing the conditions under which it is true at various 
counterfactual Wp. Perhaps she knows how the reference of a proper name occurring in 
that sentence is fixed at W a, but is unawaie that the name is a rigid designator, and so is 
unable to determine its reference with respect to counterfactual Wp. Clearly, such a 
speaker's understanding would be essentially incomplete in that there would be an 
important aspect of the assertoric use of that sentence which the speaker did not master, 
namely how to determine the truth-value of complex, modalized sentences containing it. If, 
however, a speaker knows the rigidified descriptive truth-conditions of a sentence, then she 
has knowledge of such Wp-tmth-conditions. She has a grade-two understanding in that she 
knows the conditions under which that sentence is true at counterfactual Wp. To have a 
grade-two understanding of a sentence is to know the modal properties of the contained 
expressions. But to have knowledge of such properties need not involve knowledge of 
reference. Given that modal rigidity is cashed out by (Wp-Rigidity), one can know that 
'Aristotle' is a rigid designator and yet lack knowledge of its referent. So, the Referentialist 
is right that one cannot embrace the modal rigidity of referring terms without at the same 
time accepting a notion of propositional content which is individuated by that property. But 
the Referentialist is wrong that only singular content is thus individuated. Singular terms 
can have descriptive content if only conferred upon them by rigidified expressions.
Let me sum up. The Modal Argument should only carry conviction against a form 
of Descriptivism according to which a referring term N is modally rigid yet its only 
propositional content is given by modally flexible definite descriptions (|). Since the Modal 
Argument assumes that N is a rigid designator, a form of traditional Descriptivism which 
denies that assumption can also consistently be held although only with highly counter­
intuitive consequences. There are, however, also more plausible ways to block the Modal
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Argument. One is to meet the underlying constraints - (RP) and (RCA) - about content- 
individuation. If the descriptive content of a rigid designator N were given by rigidified (j), 
then Leibniz Law could not be used to show that N and (]) must differ in content since there 
would then be no difference in modal properties between N and the content-conferring (|). 
The Descriptivist could even carve up descriptive content into a purely descriptive 
component and a rigidified component where only the latter would be subject to (RP) and 
(RCA). Descriptive content is cognitive in nature and not individuated by its modal 
properties. It is thus possible to have - a grade-one - understanding of an atomic sentence 
without knowing how that sentence would embed inside complex, modalized sentences. In 
any case, the point is that there is no easy move from modal rigidity to lack of descriptive 
content. What we leain from the Modal Argument is not that referring terms are purely 
Referential, but that they cannot be purely Descriptional. It has taught us that we must 
supplement the cluster of descriptive properties with a rigidification device such that those 
properties only determine reference at Wa- It has not taught us that reference does not go 
by associated properties, but rather which properties it goes by.
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Chapter 3. The Intentional Argument
3.1. Substitutivity
We have defined Descriptivism as the view that referring terms N - proper names and 
natural kind terms - have associated with them a cluster of descriptive conditions (j) which is 
both what someone knows when she understands N and what determines the reference of N 
at Wp - the referent of N being, if anything, all and only objects o which uniquely satisfy (]) 
at Wp. In contrast, Referentialism is the view that N has no descriptive content. The 
reference of N may have been fixed by satisfaction of (() to be o, but since N is a rigid 
designator while (|) a flexible designator, (j) cannot be what determines the reference of N at 
Wp, so (j) cannot be what constitutes the propositional content of N. The content of N is 
singular in being provided by o such that someone who understands N must know of o that 
N refers to o.
What supports Referentialism are thus considerations about the behaviour of N in 
modal discourse; whence, the Modal Argument. The Referentialist purports to show by an 
instance of the CP-Argument that a difference in modal properties between N and ({) must 
imply a difference in propositional content, hence that N is non-Descriptional. We have by 
now reason to think that this Argument does not accomplish what it sets out to prove. It 
rests on two assumptions: (i) N is modally rigid, and (ii) a modally rigid N never has the 
same content as a modally flexible (|). Old-style Descriptivism would flatly deny (i), 
whereas a more plausible new-style Descriptivism would endorse (i) and invoke some 
rigidification strategy to account for (ii). Alternatively, one could refuse to accept (ii) by 
allowing for a bifurcation of propositional content. In any case, the pivotal Descriptivist 
tenet - that N has associated descriptive content - has not been jeopardised by the Modal 
Argument. The question is now: if the main Argument against Descriptivism fails in its
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intent, are there any arguments that compel endorsement of this Descriptivist tenet? In this 
Chapter I shall motivate an affirmative answer. First some more background.
According to Referentialism, a referring term N is not only modally rigid, but also 
lacks descriptive content; indeed the truth of the former follows from the taith of the latter. 
Purely Referential terms are first and foremost ordinary proper names, but it is intrinsic to 
the view that also natural kind terms are Referential. ^  The prepositional content of N is 
therefore supplied by the object o, if any, to which N refers. Whatever other 'content' may 
be conveyed by use of N is of a non-semantic nature. But if the semantic function of N is 
merely to serve as a referring device, then it should be safe to substitute N for any co- 
referring purely Referential term M in sentences in which N occurs without change in truth- 
value or proposition expressed by those sentences; if N and M are co-referring, then they 
are also co-propositional. This is certainly true when we consider only atomic sentences, 
i.e. singulai" terms under predication and outside the scope of any modal or other intentional 
operators. Thus suppose that 'Hesperus' is purely Referential, and is substituted in:
(1) Hesperus is the evening star,
by the co-referring purely Referential name 'Phosphorus':
(2) Phosphorus is the evening star.
It is clear that utterances of (1) and (2) express the same singular proposition: <Venus; 
being the evening star>; a proposition consisting of the planet Venus and the property of 
being the star that is visible in the evening at such-and-such a position. But it is not only 
under predication that co-referring purely Referential terms are intersubstitutable without 
change in truth-value or content. The fact that they are rigid designators guarantees that 
similar changes in modalized sentences will also always preserve both truth and content. 
Thus utterances of:
 ^ In [1980, pp. 127-8, 134-5; 1994, p. 374], Kripke explicitly modelled manifest natural kind terms on 
ordinary proper names, and did seem to hold the view that both were purely Referential, or 'Millian' as he 
preferred, although with some reservations as we shall see.
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(3) Hesperus might not have been Hespems, 
and
(4) Hesperus might not have been Phosphorus,
are both false, because they both say of the planet Venus that it might not have been self­
identical. It is a consequence of Referentialism that two purely Referential terms - N and M 
- are co-referring at W a iff they are co-referring at all Wp, and that they are co-referring at 
all Wp iff they have the same singular content. So, N and M aie co-referring at W a iff they 
have the same singular content. The first bi-conditional follows from the fact that both N 
and M aie modally rigid and explains why N and M are intersubstitutable in modal contexts 
salva veritate, and the second bi-conditional follows from the fact that N and M lack 
descriptive content and explains why N and M are intersubstitutable in modal contexts 
salva significatione. It is thus part of Referentialism that N and M have the same content iff 
they have the same modal properties. That explains why it was assumed in the Modal 
Argument that if N and (j) have different modal properties, then they must differ in content, 
i.e. why the Referentialist endorses (RP) and (RCA). Here is Kiipke [1994, p. 353]:
"If a strict Millian view is correct, and the linguistic function of a proper name is 
completely exhausted by the fact that it names its bearer, it would appear that proper 
names of the same thing are everywhere interchangeable not only salva veritate but 
even salva significations: the proposition expressed by a sentence should remain the 
same no matter what name of the object it uses."
This suggests that Referentialism is committed to the following Principle o f Substitutivity:
(PS) If E(a) is a sentence containing a referring term a , then substituting a  by 
a referring term p does not change the truth-value of E(a), if ot and P have the 
same reference.
Note the resemblance between (PS) and Leibniz Law: [a  = P & E (a)] —> E(p). Since 
Leibniz Law is firmly entrenched, it would seem as if we are committed to (PS) across the
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board. We have seen that (PS) must find application on atomic and modal sentences, but 
aie any linguistic contexts exempted? Consider a - slightly modified - famous example^:
(5) Hesperus was so-called because of its evening visibility.
It goes without saying that substituting 'Hesperus' for 'Phosphorus' in (5) results in change 
in truth-value. Venus was called 'Phosphorus' because of its morning visibility. So, (PS) 
fails in contexts which involve quotational devices, e.g. mention of words. If we follow 
Quine and call contexts in which (PS) holds (referentially) transparent contexts and 
contexts in which it does not (referentially) opaque, then it should be indisputable that 
quotational contexts are opaque. It is worth emphasising why (PS) fails in (5). As 
'Hesperus' occurs in (5), it does not merely have its customary reference as it does in (1),
(3) and (4). In (5) 'Hesperus' refers to the name 'Hesperus' as well as the planet Venus. In 
the terminology, 'Hesperus' occurs in opaque position. This suggest that the reference of a 
term is sensitive to the linguistic context in which it occurs, i.e. that 'reference' in (PS) be 
qualified. Here is an amended Principle of Substitutivity which, at least on the face of it, 
admits of no exceptions:
(PS*) If E(a) is a sentence containing a referring term a , then substituting a  by 
a referring term p does not change the truth-value of E(a), if the reference of a  
in E(a) is the same as the reference of p in E(P).^
(5) is no counterexample to (PS*): 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphoras' are not co-referential, since 
in the quotational context E they refer inter alia to different proper names. As Quine 
pointed out, there aie also counterexamples to (PS) when the context is modal. Famously,
(6) It is necessary that 9 > 7,
is true, but substituting '9' for the - at Wa - co-referring 'the number of planets',
(7) It is necessary that the number of planets > 7,
2 Quine [1960, pp. 141-156; 1980, pp. 139-59].
 ^ The idea o f contextualising Substitutivity owes much to Forbes [1989, p. 121].
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fails to preserve truth. (PS*), however, can handle (6) and (7), since for a  and p to be co- 
referring in modal contexts requires that a  and p are co-referring at all Wp. In other words, 
when the context E is modal, and a  and P differ in modal properties, then it is possible that 
'a  = P' is true, while 'E(a) E(p)' is false. So, the failure of substitution is due to the fact
that while '9' is a rigid designator, 'the number of planets' is not.^
Are there any linguistic contexts where (PS*) breaks down? If we turn to 
intentional contexts and in particular ascriptions of De Dicto prepositional attitudes, we 
have firm intuitions that it does. It is, for instance, part of the Superman legend that Lois 
Lane never realises that Superman is, in fact, identical to Clark Kent. Our inclination is to 
think that since Lois Lane is a rational speaker who sincerely and on reflection assents to:
(8) Superman flies,
but, given her state of information, reflectively and honestly dissents from:
(9) Clark Kent flies, 
it is tiue to say that:
(10) Lois Lane believes that Superman flies, 
but false to say that:
(11) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies.
The problem is, however, that if both 'Superman' and Clark Kent' are purely Referential, 
then (PS*) should allow us to infer (11) from (10). If the prepositional content of 
'Superman' is exhausted by its referent, then since 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' have the 
same referent, they should also have the same prepositional content; hence any two 
sentences - (8) and (9) - which differ only in that the one contains 'Superman' whereas the
^ Note that if  'the number o f planets' is either rigidified or read as taking wide scope with respect to the modal 
operator - the number o f planets is such that necessarily it is larger than 7 - then the substitution preserves 
truth. As is well-known, Smullyan [1948] took this to refute Quine's startling claim [op. cit.] that modal logic 
failed to sustain Substitutivity and thereby violated Leibniz Law.
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other contains 'Clark Kent' should express the same proposition. This provides sufficient 
background for setting up a CP-Argument against Referentialism.
The Intentional Argument goes like this: suppose 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' 
coincide in prepositional content by the lights of Referentialism, i.e. are co-referring purely 
Referential terms. It follows by (Compositionality o f Content)^ that the contents expressed 
by (8) and (9) should be identical. But if two contents are identical, then, by Leibniz Law, 
they should have the same content-individuating properties. In paiticulai*, they should have 
the same cognitive properties where this is understood to mean that the sentences that 
express those contents must embed similarly inside the scope of an attitude-operator. 
Hence, (10) and (11) should also express the same contents. Yet, we agreed, (10) is true, 
while (11) is false. But a difference in truth-value entails a difference in content. So, (10) 
and (11) must differ in content, hence, so must (8) and (9), and therefore also 'Superman' 
and 'Clark Kent'. And since nothing hangs on the particular example - same stories could be 
told about Hesperus/Phosphorus, Cicero/Tully, etc. - the conclusion generalises to all 
purely Referential terms.
In other words, were Referentialism true, (PS*) should license intersubstitutions of 
co-referring purely Referential terms in intentional contexts salva veritate, i.e. such 
contexts should be transparent. On this view, co-referentiality entails co-propositionality. 
But this manifestly jars with best intuitions about the truth-values of the resulting 
sentences. A term occurring inside the scope of a 'believe that'-operator cannot in general 
be supplanted by a co-referring term without change in truth-value: it occurs in opaque 
position. So, co-referentiality of referring terms is - the thought goes - too coarse-grained a 
criterion for sameness of their prepositional contents.
 ^ Along the lines of: the propositional content o f a complete complex expression is uniquely determined by 
the propositional contents o f its component expressions and the way in which they are combined; cf. also Sec. 
2.4.
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It is natural to think of a proposition as the content of a propositional attitude, as the 
object of belief. Suppose therefore we accept the Relational Principle o f Belief.
(RPB): S believes that P states a relation between S and the proposition expressed by P'.
Then, on the Referentialist account, (10) states that S stands in the belief-relation to the 
singular proposition about Superman that he flies: <Superman; fly-hood>. On this account, 
remember, all there is to the propositional content of 'Superman' is its bearer. So, if Lois 
Lane believes the proposition expressed by the embedded sentence 'Superman flies’, she 
must stand in a belief-relation to a singular proposition individuated by Superman, i.e. 
Clark Kent, and the property of flying. (11) thus follows from (10), because (11) states that 
the same believer stands in the same cognitive relation to the same singular proposition. 
The mere fact that 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' are co-referential guarantees that their 
singular contents coincide, hence that the embedded sentences in (10) and (11) express 
identical singular propositions. Moreover, if it is true that Lois Lane believes that 
Superman flies, then there must be a proposition she believes which is singular with respect 
to Superman such that had he not existed that proposition would not have existed. It is thus 
always safe to existentially generalise^ - infer (3x)Fx from Fa - on a true De Dicto belief 
ascription like (10):
(12) There is someone such that Lois Lane believes that he flies.
In other words, whenever a structurally De Dicto belief ascription - an ascription in which 
the singular term takes narrow scope with respect to the cognitive operator - is true, its 
structurally De Re counterpart is also true:
(13) Lois Lane believes of Superman that he flies.
 ^ As Quine remarked [op. cit.] existential generalisation fails in opaque contexts. For instance, from the fact 
that S believes that Hesperus was so-called because o f its evening visibility, one cannot infer that there is 
something such that S believes that it was called 'Hesperus' because o f its evening visibility. S may just 
believe that if  'Hesperus' names anything, then only in virtue of that thing being visible in the evening.
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The fact that interchanging ’Superman’ for 'Clark Kent' in (13) preserves truth-value shows 
that 'Superman' occurs in transparent position in (13), More vividly, (13) is semantically 
equivalent to
(14) Superman is such that Lois Lane believes that he flies,
where 'Superman' appears outside the scope of the 'believe that' operator and so is clearly in 
transparent position, hence subject to (PS*). Conversely, whenever a De Re belief 
ascription like (13) is true, its structurally De Dicto counterpart in (10) is also true: to 
believe of a that it is F is just to believe the singular proposition about a that it is F. Or 
formally, 'B(S, Fa)' is true iff '3x [x = a & B(S, Fx]' is true, where 'B(x, y)’ reads: x bears 
the belief-relation B to y. So, on the Referentialist account there are only syntactic 
differences between (10), (13) and (14). All Referential terms, whether in De Dicto or De 
Re belief ascriptions, occur in transparent position which is to say that all hue syntactic De 
Dicto belief ascriptions containing purely Referential terms are semantically equivalent to 
their syntactic De Re counterparts. Were Referentialism true, referring terms would thus 
not exhibit any semantic De Re - De Dicto distinction in intentional contexts.^ What the 
Intentional Argument purports to show is that doxastic contexts should by governed by 
such a distinction, i.e. that it should allow for opaque occurrences of referring terms and so 
that (PS*) should not permit intersubstitution of all co-referring terms. To think otherwise 
is to disregard speakers' linguistic behaviour and intuitions.
3.2. Semantics or Pragmatics
Prima facie  implausible as it seems, Referentialism has nevertheless been defended with 
much ingenuity and persistence.^ Let me briefly canvass how the defence goes. The idea is.
 ^ In other words, purely Referential terms would be scopeless just as we saw that they were in modal 
contexts.
 ^Notably in Salmon [1986; 1989], and Soames [1987a; 1987b].
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roughly speaking, to explain away the intuitive readings of (10) and (11) as not genuinely 
pertaining to their semantics, but to what they pragmatically implicate - hence the 
Implicature Theory. What is called for is some persuasive story why we have such strong 
intuitions that (10) and (11) can be given opaque readings. The Implicature Theory is 
helpful in this respect in that it explains the appearance of opacity as due to, not a 
difference in semantics, but in conversational implicature. The Theory adheres to (RPB) 
with the modification that a belief sentence 'S believes that P' be analysed as a three-place 
relation holding among believers, singular propositions and something else;
(15) (3x) [S grasps P by means of x & B (S, P, x)], where x is, say, the disposition to assent 
when the proposition P is taken in a certain way. But an utterance of 'S believes that P' 
communicates not only that there is a way in which S takes the proposition she believes, 
but also which way that is, namely that S is presented with P through the sentence in the 
that-clause P':
(16)B [S ,thatP , x(S, 'P')],
where x(S, 'P') is the way S would take the proposition expressed by the sentence 'P', were 
it presented to S through P'.^ On this view, (10) and (11) receive identical truth-values, 
since the same singular proposition is believed in different linguistic guises. The mistaken 
intuition that (11) is false, while (10) is true, is due to the fact that while (10) has the true 
pragmatic implicature that Lois Lane is disposed to assent to 'Superman flies', (11) has the 
false pragmatic implicature that Lois Lane is disposed to assent to 'Clark Kent flies'. (10) 
and (11) communicate different things, but - strictly speaking - say the same thing. Given 
her state of information, Lois Lane is disposed to dissent from 'Clark Kent flies', or to 
assent to 'Clai'k Kent does not fly'. Had Lois Lane been in a different state of information 
which comprised knowledge of their identity, she would have been disposed to assent to 
'Clark Kent is Superman', and so also been disposed to assent to 'Clark Kent flies' given 
that she is disposed to assent to 'Superman flies'. She would thus have to withdraw her
 ^ (15) and (16) are explicit in Salmon [1986].
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assent to 'Clark Kent does not fly', since she could not rationally assent to both 'Clark Kent 
flies' and 'Clark Kent does not fly'. But on the assumption that Lois Lane fails to realise 
their identity, she can rationally believe and disbelieve that Superman flies. In our notation:
(17) B [Lois Lane, that Superman flies, x(Lois Lane, 'Superman flies')], 
is true, while:
(18) B [Lois Lane, that Superman flies, x(Lois Lane, 'Clark Kent flies')],
is false. When beliefs are reported, one should strive "...to remain faithful to the words of 
the speaker unless there is reason to d e v ia te ."O n e  is constrained to ascribe beliefs whose 
content-clauses contain only sentences that S would assent to were she presented with 
them. Otherwise an utterance of a belief sentence is liable to mislead a hearer. It is clear 
that (11) violates this Maxim o f Faithfulness and is thus inappropriate. That, however, is 
not to say that it is false. It is literally true that Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies, 
since she does stand in the belief-relation to the singular proposition expressed by 'Clark 
Kent flies'. It is just that that ascription falsely implicates that it is in virtue of accepting 
'Clark Kent flies' that she believes that proposition. The contention is thus that even if 
competent speakers are highly sensitive to the informational content conveyed by 
utterances of (10) and (11) respectively, they are equally unreliable in sorting out what is 
semantically encoded and what is pragmatically imparted.^^ They are, in particular, prone
Soames [1987a, p. 119].
That - untutored - speakers tend to confuse implicated information with truth-conditional content is 
familiar from 'Jane became pregnant and she got married' which seems to imply that the foimer happened 
before the latter. But it is no part o f the truth-conditional content o f 'and' to encode a temporal priority 
between its conjuncts. An utterance o f this sentence would be true even if  Jane got pregnant after her 
wedding; the example is Salmon's [1989, pp. 252-3]. If, however, that sentence features as antecedent in 'if 
Jane became pregnant and got married, her father must be unhappy', what seemed to be temporally implicated 
must now be semantically encoded; cf. Recanati [1997, pp. 342-3],
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to think that informational content at the level of conversational implicature goes into 
determining the truth-conditions of the reported attitudes. 12
One worry immediately springs to mind: it is not hard to see how the implicature 
could be false once it is there, but rather how it could as much as arise in the first place. 
Bear in mind the point from Sec. 3.1 that, following Referentialism, even though both of
(10) and (11) are syntactically De Dicto, they can be given nothing but semantically De Re 
readings, indeed the entire De Dicto/De Re distinction seems to vanish at the level of 
semantics. Despite the structural difference, (10) is semantically equivalent to its 
syntactically De Re counterpart (13). But how could (13) give rise to any implicature? No 
doubt, (13) implies that Lois Lane has some way of referring to Superman, and presumably 
she will be disposed to assent to a sentence containing a term in subject position that refers 
to Superman - '\}Z flies'. But it is no part of the functioning of 'Superman' in (13) to indicate 
which way of referring that is. We could equally well have reported the very same De Re 
belief in a different linguistic guise. But if it is no part of De Re belief ascriptions that one 
rather than another linguistic mode of presentation of reference is implicated, then how can 
it be part of De Dicto belief ascriptions when they are claimed to be semantically 
equivalent to their De Re counterparts? It seems that only if (10) were given an opaque 
reading could it be accounted for how an utterance could pragmatically impart that Lois 
Lane was disposed to assent to 'Superman flies', for only then need one take into account 
the linguistic mode under which the believed proposition is presented to her. In embracing 
only transparent readings, the Implicature Theory has simply divested itself of the
* 2  Note how easily the Implicature Theory can handle Frege's [1994b] original puzzle about how 'a = a' and 'a 
= b' can differ in cognitive value if  'a' and 'b' are purely Referential. The two sentences convey different 
information - only the first is a priori knowable - but they have the same singular truth-conditions. What one 
must do is prefix to those sentences an appropriate intentional operator, e.g. It is a priori knowable that' or 'S 
believes that', such that the complex sentences receive different truth-values. Only that way can one hope to 
argue via (Compositionality o f Content) that the difference between the two atomic sentences is semantically 
relevant.
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possibility of explaining, not only why one implicature arises rather than another, but even 
how they could as much as get off the ground in the first p l a c e
Now, maybe the Referentialist has the resources to patch up the Implicature Theory 
and hit upon some credible story as to why embedded expressions that occur in transparent 
positions nevertheless can carry certain pragmatic implicatures. It is still worth emphasising 
that if we allow for the same expressions to occur in opaque positions, then there is an 
obvious explanation as to why those implicatures can arise. So, not only can a view that 
treats doxastic contexts as opaque accommodate speakers' intuitions about the truth- 
conditions of belief ascriptions, it can also easily explain, by appeal to that very opacity, 
why such ascriptions have a certain pragmatics. Yet distorted intuitions and explanatory 
power is one thing, a knock-down argument another.
Before we address the question of whether more troublesome objections can be 
levelled against Referentialism, there is a key question which I have left hanging in the air: 
does this response on behalf of Referentialism accept the assumption, underlying the 
Intentional Argument, that the cognitive properties of referring terms are relevant content- 
individuating properties! Reflection on how Referentialism was characterised in Sec. 2.3 
certainly suggests that the contents of referring terms should not be individuated 
intentionally, i.e. by their behaviour in belief contexts. Two referring terms have the same 
propositional content iff they are co-referring and lack descriptive content. If 'Superman' 
and 'Clark Kent' are co-referring, then supplanting one for the other in more complex 
expressions should neither result in change of truth-value nor have an impact on the 
proposition expressed - even if intentional operators are prefixed to those expressions. 
Nevertheless, the answer depends on what is understood by 'cognitive p r o p e r t y ' . ^  jg clear 
that the Intentional Argument rests on the following Descriptivist Content Assumption:
Cf. also McKinsey [1998, pp. 6-10], who argues along the same lines with respect to indexicals.
There are special problems with second-order properties: even if  N  and M are synonyms, S could 
competently believe that S* believes that N  is F without believing that S* believes that M is F; or if  not
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(DCA) If 'P' and 'Q' have the same propositional content, then a fully competent speaker S 
believes that P iff S believes that Q,
where 'P' and 'Q' are atomic sentences free of intentional and modal vocabulary. But (DCA) 
is not disputed by the Implicature Theory, (10) and (11) contain (8) and (9) respectively 
within the scope of a believe-that operator yet both are true precisely because they state that 
Lois Lane believes the same proposition that (8) and (9) express. One may of course say 
that since the Theory bites the bullet and assigns the same truth-values to (10) and (11), it 
reduces the role of cognitive properties as merely pertaining to pragmatics. In that sense the 
Theory does contest an assumption concerning content individuation underlying the 
Intentional Argument:
(DCA*) If ’P' and 'Q' have the same propositional content, then a fully competent speaker S 
is disposed to assent to P' iff S is disposed to assent to 'Q'.
On the Implicature Theory, (DCA*) is rejected. The propositional content of (8) is identical 
to that of (9), but Lois Lane is only disposed to assent to (8), since she is not presented with 
that content through (9). The point is merely that, as far as semantics is concerned, 
'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' have the same cognitive properties in the sense that they are 
intersubstitutable in belief-contexts without change in truth-value. In order to properly 
question (DCA), it would have to be conceded that 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' were not 
everywhere interchangeable salva veritate yet denied that this would make a difference in 
propositional content. Similarly, we saw that the Descriptivist might deny (RP) and (RCA) 
underlying the Modal Argument: although replacement of co-referring terms in modal 
contexts might fail to preserve truth-value, they could nevertheless coincide in
believe then doubt. In order to avoid such hyper-intentional contexts we should just focus on first-order 
beliefs held by fully competent speakers.
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propositional content. This strategy has, to my knowledge, not been adopted by any form of 
Referentialism.
3.3. The Intentional Argument
We have seen that Referentialism is committed to the universal application of (PS*) in 
intentional contexts: any two co-referring purely Referential terms are interchangeable in 
such contexts salva veritate. We are now in a position to fortify our initial Intentional 
Argument using (PS*) in conjunction with two platitudes governing our practice of 
reporting beliefs. The first is Disquotation which connects disposition to assent with belief:
(D) A competent speaker S is, on reflection, sincerely disposed to assent to 'P' iff S believes 
that P,
where 'P' ranges over appropriate assertoric sentences lacking indexical devices and 
ambiguities. By 'competent', we assume that S uses 'P' in accordance with standard usage, 
by 'sincerely' that S is not deceitful, and by 'on reflection' that S is attentive and without 
mental defects. The rationale behind (D) is that to utter an assertoric sentence 'P' is, ceteris 
paribus, to assert that P and that to assert that P is to express the belief that P. Conversely, 
to believe that P is, ceteris paribus, to be disposed to assert that P by making an assertoric
15 I suppose (Com positionality o f  Content) would have to be abandoned. If 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' 
coincide in content, and that is the only difference between (10) and (11), then, by (Com positionality o f  
Content), (10) and (11) should also coincide in content. The same need not follow  on the version of  
Descriptivism which accepts modal rigidity but denies (RP), since this view, remember, embraced a notion of 
propositional content - Evans' 'proposition' and Dummett's 'ingredient sense' - which was individuated by 
(RP), So, this other notion could explain why (Compositionality o f  Content) was not jeopardised; indeed it 
was explicitly intended to by Dummett [1981].
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utterance of 'P  in appropriate circumstances, The second is Consistency which links 
rationality with absence of logically contradictory beliefs:
(C) A fully rational speaker S cannot reflectively and occurrently believe that a is F and 
that a is not F.
There are undoubtedly cases where speakers rationally believe things they are not 
reflectively aware of. Psycho-analysis abounds with agents who endure cognitive illusions, 
repressed prejudices, self-deceptions, etc. Put them aside. (C) is only concerned with 
occurrent and reflectively accessible beliefs held by speakers who are as rational as anyone 
gets. We can now use (D), (C) and (PS*) to set up a Strengthened Intentional Argument:
(i) S is fully rational ass.
(ii) a = b ass.
(iii) S assents to 'a is F' and S assents to 'b is not F' ass.
(iv) S believes that a is F and S believes that b is not F (D)
(v) S believes that a is F and S believes that a is not F (PS*)
(vi) S has contradictory beliefs, so S is not fully rational (C)
Assumptions (i) - (iii) are uncontested, (D) and (C) seem warranted, and the reasoning is 
fine. But since (i) contradicts (vi), something must give way. Clearly, it is the application of 
our Substitutivity Principle:
(PS*) If E(a) is a sentence containing a referring term a, then substituting a  by 
a referring term |3 does not change the truth-value of E(a), if the reference of a  
in E(a) is the same as the reference of (3 in E(P),
to move from (iv) to (v) which generates the trouble. But according to Referentialism, 
(PS*) should license us to infer (v) from (iv) on the assumption in (ii) that a = b. This view
16 W e also assume that S speaks the same language as the speaker who attributes the beliefs to S, i.e. that 
some homophonie translation principle holds, and that the speaker is not reticent - we occasionally believe 
things we never get the opportunity, or have the courage, to express; cf. Kripke [1994, pp. 360-1, 364, 375].
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has it, remember, that co-referring purely Referential terms a and b are intersubstitutable in 
intentional contexts like (iv) and (v) without change in truth-value.
Note that what (C) rules out, on pain of irrationality, is that S can reflectively and 
simultaneously hold contradictory De Dicto beliefs. There is no inconsistency in holding 
similar De Re beliefs. Lois Lane, for instance, may both believes of Superman that he flies 
and that he does not fly. Substitute throughout and this follows from (iv). The reason why 
those beliefs do not impugn her rationality is that their contradictory nature cannot be 
resolved by reflection; she must realise, by whatever empirical means, that Superman is 
Clark Kent before she could be moved to withdraw her assent to 'Clark Kent does not fly'. 
Not so for De Dicto beliefs. If Lois Lane, on reflection, did occurrently believe that Clark 
Kent flies and that Clark Kent does not fly, then she would incur criticism for being 
inconsistent. The problem is that the conjunction of (D) and (PS*) validates just that in (v) 
yet she is not inconsistent.
What can be said in response on behalf of Referentialism? There is no way of 
circumventing the conclusion in (v) that S holds logically contradictory beliefs which by 
definition S holds iff she occurrently and reflectively believes both Fa and -Fa. The 
Referentialist might adopt some deflationary strategy in order to make this prima facie 
unacceptable consequence somehow more palatable. There are two ways this might go.
The first strategy is to motivate a denial of (C) by reiterating the story about 
pragmatic implicatures. Consider what Kripke [1994, p. 368] thought about (C):
"We may suppose that [Lois Lane]...is a leading philosopher and logician. [She] 
would never let contradictory beliefs pass. And surely anyone, leading logician or no, 
is in principle in a position to notice and correct contradictory beliefs if he has them. 
Precisely for this reason, we regard individuals who contradict themselves as subject 
to greater censure than those who merely have false beliefs. But it is clear that [Lois 
Lane]...is in no position to see, by logic alone, that at least one of [her] beliefs must 
be false. [She] lacks information, not logical acumen. [She] cannot be convicted of 
inconsistency: to do so is incorrect."
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Kripke is surely right about the latter: there is no way for Lois Lane to figure out that she 
holds logically contradictory De Dicto beliefs before the relevant empirical information is 
in. But for that very reason he is wrong about the former: the logical properties of her 
beliefs cannot be recovered just by reflection - even if, as we assume, her cognitive abilities 
were idealised. And the Implicature Theory helps us to see why. Although it is true that 
Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent does not fly and that Clai'k Kent flies, she assents only 
to 'Clark Kent does not fly'. She assents to 'Superman flies', but can consistently dissent 
from 'Clark Kent flies', because she dissents from 'Superman is Clark Kent'. She would 
have been "subject to greater censure" had she assented to 'Superman is Clai'k Kent', but the 
fact that she does not suffices to make perfectly good sense of her theoretical r a t i o n a l i t y .  
Why then does Kripke think that at least idealised speakers have reflective access to the 
logical properties of their De Dicto beliefs? Well, he must think that the contents of such 
beliefs are Epistemically Transparent in a way that allows for speakers to come to know 
such properties in an altogether non-empirical manner. But it is clear that speakers cannot 
hold logically contradictory De Dicto beliefs and not violate norms of rationality if their 
contents are fully Transparent to them. This means that if the Referentialist chooses to 
discard (C) such that speakers can rationally hold contradictory De Dicto beliefs, then the 
contents of such beliefs must be Epistemically Opaque}^ Indeed, this should follow in any 
case. We have seen that, on this view, tme De Dicto belief ascriptions are semantically 
equivalent to their structural De Re counterparts. But since De Re beliefs are clearly 
Epistemically Opaque - S can consistently believe of a that it is both F and not F - then so
Note, however, that on the Implicature Theory, 'Lois Lane believes that Superman is Clark Kent' must be 
ti'ue, since it follows via (PS*) from the truth of 'Lois Lane believes that Superman is Superman' - contrary to 
what the legend tells us!
18 Epistemic Opacity was the claim that S can have introspective knowledge that she believes that P and that 
she believes that Q, and yet not have introspective knowledge o f basic logical properties o f her beliefs such as 
whether P is identical to, or distinct from, Q; cf. Sec. 1.3.
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should the corresponding De Dicto beliefs also beJ9 Lois Lane is unaware that she 
reflectively and occurrently believes a singular proposition and its negation in that she 
cannot introspectively discriminate between them due to the different ways in which she 
takes them. The upshot is that on the Referentialist account, the propositional contents of 
beliefs cannot be subject to Epistemic Transparency. In Sec. 1.3 I left it open whether 
Epistemic Transpaiency was an indispensable ingredient in Privileged Access. On the one 
hand, there is the worry that if we are ignorant of such key inferential relations between the 
contents of our beliefs as identity or contradiction, then there is a robust sense in which our 
intuitions about how those contents are transparently available to us are compromised. On 
the other hand, there is the thought that if indeed the contents of our beliefs are singular, as 
Referentialism tells us, then the corollary that we lack introspective access to logical 
properties of those contents should be welcome. After all, they are still Transparent in the 
weaker sense that in most cases when we have beliefs, we can have introspective 
knowledge of them.
3,4. Kripke's Paradox
This may prompt the Referentialist to pursue the second deflationary stiategy: the problem 
about inconsistent beliefs just levelled against Referentialism is a deep problem that afflicts 
everyone. To appreciate the difficulty, Kripke [1994, p. 375] invites us to imagine the 
following: a competent speaker Peter learns the name 'Paderewski' with an identification of 
the person named as a famous pianist. Having learned this, Peter assents to 'Paderewski had 
musical talent', and we infer that Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent. Later, 
in a different context, Peter learns of someone called 'Paderewski' who was a Polish Prime 
Minister. Peter, who unawares has just acquired two co-referring names, thinks that no
In short, the content o f a belief is Epistemically Opaque iff the terms that occur in the embedded sentence 
that expresses that content are referentially transparent, see also Boghossian [1994].
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politician has musical abilities, and so assents to 'Paderewski had no musical talent', and we 
infer that Peter believes that Paderewski had no musical talent. We can regiment this - 
Kripke's Paradox - as follows:
(i*) S is fully rational ass.
(ii*) 'a' in context G and 'a' in context H are co-referring ass.
(iii*) S assents to 'a is F  and S assents to 'a is not F' ass.
(iv*) S believes that a is F and S believes that a is not F (D)
(v*) S has contradictory beliefs, so S is not rational (C)
Both of (C) and (D) are prima facie  warranted yet jointly inconsistent. But if the 
conjunction of (C) and (D) is false, then they cannot be used to refute the application of 
(PS*) in the Strengthened Intentional Argument; one cannot run a reductio that rests on 
false premises. In other words, why blame (PS*) in the Strengthened Intentional Argument, 
when we have independent reason to think that either or both of (C) and (D) are false? But 
if, as we suppose, (C) and (D) are platitudes that everyone should endorse, then problems 
about inconsistent beliefs should arise in any case - regardless of one's take on (PS*).
On closer examination, however, it emerges that Kripke's Paradox does not succeed 
in defusing the threat posed against Referentialism by the Strengthened Intentional 
Argument. Ironically enough, that Paradox makes the difficulties seem even more 
insuperable. Here is why. What is it to hold inconsistent beliefs? We agreed that it is not to 
hold contradictory De Re beliefs since the logical properties of such beliefs are not 
Epistemically Transparent. It is feasible to believe of a both that it is F and that it is not F 
without being reproached with rational inconsistency. Nor is there necessarily any 
inconsistency involved in holding De Dicto beliefs with embedded contradictory sentences. 
If the two occurrences of 'a' in (iv*) were not co-referring, then there would be no reason to 
think S held inconsistent beliefs. S can without inconsistency simultaneously believe that 
the bank is closed and that the bank is not closed, as long as what S believes is that the 
money-bank is closed and that the river-bank is open. What does seem rationally
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inconsistent is to reflectively and occurrently believe the propositions expressed by 'a is F’ 
and 'a is not F', where 'a' is unambiguous. Thus in the Strengthened Intentional Argument S 
holds contradictor beliefs as she believes the singular propositions expressed by those 
sentences. Nevertheless, S infringes no norms of rationality: although S assents to 'a is F', 
she does not assent to 'a is not F', and so does not realise that the propositions she believes 
are contradictory. Is a similar response available in the case of Kripke's Paiadox? It seems 
not. S assents to both 'a is F' and 'a is not F . Neither of S's beliefs in (iv*) carry any false 
implicatures and yet they have straightforward contradictory propositional contents. Faced 
with these difficulties, the only way to maintain Referentialism is therefore to resort to 
Epistemically Opaque contents, i.e. to give up on introspective knowledge of basic logical 
properties of occurrent mental content. And the worry is that core parts of what we 
intuitively take Privileged Access to be are thereby jettisoned.
Is the problem general, and, in particular, is Descriptivism faced with a similar 
problem? Well, let me briefly sketch how the logical form of De Dicto belief ascriptions is 
cashed out according to Descriptivism. If we assume that (RPB) is endorsed, then S 
believes that P states a relation of belief between S and the descriptive proposition 
expressed by 'P'. On this view, the contents of propositional attitudes are descriptive 
propositions consisting of descriptive, conceptual elements which are modes o f  
presentation of the referents, if any, of the embedded terms.20  Consequently, an ascription 
like (10) amounts to something like:
(19) B(Lois Lane, <mg, mp>)
2 0  There is a very difficult issue about what a mode o f presentation is that I eschewed in Chap. 2 . 1 confess I 
have no detailed theory at hand. What I propose is that 'mode of presentation' be functionally defined along 
what Schiffer [1992, pp. 502-3] has called Frege's Constraint: (i) a rational person S may believe and 
disbelieve that a is F only if there are distinct modes o f presentation m and m' such that S believes a to be F 
under m and disbelieves a to be F under m'; (ii) there are distinct modes o f presentation m and m' such that S 
believes a to be F under m and disbelieves a to be F under m' only if S fails to realise that m and m' are both 
modes o f presentation o f a.
I l l
i.e. a two-place relation that obtains between Lois Lane and the proposition expressed by 
'Superman flies' consisting of a particular mode of presentation of Superman and a 
particular mode of presentation of the property of flying. Since it is true that Superman is 
presented to Lois Lane in Superman-mode as the disguised hero who flies around and 
chases criminals, (19), i.e. (10), is true. (11), however, is false. Lois Lane does not believe 
the descriptive proposition expressed by 'Clark Kent flies' since Superman is not presented 
to her in Clark Kent-mode - mcK ~ the shy journalist who tries to chat her up. What this 
means is that (PS*) does not license replacement of 'Superman' for 'Clark Kent’ salva 
veritate. So, the Descriptivist denies the validity of the application of (PS*) in line (v) in 
the Strengthened Intentional Argument.
According to Descriptivism, a referring term like 'Superman' is simply short for a 
cluster of descriptions which express identifying properties: 'the guy with the superman- 
properties'. It is then obvious that (PS*) fails to validate substitution of co-referring terms 
in true De Dicto belief ascriptions, since it is uncontroversial that definite descriptions are 
generally not subject to intersubstitution in belief contexts salva veritate. In order to apply 
(PS*) in true De Dicto belief ascriptions, one must ensure that the referents of the two 
terms in question are presented to the believer under the same mode of presentation. 
Conversely, Descriptivism does not deny intersubstitution of co-referring terms in true De 
Re belief ascriptions. Two De Re belief ascriptions are equivalent as long as the objects 
that individuate them are identical - no matter how they are referred to.^i What is claimed 
is that belief contexts do exhibit a genuine semantic De Re - De Dicto distinction. The truth 
of a De Dicto belief ascription does not license the inference of the corresponding De Re 
belief ascription. This follows from the fact that existential generalisation fails on such an 
ascription, that, say, the truth of (12) is not entailed by the truth of (10). If no one uniquely
21 So, one might say, there is an extent to which Referentialism accepts that belief contexts are referentially 
opaque, namely when definite descriptions occur in the embedded 'that'-clauses, and there is an extent to 
which Descriptivism accepts that belief contexts are referentially transparent, namely when those contexts aie 
De Re.
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has the Superman-properties, then it is possible for Lois Lane to believe that the guy with 
the Superman-properties flies without it being true that she believes of anyone in particulai* 
that he flies. If, on the other hand, a De Re belief ascription is true, then the truth of the 
corresponding De Dicto belief ascription cannot invariably be inferred. It follows that some 
De Dicto belief ascription will be true, since one cannot have a belief of an object without 
having some way of thinking of it, but it need not be the structural equivalent of the 
particular De Re belief ascription. 22  It is true that Lois Lane believes of Clark Kent that he 
flies, but not that she believes that Clark Kent flies. The truth of the former is grounded in 
her true belief that Superman flies. The ascription 'Lois Lane believes that Superman flies' 
correctly reports the mode in which Lois Lane is presented with Superman when it comes 
to her belief that he flies - a belief which issues in her assent to 'Superman flies'.
In the case of Kripke's Paradox, a similar analysis explains away the appearance of 
paradox. The fact that (PS*) is not to blame in Kripke's Paradox as it does not feature there 
as a premise, does not mean that it is blameless in the Strengthened Intentional Argument. 
The dialectic is not that Kiipke's Paradox shows that the conjunction of (D) and (C) is false 
simpliciter, hence also false in the Strengthened Intentional Argument, hence that (C) and 
(D) cannot be used as premises in a reductio of (PS* ) . 22 Unlike the Referentialist, the 
Descriptivist can endorse (C). (C) says that if S is fully rational, then S does not believe the 
proposition that a is F and the proposition that a is not F. On the Descriptivist account, (C)
2 2  As Dummett [1978, pp. 124-8, 1991, pp. 126-32] has argued, there can be no such thing as bare knowledge 
o f  reference of an expression: one cannot know of a particular object o that a name 'a' refers to it unless, for 
some F, one has an antecedent capacity to identify o as the F and knows that a is the F. One's predicative 
knowledge o f o that 'a' refers to it rests on one's propositional knowledge that a is the F. See also Jackson 
[1998b, p. 216] and Stalnaker [1999b, p. 547].
23 Kripke him self interpreted the Paradox in this way and since he also thought both (C) and (D) were 
indisputable, he had "...no firm belief as to how to solve it"; [1994, p. 369]. Many have, in my view  
incorrectly, followed Kripke in thinking that since Kripke's Paradox does not rest on (PS*), it is not what is at 
fault in the Strengthened Intentional Argument; for recent statements see Sosa [1996] , Francis [1998] and 
compare with Kripke [1994, pp. 376-9].
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simply does not apply in Kripke's Paradox, since there is no descriptive proposition 
associated with 'a is F  whose negation is associated with 'a is not F . In (iv*), the content of 
S's belief that a is F consists of modes of presentation of a and F-ness and likewise for the 
content of S's belief that a is not F. But it follows from the way the Paradox was set up that 
S is presented with a in different modes. Peter, for instance, thinks of Paderewski in the 
politician-way and in the musician-way. So, S does not hold logically contradictory beliefs, 
so it does not follow by contraposition on (C) that S is less than fully rational.24 On the 
Referentialist account, however, S does hold logically contradictory beliefs since the 
singular proposition expressed by 'a is not F  is the negation of the singular proposition 
expressed by 'a is F . So, if S is not to be deemed irrational, then the Referentialist is 
compelled to concede that mental content is Epistemically Opaque. In other words, (C) 
must have counterexamples.
In the Strengthened Intentional Argument, however, (C) applies on the Descriptivist 
account since nothing indicates that 'a is F  and 'a is not F' in (v) should be associated with 
different descriptive propositions. Lois Lane, for instance, is presented with Superman in
24 Sosa [1996] has proposed a response to Kripke's Paradox in much the same spirit. His diagnosis is that 
'Paderewski' is ambiguous in a way the Referentialist cannot see. When can an ordinary language name be 
represented as a logical constant (|) such that [F({)] and [~F(j>] are logically contradictory? N ot when (j) is 
ambiguous. When is (|) ambiguous? Well, certainly when (|) has more than a single referent. Sameness of 
reference is a necessary condition on unambiguity, e.g. money-bank and river-bank. But, pace the 
Referentialist, it is not a sufficient condition. In order for an expression to occur unambiguously, it must also 
have the same semantic content, and, on the Descriptivist account, the two occurrences o f 'a' in (iv*) have 
different descriptive contents. So, S does not have contradictory beliefs in (iv*). In [1994, p. 371], Kiipke 
anticipates this response and argues in the case o f Pierre's beliefs that Londres is pretty and that London is not 
pretty "...that the puzzle can arise even if  Pierre associates to 'Londres' and 'London' exactly the same uniquely 
identifying properties." Thus if  Pierre associates the unique property of being the largest city in England, then 
he may just think that expressing his beliefs in English and French, 'England' and 'Angleterre' name distinct 
countries. I think Kripke is wrong. Pierre does not associate exactly the same identifying properties: he 
associates with 'Londres' the property o f being the city called 'Londres' by his French speech-community, but 
he does not associate that property with 'London'; and vice versa. In the case o f 'Paderewski', it is even more 
difficult to see how to restate the paradox.
114
different modes, but they are modes which have distinct names. She does not associate 
different descriptive contents with tokens of 'Superman' that she falsely takes to pick out 
different individuals. So, were it not for the failure of (PS*), S would have been deemed 
irrational by (C). The Referentialist, however, is in no position to blame (PS*), and so must 
deny (C): the singular proposition expressed by 'a is not F' is the negation of the singular 
proposition expressed by 'a is F', but both can rationally be believed if mental content is 
Epistemically Opaque.
The Referentialist may retort that we have not answered the question: does S, or 
does S not, believe that a is F? Maybe the Descriptivist has a semantics for belief reports on 
offer which dissolves the Paradox when it comes to S's belief, but a Paradox remains when 
it comes to our description of S's belief. The point should be granted. We simply do not 
have adequate linguistic means to answer the question. It is like asking someone 'did you 
go to the bank?' in a context in which it is unclear whether the speaker means a money- 
bank or a river-bank. There is no determinate answer until after an interpretation has 
clarified the speaker's intended meaning. One must augment one's linguistic resources and 
say 'yes, I went to the money-bank'. By the same token, we could ascribe to S the belief that 
a, i.e. the G, is F, and the belief that a, i.e. the H, is not F. That way, we attribute true, 
consistent beliefs and remain faithful to S's linguistic behaviour.25
3.5. The Strengthened Kripke’s Paradox
What about our disquotational principle (D)? Well, if we could set up a similar argument 
against Referentialism that did not even rest on (C), then presumably it would be no help 
pointing out that fully rational speakers can hold contradictory beliefs if only their contents
25 The objection is, o f course, Kiipke's [1994, p. 369]. For discussion on this point see Forbes [1990, pp. 558- 
63].
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are Epstemically Opaque. What we need is to bear in mind that we can read the bi­
conditional in:
(D) A competent speaker S is, on reflection, sincerely disposed to assent to P' iff S believes 
that P,
from left-to-right - from disposition to assent to belief - as we have done so far, but also 
from right-to-left - from belief to disposition to assent. It is important to see that (D) allows 
for cases in which speakers are agnostic as to whether they believe that P or ~P. If S neither 
assents to, nor dissents from, 'P', then S is agnostic about P, and her refusal to assent or 
dissent is merely an indication of her demurral with respect to the belief that P. S's refusal 
to assent to 'P' does not imply that S believes that -P  as she might refuse to assent to '~P' as 
well. And her refusal to dissent from 'P' does not imply that she believes that P as she might 
refuse to assent to 'P' as well. Would S's dissent from 'P' suffice to entail her belief that ~P? 
If we suppose that dissent is simply refusal to assent, then the answer is no. If S dissents 
from 'P', then S disbelieves that P, but that is not to say that S believes that ~P, since S may 
also dissent from '~P'. (D) respects agnosticism in that all contraposition on the right-to-left 
reading entails is that if S is not disposed to assent to 'P', then, ceteris paribus, it is not the 
case that S believes that P. (D) does not allow entailment from lack of - disposition to - 
assent to P' to the belief that ~P. With this in mind, it would seem that we can use (D) and 
the story about Paderewski, to get a Strengthened Kripke’s Paradox:
(i**) S assents to 'a is F' ass.
(ii**) S believes that a is F (D)
(iii**) ~(S assents to 'a is F') ass.
(iv**) ~(S believes that a is F) (D)
(v**) A ~E
When Peter learns of Paderewski as the famous pianist, he assents to 'Paderewski had 
musical talent', and we infer that he believes that Paderewski had musical talent. But when
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he later learns of Paderewski as the Prime Minister, he refuses to assent to, or perhaps he 
dissents from, 'Paderewski had musical talent', and we infer that he lacks the belief that 
Paderewski had musical talent. So, given this story, the assumptions are harmless, and (D) 
seems innocent. But in line (v**) we have a contradiction, so something must give way. 
What can that be?
On the Referentialist account, the two occurrences of 'a is F' in (ii**) and (iv**) 
express the same singular proposition since the two occurrences of 'a' are co-referring. So, 
the application of the rule ~E (infer A from P & ~P) should be valid as we agreed that 
logical contradictions are between propositions and their negations. And, as I mentioned, 
no story about Epistemic Opacity is available to explain away the appearance of paradox: 
(ii**) and (iv**) will be contradictory regaidless of the epistemic status of the propositions 
expressed by 'a is F' in (ii**) and (iv**). In Kiipke's Paradox, the contradiction was 
between the propositions expressed by the embedded sentences 'a is F' and 'a is not F', but 
in the Strengthened Kripke's Paradox, the contradiction is between the propositions 
expressed by the belief reporting sentences 'S believes that a is F' and '~(S believes that a is 
F)'. So, in the latter, contradiction will arise no matter how Epistemically Opaque the 
proposition expressed by 'a is F' is.26
I think there are two responses. First of all, the Referentialist may disavow (D) at 
least in its bi-conditional form such that refusal to assent, or dissent, does not indicate lack 
of belief. Lois Lane, for instance, would refuse to assent to, or perhaps even dissent from, 
'Clark Kent flies', but according to Referentialism, she nevertheless believes that Clark 
Kent flies. However, the worry is that if there were no systematic links, even in the best 
cases, between assertoric use of sentences and expression of belief, then our practice of 
relying on our fellow speakers' linguistic behaviour as guiding our interpretation of their 
beliefs would seem to be unwarranted. Secondly, it may be objected that (D) is irrelevant to 
the Paradox since in fact (!**) and (iii**) are already contradictory. Suppose that on day 1
26 It is instructive to note that Kripke [1994, p. 361] himself endorsed (D).
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S assents to 'It's raining today', but on day 2 S refuses to assent to 'It's raining today'. Can 
we then use ~E to derive contradiction from: S assents to 'It's raining today' and ~(S assents 
to 'It's raining today')? The claim is that -E  fails to apply since somehow the time of 
utterance must be taken into account. Had S, in the very same context, both assented to, and 
refused to assent to, the very same sentence, then ~E would have applied. The point should 
be taken. Context-relativity clearly helps to solve our Paradox: S believes that a is F in 
context G and ~(S believes that a is F in context H) are not contradictory. But the worry is 
that S's beliefs are not sensitive to contexts. The mere fact that S lacks the belief that it is 
raining today does not entail that S ceases to believe that it was raining yesterday. 
Similarly, Peter's belief that Paderewski had musical talent is not relative to the context in 
which he learns of the famous pianist. When he later acquires the belief that Paderewski 
had no musical talent, he retains his old belief since he is unaware that his new belief is 
about the same individual. ^ 7
In any case, the Strengthened Kripke's Paradox is easily accounted for if 
Descriptivism is endorsed. The rule ~E fails to apply since 'a is F' in (n**) and 'a is F' in 
(iv**) express distinct descriptive propositions due to the fact that S associates distinct 
descriptive contents with the two occurrences of 'a'. The proposition that the famous pianist 
had musical talent does not contradict the proposition that the Polish Prime Minister had no
Moore [1999] thinks (D) breaks down in cases where the context o f assent is relevantly different from the 
context o f attribution. B elief reports should therefore be contextualised; 'Peter believes that Paderewski had 
musical talent’ is tiue relative to context G. But why should Peter’s assent to 'Paderewski had no musical 
talent’ in context H change the truth-value o f the ascription in context G when Peter takes the information 
acquired in context H as irrelevan t to his belief that Paderewski had musical talent? After all, Peter is 
unaware that 'Paderewski* in the two contexts are co-referring. Moreover, in context H where Peter learns of 
the Polish Prime Minister, he would still assent to 'Paderewski had musical talent' if  asked about the famous 
pianist. Peter would thus be saddled with contradictory beliefs in the very same context.
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musical talent. The upshot is that Referentialism is faced with difficulties that do not arise 
for Descriptivism.
Let me take stock. I have presented arguments against Referentialism to the effect 
that referring terms cannot be purely Referential, but must have associated descriptive 
content, and I have rejected a three-pronged defence of Referentialism. First I presented the 
Intentional Argument against Referentialism. Widespread intuitions have it that often 'S 
believes that a is F' is true while 'S believes that b is F' is false even though a is b, but how 
can that be if 'a' and 'b' are purely Referential? In response, the Referentialist invoked the 
Implicature Theory to the effect that our intuitions pertained to pragmatics and not 
semantics. Once proper account is taken of the defeasible pragmatic implicatures that arise 
when cognitive attitudes are ascribed, the universal applicability of (PS*) which follows 
from Referentialism, poses no problem. We answered by reinforcing the Intentional 
Argument. (PS*) in conjunction with prima facie platitudes about consistency and 
disquotation allow us to ascribe to fully rational speakers logically contradictory beliefs. 
The Referentialist’s second response was then to acknowledge that (PS*) did issue in 
contradictory beliefs, but somehow deflate the implications for psychological rationality. 
The reason fully rational speakers can hold contradictory De Dicto beliefs is that their 
contents are Epistemically Opaque to them. Moreover, it need not be a devastating 
consequence that we must surrender the Epistemic Transparency of mental content. The 
third response was to concede that Referentialism sanctioned the existence of 
psychologically inconsistent beliefs, but to maintain that so did Descriptivism. Kripke's 
Paradox shows that we can deduce inconsistent beliefs from our platitudes without using 
(PS*). But we have not seen reason to suspect that the problem is general. According to 
Descriptivism, referring terms occur in opaque position in intentional contexts. This means 
that (PS*) disallows universal substitution of co-referring terms in such contexts, and so the 
Strengthened Intentional Argument is blocked. Also, the contents of beliefs are descriptive 
propositions consisting of modes of presentation. But Kripke's Paradox contains no
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contradiction between a descriptive proposition and its negation, and so poses no problem 
on the Descriptivist account. Finally, we tried to strengthen Kripke's Paradox. It we could 
deduce a contradiction between the belief reporting sentences, and not just between the 
embedded clauses, then it would be no help pointing out that mental content is 
Epistemically Opaque. The Referentialist is again faced with difficulties that do not arise 
for the Descriptivist.
This suggests that we better settle for Descriptivism when it comes to a viable 
account of belief ascriptions. Referentialism is committed to the claim that co-referring 
singular terms are intersubstitutable in all contexts without change in truth-value, but we 
have seen strong grounds for thinking that this claim is false when it comes to intentional 
contexts, and that Descriptivism can explain why. That is, there are good reasons for 
suspecting that Referentialism is wrong in allowing us to use (PS*) to substitute all co- 
referring singular terms in intentional contexts salva veritate. However, unlike (PS), (PS*) 
was supposed to be a principle without counterexamples, so something has gone wrong. 
Correctly put, Descriptivism does not reject (PS*), only the Referentialist inteipretation of 
the clause "...if the reference of a  in E (a) is the same as the reference of p in E(p)." 
According to that interpretation, the reference that a  and p have in E, for all E, is the 
reference that a  and P have when not in E. In other words, sameness of reference in opaque 
contexts is sameness of reference in transparent contexts. Reference is not context- 
dependent.28 This means that the clause in (PS) "...if a  and p have the same reference" 
would do just as well. So, what the Descriptivist claims is that (PS) may fail across all 
intentional contexts, but that (PS*) holds provided the contextual constraint is given an 
adequate reading. According to - at least one version of - Descriptivism, sameness of 
reference in opaque contexts is sameness of propositional, i.e. descriptive, content in 
transparent contexts. This is what is meant by Frege's dictum [1994b] that terms occurring 
within the embedded sentence in an attitude attribution take indirect reference to their
28 We are still ignoring quotational contexts.
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customary descriptive contents (sense). It is easy to see how this move enables us to solve 
the Strengthened Intentional Argument: 'Superman' and 'Clai’k Kent' are not replaceable, 
because they differ in descriptive content, hence are not co-referring when the context E 
contains a 'believe that' operator. The substitution-instances in (10)/(11) and (iv)/(v) fail to 
satisfy the conditions for successful application of (PS*) which is to say that 
'Superman'/'Clark Kent' and 'a'/'b' occur in opaque positions.
It thus seems as if we should endorse the logical form of belief ascriptions - S 
believes that a is F - that Descriptivism proposes, namely a two-place relation between a 
believer S and a descriptive proposition expressed by the embedded content-clause 'a is F':
(20) B(S, <ma: mp>).
Note that, on this account, (Compositionality o f Content) is left intact: the propositional 
content of'S  believes that a is F' is uniquely determined by the propositional contents of its 
constituent expressions and their mode of combination. In particular, if 'a' and 'b' are 
(ordinarily) co-referring, but associated with distinct contents, then substituting 'a' for 'b' in 
'S believes that a is F' yields a different propositional content.
The worry with this proposal is, however, that not all descriptive contents as ways 
of latching on to things in thought are intersubjectively shared amongst speakers. If in (10) 
Lois Lane associates a descriptive content with 'Superman' that is not part of common 
knowledge - if she thinks of Superman in a highly idiosyncratic way - then no one can 
believe or even understand what she believes when she believes the proposition expressed 
by 'Superman flies'. And moreover, as in the case of 'Paderewski', the particular modes of 
presentation which the believer associates with the embedded singular terms often cannot 
simply be read off from the speaker's ascription due to the insufficiency of the mere 
wording. Yet, as we shall see in Section 3.6, there is frequently no need to know which 
mode of presentation is employed to ensure successful communication, as long as some 
mode of presentation is shared. To require mutual knowledge of all associated descriptive
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contents - in the face of community-wide variation - for successful communication is to run 
an unnecessary risk of communal misunderstandings in l a n g u a g e . ^ 9
To remedy this drawback, it may be suggested that descriptive contents be 
quantified over rather than referred to.^o This allows us to maintain Semantic Innocence 
(SI): utterances of embedded sentences in belief attributions express just the propositions 
they would if not embedded. Typically, the plausibility of (SI) resides in considerations to 
do with theoretical economy, but in this context, it enables us to respect the modal rigidity 
of the embedded singular terms: they cannot be used to speak of the descriptive contents 
associated with them, but only to refer to their bearers. That is, a referring term exhibits the 
same semantic behaviour whether it occurs inside or outside the scope of an intentional 
operator. On this account, the logical form of (10) amounts to something like:
(22) (3 ms) (3mp) (ms is a mode of presentation of Superman & nip is a mode of 
presentation of fly-hood & B(Lois Lane, <ms, mp>)),
where modes of presentation are existentially quantified over. One of the advantages of this 
view is that one can know the truth-conditions of a De Dicto belief ascription like (10) 
without knowing the particular descriptive content - the mode of presentation - that the 
believer associates with the embedded singular term.
I shall not spend time developing this view in any detail. Instead I will finish this 
Chapter by giving an argument why I do not think Descriptivism jeopardises 
communication. This argument is important for another reason as well. What we have 
shown so far, if the arguments are good, is that singular terms in opaque position must have 
truth-conditionally relevant descriptive content. The semantic function of 'a' in 'S believes 
that a is F' cannot be merely to pick out an object. But we have not shown that singular
29 There are also worries about the logical form o f intuitively valid arguments like (a) Bill believes that Jones 
is tall; (b) Jones is tall; so (c) B ill believes something true. If, as on this view, 'Jones’ in (a) refers to the 
descriptive content of 'Jones', while 'Jones' in (b) refers to Jones, then the argument equivocates and so is 
invalid.
30 Cf. Forbes [1990], Noonan [1979] and Cairuthers [1983].
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terms occurring in transparent position must also have truth-conditionally relevant 
descriptive content. Maybe the semantic function of 'a' in 'S believes of a that it is F' is just 
to pick out an object. In other words, one could hold a Hybrid View according to which 
Referentialism is true in all but intentional contexts. All an utterance of an atomic sentence 
can express is a singular proposition, but an utterance of a true De Dicto belief attributing 
sentence states a three-place relation B(S, P, m) between a speaker S, a singular proposition 
P, and a semantically relevant mode of presentation m of P.^i What I shall try to argue is 
that modes of presentation are semantic properties of singular terms regardless of the 
linguistic context in which they occur, and that they must be intersubjectively shared by 
speakers. So, we should not settle for less than full blown Descriptivism.
3.6. Communication
In the last Section I mentioned a worry that any version of Descriptivism must face: if a 
speaker's S understanding of a statement involving a referring term N requires her to be in 
possession of some way of thinking of the referent of N, then how can the informational 
content of that statement be passed on to another speaker S*i fS* employs some other and 
very different way of thinking of the referent of N? In particular, if those 'ways of thinking' 
are not standardly reflected in any mutually shared meaning of N, then what reason does S 
have for thinking that by N she refers to the same thing as S* does when he uses N? All the 
Intentional Argument shows, if sound, is that S and S* must associate some descriptive
31 What is wrong with Referentialism is thus not that it dismisses modes o f presentation altogether, but that it 
robs them o f their semantic significance. It must be part o f the semantic content o f sentences in tliat-clauses to 
specify the way S takes the proposition P. Descriptivism, on the other hand, is right that associated descriptive 
content, understood as modes o f  presentation, enters into the truth-conditions o f  true De Dicto belief 
attributions, but wrong in thinking that nothing else does. The Hybrid View has over the years been advocated 
in various guises, see for instance McGinn [1999], Richard [1983], Recanati [1997], Crimmins & Perry 
[1989] and Schiffer [1992,1995].
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content with N, but if this content is not intersubjectively shared, and they have no other 
effective means by appeal to which they could resolve their differences, then, for all they 
could tell, they might be talking about different things, and so might fail to transmit any 
information by means of sentences containing N. It would thus seem, with Dummett's 
words [1978, p. 130], cf. [1991, p. 133], that the Argument has:
"[...] a major defect: it has no tendency to show that the sense of a word is a feature of 
the language. It shows, at best, that each speaker, if he is to associate a reference with 
a word, must attach a particular sense to it; it does not show any necessity for 
different speakers to attach the same sense to any one word, so long as the senses 
which they all attach to it determine the same reference. It therefore leaves open the 
possibility that the sense of a word is not part of its meaning at all, if meaning is to be 
something objective and shared by all speakers [...]"
In other words, what the Intentional Argument shows is that two co-referring singular tenns 
N and M must have associated different descriptive contents when they occur in opaque 
contexts. It is open to hold, as indeed most proponents of the Hybrid View do [cf. fn. 31], 
that when N and M occur in transparent contexts, as in 'N is F' and 'M is F' where 'Fx' is 
extensional, N and M merely express the same singular content. But, the thought continues, 
[1978, p. 132], [1991, p. 133]:
" [...] the use of language for communication [...] depends upon the informational 
content of a sentence being constant from speaker to speaker. If language is to serve 
as a medium of communication, it is not sufficient that a sentence should in fact be 
true under the interpretation placed on it by one speaker just in case it is true under 
that placed on it by another; it is also necessary that both speakers should be aware of 
the fact."
If Dummett is right, what is called for is some additional argument that N and M must have 
associated different descriptive contents regardless of the linguistic context in which they 
appear, and moreover that such contents are "constant from speaker to speaker." What must
124
be argued is thus that descriptive content is needed not just in a theory o f speaker's 
reference, but also in a theory o f reference fo r  a common language. If we could show not 
only that every speaker must associate some descriptive content with the terms they use for 
singular reference, but also that they must associate approximately the same descriptive 
content with those terms, then we would have reason to think that descriptive content is "a 
feature of the language". Consider, for a start, Frege's example^^:
Suppose...that Herbert Garner knows that Dr. Gustav Lauben was born on 6 
September 1875 in N.N. and [that] this is not true of anyone else; suppose, however, 
that he does not know where Dr. Lauben now lives nor indeed anything else about 
him. On the other hand, suppose that Leo Peter does not know that Dr. Lauben was 
born on 6 September 1875 in N.N. Then as far as the proper name "Dr. Gustav 
Lauben" is concerned, Herbert Garner and Leo Peter do not speak the same language, 
although they do in fact refer to the same man with this name; for they do not know 
that they are doing so.
Let us call the problem that Frege raises the Problem about Communication^'^: how must 
the descriptive contents - as ways of thinking of objects - which different speakers associate 
with given names, be related if communication is to be possible? Let me illustrate. Suppose 
Garner truly says: 'Dr. Lauben is wounded', in the presence of Peter. Peter assumes that by 
'Dr. Lauben' Garner refers to the same man Peter uses 'Dr. Lauben' to refer to. Peter is right 
and so comes to believe that Dr. Lauben is wounded. Is this a successful case of 
communication? Well, if Referentialism is right about the semantics of transparently 
occurring names, then the sole propositional content of the sentence is the singular 
proposition <Dr. Lauben; wounded-ness> which Peter apprehends upon hearing Garner's 
utterance. Since what Garner said is what Peter understood, it would seem that information 
has successfully been transferred from Garner to Peter. Referentialism is thus committed to 
the view that preservation of reference suffices for understanding if by 'understanding' we
32 Cf. [1994a, p. 523].
33 Cf. also Heck’s [1994, pp. 8 1 ,9 2 ,9 9 ].
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mean grasp of propositional content. As long as Peter gets the reference right, he also gets 
the propositional content right, and so, he will understand what Garner has said, despite the 
fact that they have no identifying knowledge in common. Consequently, Peter will come to 
believe what Garner believes if he has no reason to think Garner is wrong. According to 
Referentialism, the answer to our question is therefore that:
(A) We need only get the reference right: mutual reference is necessary and sufficient for 
mutual understanding, hence for communication. 4^
The worry with (A) is not the necessity-claim: preservation of reference is imperative if we 
are to rely on others' testimony as a means of acquiring knowledge. It is rather that mutual 
reference does not suffice for securing transmission o f knowledge by means of language. It 
is true, as the example shows, that as long as Garner and Peter refer to the same man, they 
run no risk of distorting information, i.e. of not transmitting true beliefs. The problem is, as 
Dummett and Frege emphasise, that although Garner and Peter refer to the same man by 
Dr. Lauben', they do so unwittingly. Moreover, they have no effective means by which 
they could come to know of their co-referential use of Dr. Lauben', since there is no 
overlap in their identifying knowledge of Dr. Lauben. But we tend to think that 
communication requires understanding and that understanding is a species of knowledge 
such that to understand what someone has said is to know what he has said. The purpose o f 
communication is therefore to facilitate transmission o f knowledge and not ju st true 
beliefs.^^ In our example, Peter does not know what Garner has said, because he does not 
know who Dr. Lauben' refers to in Garner's utterance, even though 'Dr. Lauben' 
accidentally refers to the same man in Peter's idiolect. Garner's statement prompts Peter to 
believe what Garner said but incidentally so; for all Peter knows, Garner might have been
34 Kripke [1994, pp. 359-60] seems to have advocated this view.
35 In general, if  S knows that P, and S asserts in the presence of S*, then, if  S* understands the assertion 
and accepts it as true, then, ceteris paribus, S comes to know  that P; cf. Heck [1994, pp. 91-4], [1996, pp. 
155-56] and Evans [1982, pp. 310-11].
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speaking of someone else. Peter's belief that Garner has said that Dr. Lauben is wounded is 
true, but true belief is not knowledge. Peter has no justification to believe that he believes 
what Garner believes. Nor is there any reliable method that he could appeal to. Peter cannot 
rely on the wording: it is a coincidence that Garner and himself use orthographically 
identical names of Dr. Lauben. There is no intrinsic connection in Peter's and Gamer's use 
of 'Dr. Lauben' apart from the fact that Dr. Lauben is causally responsible for their 
respective use of that name. Also, Dr. Lauben' may be unusual, but most types of ordinary 
proper names, e.g. 'Anna' or 'John', have multiple referents. So, it seems that all Peter is 
entitled to infer from Garner's statement is that, if true, someone named Dr. Lauben' has 
been wounded.36 But he cannot disquote since nothing he can point to indicates that he has 
understood Gainer's use of it. So, although Peter gets the reference right, he does not fully 
grasp its propositional content, so that content cannot be exhausted by its reference. Or to 
make the point more obvious, suppose Peter knows of Dr. Lauben only under his other 
name 'Gustav Hendricks'. Imagine also, as in the Superman story, that Peter has no reason 
to think that Dr. Lauben' and 'Gustav Hendricks' are co-referring. As it turns out, Peter 
forms the belief that Gustav Hendricks is wounded, upon hearing Gainer's assertion of Dr. 
Lauben has been wounded'. According to (A), communication achieves its purpose in 
securing that Peter acquires Garner's true belief. But surely, it does not. Peter cannot come 
to know that Gustav Hendricks is wounded on accepting Dr. Lauben is wounded' as true 
when he has no evidence that Gustav Hendricks is Dr. Lauben. This suggests that 
communication can misfire even if reference is preserved. Although Peter gets the 
reference right, he has not understood Garner's statement, and so, if understanding is
36 This is where the other-dependent descriptions enters the picture; cf. Sec. 2.2. All Peter understands by 
Garner's use of 'Dr. Lauben' is 'the individual whom Garner is intending to refer to, on this occasion, with his 
use of Dr. Lauben'. Such 'buck-passing' descriptions are especially relevant when one acquires the mastery of 
names not hitherto encountered. They show the possibility of competent use of names without possessing any 
uniquely identifying information other than pointing to the causal chain by which that use is passed on.
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knowledge of propositional content, there must be more to the content of a name than its 
referent. So, perhaps (A) should be replaced by:
(B) We need only know that we have got the reference right: knowledge of mutual 
reference is necessary and sufficient for mutual understanding, hence for communication.
Thus if Peter knows that by 'Dr. Lauben' Garner refers to the man Peter uses Dr. Lauben' to 
refer to, then Peter understands Garner's statement since he knows that Garner says of Dr. 
Lauben that he is wounded. So, if Garner's statement is true, and Peter has no reason not to 
accept it as such, then, ceteris paribus, Peter comes to know that Dr. Lauben is wounded. 
Now, how does Peter come to know that they are talking about the same man? I said above 
that Peter could not rely on the mere wording yet that seems to be what we do all the time. I 
truly say: 'Bill Clinton is on ITV and you accept my assertion and come to know that Bill 
Clinton is on ITV. In normal contexts, you assume I mean the US president, and not, say, 
your uncle who goes under the same name. In the normal run of things, this common 
identifying knowledge is contextually presupposed and never actually brought out. But it 
could be. If you had just told me about your uncle, it might be unclear whom I was now 
talking about. For each of the Clintons, we would no doubt have different identifying 
knowledge, but there will also be enough common ground between us to resolve the issue. 
Suppose instead I tmly say: 'John was late' in a context in which we both know that I could 
have meant either of two men. In order for you to come to know what I said, you must 
know which one I intended, i.e. disambiguate my utterance. Communication succeeds only 
after I have drawn on common associated properties: 'I meant John, the German, not John, 
the Englishman'. So, you must think of the referent of my use of 'John' in such a way that 
you can come to know whom I was referring to, and it is hard to see how you could do that 
if we were not thinking of that referent in relevantly similar* ways; if you did not also think 
of John as, say, the German. Had you by chance formed the belief that John (the German) 
was late upon hearing my utterance without bothering about whom I intended to pick out.
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your true belief would fall short of knowledge. So, there are cases in which understanding 
requires not only that speakers think of objects in similar ways but also know that they do. 
Hence, the way to knowingly get the reference right is for there to be common identifying 
knowledge that is accessible if needed. (B) should therefore be modified by:
(C) We need to share some identifying knowledge: mutual descriptive content is both 
necessary and sufficient for mutual understanding, hence for communication.^^
Consider two putative counterexamples to (C). First, the necessity-claim^^\ Suppose 
Lingers understands with Peter by the name 'Dr. Lauben' the only doctor who lives in a 
house known to both of them, and suppose furthermore that Lingers understands with 
Garner by Dr. Lauben' the unique individual born 6  September 1875. Then one might think 
that both Garner and Peter could communicate with Lingers, although not with each other. 
But this is false: if Lingers reports Garner's utterance to Peter, then Peter will come to 
know, on the basis of a third-party testimony, that Garner uses Dr. Lauben' to refer to the 
same man that he uses 'Dr. Lauben' to refer to, and so Peter could come to know what 
Garner expressed by his utterance. There aie two things to say in response. First, were it not 
for the intermediary, Peter and Garner could not successfully have exchanged information, 
but we are interested in the basic cases where two speakers purport to communicate. In 
such cases, it is still true that knowledge of mutual reference goes via knowledge of 
mutually associated descriptive content. Peter, for instance, is able to communicate with 
Lingers only because they share identifying knowledge of Dr. Lauben. Secondly, it seems 
to me they could share some identifying information by way of deferring to Lingers, i.e. 
with Dr. Lauben' they could both associate 'the man whom Lingers uses Dr. Lauben' to
32 (C) assumes that enough descriptive content is in common between speakers to guarantee uniqueness. E.g. 
you and I can both associate the description 'the current President' with 'Bill Clinton' and yet disagree as to 
which nation has Bill Clinton as their current President. In order to enable transmission o f  knowledge 
between us by means o f that name, we would need to associate something like 'the current US President'.
38 This example is modelled on Carruthers [1983, pp. 26-7] and Frege [1994a].
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refer to'. Then suppose Garner knows from Lingers that Dr. Lauben is wounded. Upon 
hearing Garner's utterance of 'Dr. Lauben is wounded', Peter could thus come to know that 
whoever Lingers uses Dr. Lauben' to refer to is wounded.
Secondly, the sujficiency-claim?'^: Suppose I saw a very drunk American in the 
Keys last night and decided to call him 'Jack'. After I left, you saw the same guy, also 
dubbed him 'Jack' and associated the same identifying information with the name. Later on 
we met up and you told me what happened in the Keys: 'Jack got thrown out', which 
prompted me to believe that Jack got thrown out. Despite shai'ed descriptive content, I have 
not understood you, so my belief, albeit true, does not amount to knowledge. I think the 
example shows that when the context provides insufficient information for the speakers to 
know that they are talking about the same thing, then, just as in the example with 'John', 
they must know that they share the same identifying information. Suppose I had named him 
'Jones', and suppose your utterance of 'Jack got thrown out' somehow caused me to believe 
that Jones got thrown out. Maybe I only saw one drunk in the Keys last night and therefore 
assumed you were talking about him. It seems clear that although my belief that Jones got 
thi'own out is in fact true, it does not constitute knowledge since I do not know that the 
individual you refer to by 'Jack' is the individual I refer to by 'Jones'. But the only way to 
know that is to know that by 'Jack' and 'Jones' we associate the same identifying 
information: the drunk American in the Keys last night. So, it appears that knowledge of 
shared descriptive content would suffice to secure successful communication after all.
The point is thus that if we are to transmit knowledge by means of singular terms, 
then there must be some constraints on, or uniformity in, the kind of descriptive contents 
that we associate with them.40 In the case of general terms like 'water', 'lemon' or 'sofa', one 
can expect a community-wide consensus in associated descriptive content, and in the case
39 This example is modelled on Byrne & Thau [1996, p. 147]. Heck [1994, pp. 101-2; 1996, pp. 153-4] 
accepts (C) as far as the necessity-claim is concerned but is uncertain about the sufhciency-claim.
40 Cf. also Heck [1994, pp. 101-4].
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of proper names a less extensive and more speaker-relative agreement. Communication 
cannot take place between speakers who think about objects in radically different ways. On 
the contrary, successful communication about objects requires intersubjectively shared 
ways of thinking about them. But if speakers by and large associate the same descriptive 
contents with the same singular terms, then, as Dummett says, there is reason to think that 
descriptive contents are properties of such terms as used in a common language, and not 
merely what each individual speaker must attach to terms if she is to use them to refer to 
objects. And if descriptive contents aie features of singular terms as such, then they will be 
so regardless of the linguistic context in which those terms are embedded. Whether a 
singular term occurs in transparent or opaque position, it should have descriptive content 
associated with it.
Let me sum up. I have argued that Referentialism is wrong in claiming that the only 
propositional content a singular referring term has is its reference. Descriptive content as 
modes of presentation of objects must be invoked to account for the truth-conditions of 
sentences ascribing propositional attitudes. Moreover, I have tried to show how 
considerations about the enabling conditions for successful communication support the 
stronger claim that descriptive content also plays a role when referring terms occur in 
transparent position. Regardless of the linguistic context in which a term occurs, it must 
have widespread associated descriptive conditions by satisfaction of which an object is 
referred to by that term. So, Descriptivism seems indeed to be a viable option. I have 
argued against the Modal Aigument against Descriptivism in Chapter 2, and in favour of 
the Intentional Argument against Referentialism in this Chapter. What I shall now do is 
present a version of Descriptivism - Causal Rigidified Descriptivism - which not only 
accounts for the Modal Argument but also for the Twin Earth Argument.
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Chapter 4. Two-Dimensionalism
4.1. Causal Rigidified Descriptivism
I have presented arguments against Referentialism to the effect that the propositional 
content of a refemng term N cannot consist merely in its having the reference it has. It 
must also have associated descriptive content which goes into the truth-conditions of 
sentences containing N in opaque as well as in transparent position. Descriptive content 
must be invoked to account for the truth-conditions of all sentences and not only those 
which ascribe propositional attitudes. The question we should now address is: what is 
descriptive content? We started off by assuming that the descriptive content of N was 
simply given by a set of definite descriptions that competent speakers associated with N. 
These definite descriptions were supposed to encapsulate the way in which those speakers 
were thinking about the referent of N, i.e. the mode of presentation of that referent. Nothing 
was initially presupposed about the character of those descriptions, except that if N had a 
referent, then it would be whatever object uniquely satisfied those descriptions. The 
descriptive content of, say, 'water' was given by a cluster of stereotypical properties that all 
and only typical samples of the natural kind water possess - what we have called 'the 
watery stuff. But it is plain that our conception of what goes into the descriptive content of
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'water' would have to take into account the arguments brought forward against 
Descriptivism. Consider this formulation of the Twin Earth Argument:
(1) Suppose Twin Earth is a remote place in Wa just like Barth except that XYZ is the 
watery stuff.
(2) Suppose 'water' is short for 'the wateiy stuff.
(3) Then my utterance on Earth of 'water is wet' is true at Twin Earth iff the watery stuff on 
Twin Earth is wet.
(4) But my utterance on Eai'th of 'water is wet' is true at Twin Eaith iff H2 O is wet.
(5) So, 'water' is not short for 'the watery stuff.
On the assumption in (2) that 'water' is a purely Descriptional term, 'water' picks out all and 
only watery stuff. In particular, my use of 'water' on Earth picks out the watery stuff XYZ 
on Twin Earth. So, my utterance of 'water is wet' is true at Twin Earth due to the fact that 
XYZ is wet on Twin Earth. But our intuition is that water is not wet on Twin Earth since 
indeed there is no water there. Although XYZ is watery, XYZ is not water, and so the fact 
that XYZ is wet cannot make my utterance of 'water is wet' true; only facts about H2 O can 
make such utterances true. Obviously, (l)-(5) is not much of an argument on its own as (4) 
merely contradicts (3), but our intutions seem to support (4): if water is H2 O on Earth, then 
water is H2 O everywhere, including Twin Earth. ^  Moreover, the truth of (4) is clearly 
unacceptable by Descriptivist lights in that it gives singular truth-conditions. According to 
Descriptivism, one need not know the referent of 'water' in order to understand the truth- 
conditions of sentences containing 'water'. There is, however, a way of accommodating our 
intuitions without buying into Referentialism. It is at this stage worthwhile noting that 
Putnam [1996, p. 19] took his own thought-experiment to prove that:
 ^ Moreover, as I argued in Sec. 1.2, 2.3, 2.4, such intuitions are firmly grounded in the scientific role that 
natural kind terms play in so-called theoretical reductions. When physical science discovered that water is 
H2 O, it discovered which micro-physical property is causally responsible for the macro-physical properties 
that water have, e.g. why it obeys certain physical laws.
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"words like "water" have an unnoticed indexical component: "water" is stuff that 
bears a certain similarity relation to the water around here."
I think the remai'k is spot on. The conditions under which my token of 'water is wet' is true 
on Earth, or on Twin Earth, must concern the kind of watery stuff I am acquainted with on 
Earth. It is integral to the concept of water that water is the stuff I drink, swim in, look at, 
listen to, and what not, i.e. that water is the watery stuff of my acquaintance. Given that 
Twin Earth is taken to be a remote place in W a, I, qua Earthling, have had no causal 
encounters with XYZ on Twin Earth, and so by 'water' I do not refer to XYZ even if XYZ 
is watery. The only watery stuff Earthly speakers sustain causal connections with is H2 O, 
and so H2 O is what they refer to by 'water'. Similarly, my doppelganger, who is acquainted 
with the watery XYZ on Twin Earth, will by tokens of 'water' refer to XYZ, and not to H2 O 
even if watery.
What the Twin Earth Argument thus tells us is that causality must play a role in 
determining the reference of a term. In most ordinary cases, we use referring terms to pick 
out objects that not only have all the superficial properties we are familiar with, but also are 
the objects we are causally related to. Subjectively indistinguishable counteiparts in far off 
locations are rarely the kind of objects we intend to pick out. The point is that the 
Descriptivist should allow for a causality constraint to be built into the purely descriptive 
content: 'water' refers to the watery stuff of our acquaintance. Correspondingly, sentences 
containing 'water' should be assigned causally constrained descriptive truth-conditions. In 
particular, (3) should read:
(3*) Then my utterance on Earth of 'water is wet' is tme at Twin Earth iff the watery stuff 
of our acquaintance is wet.
Note how this gets the truth-conditions right with respect to Twin Earth. My token of 'water 
is wet' is true at Twin Earth iff the watery stuff on Earth is wet on Twin Earth. The watery 
stuff on Earth is H2 O and H2 O is not wet on Twin Earth since ex hypothesi there is no H2 O 
on Twin Eaith. So, (3*) respects our intuitions about Twin Eaith. Yet the truth-condition in
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(3*) is not singular since the reference of 'water' does not appear on the right-hand side of 
the bi-conditional. What Twin Earth teaches us is thus not that 'water' is a purely 
Referential term, i.e. that the reference of 'water' cannot go via associated properties. It is 
true that Twin Earth tells us that 'water' cannot be purely Descriptional, but there is scope 
for intermediary views. What we learn is that causal properties play a role in mediating the 
reference of 'water', and that in odd cases they overrule the purely descriptive properties. 
So, we learn from Twin Earth which properties form the cluster associated with 'water', and 
we learn something about how to weigh them against each other in possible cases.
The same is true of 'Aristotle'. Suppose Aristotle had an epistemic counterpart on a 
distinct Twin Earth in W a, and suppose I uttered 'Aristotle wrote De Anima'. Then, if 
'Aristotle' were short for 'the famous philosopher of antiquity, etc.', then my utterance 
would be true at Twin Eaith iff the counterpart wrote De Anima on Twin Earth. But I was 
clearly making an assertion about Aristotle. So, we must supplement the cluster of 
properties commonly associated with 'Aristotle' with a causality constraint: the individual 
causally responsible for my use of 'Aristotle'. I have had no causal encounters with 
Aristotle, but I trust that at the end of the causal chain leading to my use of the name, there 
is someone - Aiistotle - who has all the properties I associate with the name. At some point 
Aristotle was baptised 'Aristotle' and that act set off a causal chain in which the name was 
passed on from speaker to speaker. Being competent with the name, I can appeal to tliis 
chain if need be. Here is an example. In my Department, there are three professors of moral 
philosophy called 'John'. Suppose I say: 'John attended the seminar'. You were not there, so 
you ask: 'which John?'. I reply: 'the famous philosopher'. You ask: 'which famous 
philosopher?'. I reply: 'the professor of moral philosophy'. You ask: 'which professor of 
moral philosophy?'. I reply: 'the author of Weighing Goods". You get it: 'Oh, him!'. When 
speakers try to figure out what a given term is used to refer to, they resort to shared 
associated properties. In that pursuit, they are guided by the conviction that a unique 
individual is responsible for the particular use which that term has and which they both take
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part in by associating sufficiently similar properties with that term in order to determine 
that they are referring to the same object. In cases where no unique referent is immediately 
identified, speakers can track down an object, as it were, by going back along the causal 
chain until they have identified a property that uniquely marks out that object, e.g. 'the 
individual born at location x at time t'. In rare cases, like water and twin-water, one would 
have to go back to the very dubbing itself before a referent could be determined. The only 
difference between 'water' and 'twin-water' is that distinct natural kinds are causally 
responsible for the way they are used, and so all a speaker can do by way of laying down a 
referent for his use of 'water' may be to appeal to the very causal chain that has led to this 
use.
Suppose now that Twin Earth is, not a remote planet in Wa , but a non-actual Wp. 
Twin Earth is not a real place far off in Wa , but a counterfactual Wp. Suppose also that we 
now know that the reference of 'water' must be causally constrained, i.e. that water is the 
watery stuff of our acquaintance. On these two assumptions, we can run the Twin Earth 
Argument once again:
(6 ) Suppose Twin Earth is a counterfactual Wp just like Earth in W a except that XYZ is 
the watery stuff.
(7) Suppose 'water' is short for 'the watery stuff of our acquaintance'.
(8 ) Then my utterance on Earth of 'water is wet' is true at Twin Earth iff the watery stuff of 
our acquaintance on Twin Earth is wet.
(9) But my utterance on Earth of 'water is wet' is true at Twin Earth iff H2 O is wet.
(10) So, 'water' is not short for 'the watery stuff of our acquaintance'.
It is important to see that causality does nothing to ensure we get the reference right with 
respect to counterfactual circumstances.2 If Twin Earth is a remote place in W a , then I and
2 Putnam [1996, p. 19] failed to distinguish between these two ways of thinking o f Twin Earth. His intention 
was to take Twin Earth as a "...Far-away planet in the actual universe...";. [1990, p. 60, cf. p. 69]. But he 
thought that the Twin Earth Argument showed that water is "...the water around here" where he took the 
expression 'around here’ to function as a rigidifier; op. cit. It is true that the indexical 'here' is modally rigid.
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my fellow Earthlings will not have had causal encounters with the watery stuff on Twin 
Earth, and so could not by our tokens of 'water' refer to XYZ. Only the inhabitants on Twin 
Earth have encountered XYZ, so only their tokens of 'water' will pick out that stuff. But if 
Twin Earth is taken as a counterfactual Wp, then ex hypothesi we causally interact with the 
watery XYZ on Twin Earth, and so, on the assumption that 'water' is short for 'the watery 
stuff of our acquaintance', our tokens of 'water' refer to XYZ on Twin Earth. We are asked 
to imagine a Wp in which we find ourselves implanted in a physical environment just like 
in W a apart from the fact that it contains no water; only the superficially indistinguishable 
XYZ. So, in those counterfactual circumstances, we causally interact with XYZ yet we 
agreed our Earthly tokens of 'water' do not pick out XYZ even in such circumstances.
The Referentialist will now argue that since only the singular truth-conditions in (9) 
can account for such counterfactual Twin Earth cases, 'water' is a purely Referential term. 
The semantic function of 'water' is not to describe its referent, but merely to serve as a rigid 
designator of a natural kind. In light of our discussion in Chapter 2, the Descriptivist will, 
however, not be persuaded by such an argument. There is no inference from modal rigidity 
to singular content. All the Descriptvist needs to account for counterfactuals is 
rigidification. So, in order to safeguard against Twin Earth thought of as another Wp, the 
Descriptivist must build into the descriptive content of 'water', not only a causality 
constraint, but also a rigidification device: the actual watery stuff of our acquaintance. This 
gets the truth-conditions right with respect to counterfactual circumstances:
(8 *) Then my utterance on Earth of 'water is wet' is true at Twin Earth iff the actual watery 
stuff of our acquaintance is wet.
Given that I am an Earthling, my tokens of 'water' will rigidly pick out H^O since H 2 O is 
the watery stuff of my acquaintance in Wa- So, the condition under which my utterance is 
true at a counterfactual Twin Earth is that H2 O is wet on this Twin Earth. The point is again
but the way he set up the Twin Earth Argument does not license any conclusion about the rigidity o f 'water'. 
Burge [1979; 1982] was explicit about this difference.
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that there is a way of accommodating our intuition about possible cases without buying into 
singular content. The truth-condition in (8 *) is not singular since the referent of 'water' does 
not appear on the right-hand side of the bi-conditional. All we need is an appropriately 
constrained descriptive condition: a causality constraint when Twin Earth is taken in the 
remote-place sense, and a rigidity constraint when Twin Earth is taken in the another-Wp 
sense.
The argument (6)-(10) is of course nothing but the Modal Argument in a different 
guise. What we learn from that Argument is not that the reference of a term N cannot go via 
associated properties. On the contrary, we learn that what matters when N picks out an 
object o is that o has those associated properties in Wa- N refers to o iff o uniquely has the 
associated properties in W a; regardless of whether o has them in various Wp. What a 
counterfactual Twin Earth emphasises is that the correct description of a Wp often depends 
on facts about how W a is, and not just on how that Wp is stipulated to be. Our intuition 
that 'water' is a rigid designator is based on intuitions about the correct description of Twin 
Earth: although XYZ is watery, it is not correctly described by us as 'water' given that the 
watery stuff on Earth is H2 O.
The same is tme of 'Aristotle'. Suppose Aristotle has a doppelganger in W 1 who has 
all the properties we standardly associate with 'Aristotle' in W a - even the property of being 
the causal origin of our use of 'Aristotle'. Under which conditions is my utterance of 
'Aristotle wrote De Anima' tme at W i? Clearly not iff Aristotle's doppelganger wrote De 
Anima  in W i. We use 'Aristotle' to speak of the same individual in all counterfactual 
circumstances. So, my utterance is true at W i iff the famous philosopher of antiquity, etc., 
in W a wrote De Anima in W i. We learn from the Modal Argument that our description of 
W i depends on W a: 'Aristotle' picks out Aristotle's doppelganger at W i iff Aristotle's 
doppelganger has all and only the properties we associate with 'Aristotle' in Wa- But given 
that he has not - Aristotle has all and only those properties in W a - 'Aristotle' does not refer 
to Aristotle's doppelganger at W i, no matter who has those properties in W%.
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In short, neither the Twin Earth Argument nor the Modal Argument forces us to 
abandon descriptive content. On the contrary, we learn something about the character of the 
descriptions which encapsulate that content. The former tells us that at least some of those 
descriptions must be couched in a causal vocabulary, and the second tells us that those 
descriptions must be rigidified. What constitutes the cluster of associated properties are 
thus not only purely general, qualitative properties, but also causal properties and properties 
which objects have in Wa- We can call this view Causal Rigidified Descriptivism? I shall 
now spend some time on how 'actually' works.
4.2. The Logic of 'Actually’.
There are various ways a modally flexible expression can be rigidified. Take 'the teacher of 
Alexander', and suppose that Aristotle taught Alexander in Wa , but that Plato taught him in 
W i. The definite description will then pick out Aristotle at Wa  and Plato at W i. By 
rigidification we ensure that the description picks out the same individual at all Wp. More 
precisely, that the individual who satisfies the description at Wa , is the individual who is 
being picked out at all Wp. A simple way of doing that is to qualify the description: 'the 
teacher of Alexander in Wa '. This accommodates what I have called:
(Wp-Rigidity) N is a rigid designator iff N refers to the same object o at every 
Wp in which o exists and not to something else at Wp in which o does not 
exist.
Note that we could, in principle, have rigidified the description by fixing on, not the actual, 
but a possible satisfier of the description. 'The teacher of Alexander in W f is modally rigid 
by (Wp-Rigidity): it picks out Plato at all Wp including Wa - Nevertheless, when it comes
3 This view does not have many friends in the literature; exceptions are White [1982], Lewis [1999a], Stanley 
[1999a] and Jackson [1998b].
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to singular referring terms, proper names or natural kind terms, we wish to pick out the 
referents of these terms at W a at all Wp. In the normal run of things, it is their actual 
referents that concern us when we consider what would happen had various circumstances 
obtained. So, it will suffice for our purposes to consider only rigidifying devices that fix on 
objects picked out at Wa* Instead of adding 'in W a’ we could equally well have inserted an 
actuality-operator. The expression 'the actual teacher of Alexander' does also accommodate 
(Wp-Rigidity).4
When we use 'actually' for the purpose of rigidification, we are interested in a 
distinctive logical use of the expression in natural language - not in a mere pragmatic use 
as when the BBC-commentator says 'actually it was Shearer, not Owen, who got sent off...', 
where 'actually' merely serves to dispel confusion. One such logical use is to clarify matters 
of relative scope involving modal operators. Take Aristotle's:
(11) It is possible that a man who is sitting down should be standing up, 
which is ambiguous between the false:
(1 2 )0  3 x (F x & G x ),
where F is 'sitting down' and G is 'standing up', and the true:
(13) 3x (Fx & OGx).
Another way to effect the consistent reading is to introduce 'actually'. Thus:
(14) It is possible that a man who is actually sitting down should be standing up, 
disambiguates (11) by indicating that (13) is the more appropriate. There are, however, 
logical uses of 'actually' which seem to suggest that a genuine actuality-operator must be 
introduced into formal modal languages alongside 0- and O-operators. Consider:
4 A  third way o f accomplishing the same result is to use the demonstrative 'this world'. The expression 'the 
teacher o f Alexander in this world' is also modally rigid by (Wp-Rigidity). There may be some difficulties in 
spelling out how the demonstration is supposed to work. If I say 'this man is drunk', then my audience will 
understand me to be referring to the contextually salient adult male, but it is not clear that I can 
demonstratively identify a possible world in the same manner. I shall henceforth only use an actuality- 
operator. For more on the technical differences see Fitch [1981].
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(15) It is possible that eveiything which is actually square should be blue, 
and the following three putative renditions:
(1 6 )0 V x (S x -» B x ),
(17) Vx 0  (Sx Bx),
(18) Vx (Sx OBx),
with progressively narrower scope for the 0 -operator with respect to the universal 
quantifier. None, however, will do. (16) says that there is a Wp in which all square things 
are blue, but (15) does not require the existence of a Wp in which some things are both 
square and blue. (17) says that for each thing there is a Wp in which it is blue if square, and
(18) says that for each thing which is actually square there is a Wp in which that thing is 
blue, but (15) requires the existence of a Wp in which all things square in W a are blue in 
that Wp. So, it is essential that the 0-operator takes large scope with respect to the 
universal quantifier, yet that in determining the truth-value of the embedded universally 
quantified sentence, we are allowed to refer back to W a and not just to how things are in 
Wp. A regimentation which acknowledges a semantically significant actuality-operator @ 
will have at its disposal such a back-referring device. Thus:
(19)0  V x(@ S x-^B x),
translates (15) satisfactorily since (19) is true only if there is a Wp in which all things 
which are square in W a are blue in W p I n  short, sentences like (15) suggest that modal 
sentences containing 'actually' cannot adequately be expressed within standard first-order 
quantified modal logic. 6
In saying that (19) is an adequate translation of (15), it is assumed that 'actually' is 
given an indexical analysis to the effect that 'actually' rigidly refers to the worldly context 
in which it is uttered. We can use Stalnaker's [1999a] semantic matrices to represent the 
way 'actually' works. These matrices shall prove important in the following, so it is crucial
6 Proviso regarding existence, cf. Davies [1981b, p. 221].
6 The examples in this section are based on Crossley & Humberstone [1977] and Davies [1981b].
141
to understand how these devices function. What one must bear in mind is that there are two 
different ways in which a term may apply at Wp. As glossed by Jackson [1998a, p. 48], one 
must distinguish between:
...what the term applies to under various hypotheses about which world is the actual
world, or [...] what the term applies to under various counterfactual hypotheses.
Let me illustrate. Suppose Plato is the teacher of Alexander and the author of De Anima in 
W i, and suppose that Aristotle taught Alexander and wrote De Anima in W2 . Then I utter:
(20) The actual teacher of Alexander wrote De Anima,
in W i. What I said is true at W i since the description 'the actual teacher of Alexander' picks 
out Plato and he wrote that book in W i. Is (20) true at W2 ? Well, it depends on how we 
think of W 2 . If we think o fW 2 as counterfactual, then the answer is negative. 'The actual 
teacher of Alexander' refers to Plato at W 2  due to the rigidifier 'actual', but he did not write 
De Anima in W2 . If, however, we think o fW 2 as actual, then the answer is affirmative. To 
think of a Wp as actual is to think of Wp as a possible context of utterance or acquisition - a 
Wp in which we are speaking. In that case, the description refers to Aristotle due to the 
indexicality o f 'actual', and he did write De Anima in W2 . That is, if I utter 'the actual 
teacher of Alexander' in W2 , then we take W 2  to be actual, and so I refer to Aristotle since 
we assume that he taught Alexander in W2 .
This is the basic mechanism. When one thinks of a Wp as actual, one considers the 
possibility that Wp turns out to be Wa- When one thinks of a Wp as counterfactual, one 
takes a given way W a has turned out, a fixed W a, and then considers Wp as a 
counterfactual Wp. Other philosophers have made roughly the same distinction. Kaplan 
[1989], for instance, distinguished between a possible context o f utterance and a possible 
circumstance o f evaluation. A context is a location where a sentence is uttered consisting of
142
a time, place, speaker and a Wp. A circumstance is an index consisting of contextual 
features that need not go together in any possible context.^ Consider the sentence:
(2 1 ) 1  feel elated,
and suppose that S feels elated in W i but not in W2 , and that R feels elated in W 2  but not in 
W i. As Kaplan famously argued, T is an indexical which rigidly refers to the speaker of the 
context of utterance. The linguistic meaning of T - its character - is a rule from a context of 
utterance to the speaker of that context. So, the linguistic meaning determines that if S is 
the speaker, then S is the referent of T in (21). The singular proposition expressed in Wi 
<S; elated-ness> is thus tme at W i. Is (21) also tme at W2 ? It depends on how we think of 
W 2 . If W2  is thought of as a circumstance of evaluation, i.e. as counterfactual, then, given 
that S is the speaker in W i, (21) is false at W2 . When we evaluate sentences at Wp 
considered as counterfactual, we consider the truth-value at Wp of the singular propositions 
expressed in the Wp we consider as actual. It is thus false that S feels elated at W 2 . If, 
however, W2  is thought of as a possible context of utterance, i.e. as a candidate for W a, 
then our evaluation depends on who is speaking in W2 . If S is the speaker, then S expresses 
the singular proposition <S; elated-ness> which is false at W2 . If R is the speaker, then R 
expresses the singular proposition <R; elated-ness> which is true at W2 . So, the 
indexicality of T is a relevant property when we consider Wp as actual in that its 
prepositional content is sensitive to variations in contexts of utterance. The modal rigidity 
of T, on the other hand, is a relevant property when we consider Wp as counterfactual in 
that the reference of T at such Wp is fixed by whoever is the speaker in the Wp we consider 
as actual. 8
7 See also Lewis [1981] for more on the distinction between context and index.
8 Note that for modally flexible expressions, it is irrelevant for the truth-value o f a sentence at Wp how Wp is 
taken. With our examples, 'the teacher o f Alexander is a philosopher' is true at Wp iff the teacher o f Alexander 
at Wp is a philosopher at Wp; it does not matter whether Wp is taken as actual or counterfactual. Flexible 
designators apply to a counterfactual Wp independently o f how Wa turns out.
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There is a danger that natural language is liable to confuse us as to which of these 
two ways of conceiving of Wp we are engaging in. I have so far been talking about the 
tioith-value of a sentence at a Wp, But it is clear that this is potentially ambiguous between 
the possibility o f a sentence expressing a truth and the possible truth o f what a sentence 
expresses. It is, as Kaplan [1989, p. 290] emphasised:
"...likely to confuse what the truth-value of the proposition actually expressed would 
have been under some possible circumstances with what the truth-value of the 
proposition that would have been expressed would have been under those 
circumstances"
I shall therefore adopt the following terminology inspired by Prior [1976]. When we think 
of a Wp as counterfactual, we say that a sentence is true-of Wp, and when we think of a Wp 
as actual, we say that a sentence is true~in Wp. If a sentence is true-in a Wp, then it 
expresses a truth when uttered in that Wp, but a sentence can be true-of a Wp without 
occurring as uttered in it. If a sentence is true-of a Wp, then whatever it expresses when 
uttered in W a is true of that Wp. A sentence can be true-in a Wp without being true-of the 
Wp in which it is true, and a sentence can be tme-of a Wp without being true-in the Wp of 
which it is true. Let me illustrate. Take:
(20) The actual teacher of Alexander wrote De Anima,
but now suppose that Plato is the author of De Anima in both W% and W 2 . Plato is still the 
teacher of Alexander in W i and Aristotle is his teacher in W 2 . Now, (20) is true-in W \. 
When we consider W 1 as actual, then 'the actual teacher of Alexander' refers to Plato, and 
Plato wrote De Anima in W i. Is (20) also true-of W i? Well, in order to find out whether a 
sentence is true-of a Wp one must first determine which Wp is considered as actual; one 
must, as it were, fix an Wa- If we let W2  be actual, then 'the actual teacher of Alexander' 
refers to Aristotle. But since Aristotle did not write De Anima in W i, (20) is false-of W %.
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So, (20) is true-in W i, but is, when W2  is taken as actual, false-of Wi.^ (20) is, however, 
false-in W2 . If we consider W 2  as actual, then 'the actual teacher of Alexander' refers to 
Aristotle, but Aristotle did not write De Anima in W2 . Is (20) also false-of W2 ? Well, if we 
fix W 1 as actual, then 'the actual teacher of Alexander' refers to Plato, but Plato did write 
De Anima in W2 . So, (20) is false-in W2 , but is, when Wi is taken as actual, true-of W 2 ^^ 
The same is roughly true of:
(21) I feel elated.
Suppose S is the speaker in W i and R is the speaker in W2 , and suppose that S feels elated 
in both W i and W 2  and that R feels unhappy in both Wi and W 2 . Then (21) is true-in W% 
but false-in W2 . And if we consider Wi as our context of utterance, then (21) is true-of W2 . 
In W i T refers to S and S does feel elated in W2 . If, however, we take W 2  as our context of 
utterance, then (21) is false-of W i. In W2  T refers to R but R does not feel elated in Wj.
Note that when we consider the truth-value of a sentence as uttered in different 
possible contexts, we assume the sentence is given & fixed  interpretation. It is not that I feel 
elated' means that the speaker of the context feels elated in W i and that pigs fly in W2 . In
 ^ A  natural question to ask is; can a sentence be true-of a Wp in the special case where the same Wp is fixed 
as actual? The answer is clearly yes. If Wi is taken as actual, then 'the actual teacher o f Alexander' refers to 
Plato and Plato wrote D e Anima in W i. It follows trivially that if  a sentence is true-in Wp, then it is true-of Wp 
provided Wp is taken as actual. Or as Lewis [1981, p. 88] puts the same point: a sentence s is true at context c 
if f  s is true at c at the index o f the context; the context o f utterance and the context o f evaluation, i.e. the 
index, are simply one and the same.
For another example o f a sentence which is true-of a Wp, but is false-in that Wp, see Dummett [1981, pp. 
567]. Note that Dummett's distinction between truth with respect to a world and truth in a world corresponds 
to my distinction between truth-of a world and truth-in a world. Or take Priori’s own example [1976]: 'all 
propositions are negative’. This sentence is presumably true-of a Wp But if  it were to occur in that Wp it 
would not be possible that all propositions in that Wp are negative since it itself expresses an affirmative 
proposition.
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this case, the linguistic meaning of T is a fixed rule from a context of utterance to a 
speaker.
What I have said about truth also holds for reference. So far I have been talking 
about the reference of a term at a Wp but once we allow for the possibility that reference is 
sensitive to the context of utterance or acquisition, this is potentially misleading between 
what it refers to at counterfactual Wp and what it would refer to if used in Wp. For 
simplicity, I shall adopt the same terminology and say that an expression \j/ refers to o o /a  
Wp when Wp is considered as counterfactual and that \\f refers to an object o m a Wp when 
Wp is considered as actual. With our terminology in place, we can then say that @ is an 
operator which has the main semantic feature that for any referring expression \|/, @\j/ 
refers to o of a Wp just in c a tt  refers to o in Wa- But given that we have allowed for the 
possibility that another Wp turns out to be actual, what @V|/ refers to depends on which Wp 
we consider as actual. E.g. 'the actual teacher of Alexander' refers to Aristotle of a 
counterfactual Wp just in case 'the actual teacher of Alexander' refers to Aristotle in the Wp 
we consider as actual. In general, the reference of an expression thus has a double world- 
dependecy. It depends on the Wp we consider as counterfactual and on the Wp we consider 
as actual. In order to represent this kind of double world-dependency on reference, what is 
called for is not the single indexed function Fi: Wp Extension/Reference, from Sec. 2.2, 
but a doubly indexed function:
p 2 : WpA X Wpc Extension/Reference,
11 What I do not have in mind is nicely brought out by the riddle: if  you call a horse's tail a leg how many 
legs does a horse have? The answer is, of course, four! Yet had 'leg' applied to tails as well as to legs, the 
answer would have been five. In order to appreciate the other way o f taking the question we must change the 
interpretation placed on 'leg', i.e. the way we use 'leg' in our speech community. No such changes are called 
for in the case of expressions containing T or 'actual'. For a different example see Sec. 4.3.
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where the first parameter represents Wp considered as actual^^ and the second parameter 
represents Wp considered as counterfactual. The truth of a sentence has a similar double 
world-dependency. The truth of T have a headache' depends on who the speaker is and 
whether he has a headache. If in Wa I speak and have a headache, then the sentence is 
actually true. By changing the context of utterance, while fixing the circumstance of 
evaluation, we can change the truth-value. If in Wa you do not have a headache, then the 
sentence would be false if uttered by you. Or we can change the truth-value by changing 
the circumstance of evaluation, while fixing the context of utterance. If in a Wp I do not 
have a headache, then the sentence would be false if uttered by me. In other words, the 
facts determine the truth-value of what was actually expressed by a sentence, but had the 
facts been different, something different might have been expressed and that, in turn, might 
have had a different truth-value.
We can now picture this double world-dependency by a semantic matrix. Along the 
horizontal axis are Wp i and j qua counterfactual, i.e. qua circumstance of evaluation, and 
along the vertical axis are Wp i and j qua actual, i.e. qua contexts of utterance or 
acquisition. Truth, on the matrix, is thus dependent on both ways of thinking of Wp. A 
horizontal line represents the prepositional content of an expression in a given Wp and each 
item in the row records the reference of that expression of the Wp heading the vertical 
column in which it occurs. A vertical line, on the other hand, represents the variations in 
the reference of an expression effected by shifts in Wp qua contexts of utterance or 
acquisition. According to the indexical analysis of 'actually', utterances of the definite 
description:
(22) The actual world.
12 Due to Putnam-type Twin Earth cases - where Twin Earth is a remote planet in - we really need 
centred Wp in the argument place Wp^ in Fg. That is, since one and the same utterance type can occur in 
different contexts within the same Wp, WpA better be a Wp with a designated spatio-temporal location, if  it is 
to get the reference right in all contexts o f acquisition. Alternatively, F2  could take as argument a token 
utterance or, as I propose, include an acquaintance-condition; cf. also Chalmers [1996, p. 60].
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can thus be depicted by the matrix in fig. 1 :
fig. 1 i j
i i i
j j j
Due to the indexicality of 'actual', the reference of 'the actual world' varies as the Wp qua 
actual varies, but once we have fixed a Wp qua actual, 'the actual world' refers to the same 
Wp at all counterfactual Wp. In our terminology, the first horizontal row shows that 'the 
actual world' refers to i in i and to i in i of j. The second horizontal row shows that 'the 
actual world' refers to j in j and to j in j of i. Likewise, utterances of (20) can be pictured by 
the matrix in fig. 2 :
fig. 2 Wi W2
Wi True False
W2 False True
We now suppose that in Wi Aristotle taught Alexander and wrote De Anima, and that in 
W% Plato taught Alexander and wrote De Anima. The first horizontal row shows that 'the 
actual teacher of Alexander wrote De Anima' is true-in W%, but is, in W i, false-of W2 . In 
W i Aristotle taught Alexander and wrote De Anima, but he did not write it in W2 . The 
second horizontal row shows that 'the actual teacher of Alexander wrote De Anima' is true- 
in W2 , but is, in W2 , false-of W i. In W2  Plato taught Alexander and wrote De Anima, but 
he did not write it in W i.
(21) can also be represented by fig. 2 on the assumption that in W i S speaks and 
feels elated, and in W2  R speaks and feels elated. The fkst horizontal row would then show 
that I feel elated' is true-in W i, but is, in W i, false-of W2 . S is the speaker in W i, but S 
only feels elated in W%. The second horizontal row shows that I feel elated' is true-in W 2 , 
but is, in W2 , false-of W i. R is the speaker in W2 , but R only feels elated in W 2 .
148
Let me give another example. Assume, as we standardly do after Kaplan [1989], 
that the expression 'this' is an indexical which rigidly refers to the demonstratively 
identified place or entity in the context of utterance. Now consider the sentence:
(23) This is the actual world.
It is a consequence of the indexical analysis of 'actually' that (23) is true-of all Wp in all 
Wp. (23) thus expresses a necessary proposition, i.e. a proposition which is true at every 
Wp. This is depicted in fig. 3 by the fact that at least one horizontal line contains nothing 
but truths:
fig. 3 Wi W2
Wi Tme Tme
W2 Tme Tme
The same is true for sentences like 'If Aristotle exists, then Aristotle was the actual teacher 
of Alexander' or 'I am the actual speaker' which state identities between two rigid 
designators. In general, any indicative sentence s containing 'actually' will be, if true, then 
necessarily so. In other words, on the indexical analysis, Vs(@s —> n@ s) will hold good.^^
If we take S5 to be the background modal logic, then @s —> □ © s  w ill be an axiom (A5) in S5@.
Moreover, □  @s and @s are necessarily equivalent, since we have t h #  @s -4@s by a substitution-
instance o f the T-axiom o f necessity Os —>s. All (A5) says is that if @s is true, then it is true-of every Wp
that @s is true, but this is perfectly compatible with the possibility that @s is false-in some other Wp. That is,
had the sentence @s been uttered in a different Wp, @s might have expressed a falsehood. To couch this other
notion o f necessity, we need a fixedly-operator j f  which combines with @ such that j f  @s is true iff  
whichever Wp plays the role as actual, s would have been true-in that Wp. Accordingly Jf @s and Os are
equivalent, but only for ©-free formulae s, so that if the background logic for j f  is S 5© , j f© s  Os (for any
©-free formula s) will be an axiom in S 5 © jf, j f ,  however, does not by itself represent necessity: s j f s  is 
true, but only for all ©-free formulae s, since © s j f  © s is an invalid substitution instance. To be sure, j f
was precisely introduced to invalidate @s j f  @s, so that j f ©  would form a notion o f necessity distinct 
from □. What represents necessity i # ©: what is necessary is what would be true no matter which Wp is 
considered as actual. In short. Os says that s is true-of all W  whereas j f  © s says that s is true-in all Wp. For
more on this two-dimensional modal logic see Davies & Humberstone [1981a], Cross well & Humberstone 
[1977], Segerberg [1973] and Stalnaker [1999a].
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But it may be objected that this involves a kind of u n a c c e p t a b l e F o r  surely, it is 
not necessary that the world we call 'actual' is Wa- W a might have been different in 
various ways, that is, another Wp might have been W a : VWp(Wp = W a  — Wp #  W a ). 
Likewise, it is neither necessary that Aristotle taught Alexander in W a nor necessary that I 
was the speaker of some sentence token in Wa- Plato might have been Alexander's teacher 
in W a and you might have been the utterer of that token.
The objection is good, but so is the response. First of all, I have used 'W a ' as short 
for 'the actual world'. This immediately invites the caveat not to confuse the true wide 
scope reading 'the actual world might not have been the actual world' with the false narrow 
scope reading 'it might have been that the actual world is not the actual world'. To say that 
'□  (23)' is true is just to say that it is not possible that this world, %  is not W a , i.e. had 
W a been different from the way it is, it would not have been W a but another Wp. There is, 
however, also a sense in which (23) allows for the possibility envisaged: of this world, W a , 
it is possible that it is not W a , i.e. a different Wp might have been W a . In other words, the 
proposition expressed by (23) in W a is necessary. But had another Wp been actual, i.e. had
(23) been uttered in a different Wp, the expressions 'this' and 'the actual world' would have 
referred to a different Wp, and so (23) would have stated a different truth from the one 
stated in W a , although still a necessary one. Likewise with 'Aristotle was the actual teacher 
of Alexander'. If Aristotle was Alexander's teacher in W a , then there is presumably a Wp in 
which Aristotle did not teach Alexander, but there is no Wp in which Aristotle did not teach 
Alexander in W a. The proposition expressed by that sentence is therefore necessary. If, 
however, we suppose that 'Aristotle' is short for 'the actual teacher of Alexander', then had 
'Aristotle was the actual teacher of Alexander' been uttered in a Wp in which, say, Plato
As van Inwagen [1980] seems to think.
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taught Alexander, then that sentence would have stated a different truth from the one stated 
in Wa , although still a necessary one4^
4.3. Two-Dimensionalism
Consider now the following example originally due to Evans [1982, 1996b]. We know that 
some individual uniquely invented the zip fastener, but we do not know who it was. It 
would thus be convenient to introduce a name for this individual. Imagine the stipulation:
(S*) Let 'Julius' refer to whoever invented the zip fastener.
Evans' idea was now that, following Referentialism, (S" )^ fixes the reference of 'Julius' such 
that 'Julius' functions as modally rigid by (Wp-Rigidity): 'Julius' refers to the unique 
satisfier in W a of 'the inventor of the zip’ of every Wp in which that satisfier exists and not 
to something else of Wp in which it does not. But, following Descriptivism, (5*) also 
confers descriptive content on 'Julius'. What this means is not only that it is a priori
There is an interesting issue about the metaphysical ramifications o f the semantics o f 'actually*. Lewis 
[1973, pp. 85-6] endorsed the indexical theory o f 'actually' as part of his defence o f extreme realism about 
possible worlds. His view had three components: (i) Wp, i.e. ways things might have been, exist; (ii) Wp are 
just more things o f the same kind as the W^; (iii) Wp are not reducible but respectable entities in their own 
right. Lewis suggested that the actuality o f W a  is a world-relative attribute; our world has it relative to itself 
but so do all the others. In contrast, Stalnaker [1976] has argued that one can endorse the indexical theory as a 
semantical thesis without such metaphysical commitments; just as someone convinced o f the indexical 
analysis o f T could be a solipsist. He proposed a moderate realism about possible worlds which accepts only 
(i) and (iii). There exist Wp in the sense o f there existing, in their own right, ways our world might have been, 
without there existing W p which are the ways our world might have been. Stalnaker's point was that a thing 
cannot be identical with a property o f that thing, so, in particular, a thing, e.g. the cosmos, whatever that is, 
cannot be identical with any way that thing could have been, including the way that thing actually is. W a  has 
the property o f being the way it is, but W a  is not the way it is. That property is instantiated, but the property 
o f being a way W a  might have been, while existing in its own right, is not.
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knowable that the reference of 'Julius’ is fixed by 'the inventor of the zip fastener'. What it 
means is that all it takes to understand 'Julius' as it occurs in sentences is that 'Julius' refers 
to whoever invented the zip. It is not constitutive of mastery of 'Julius' that one knows of 
the referent of 'Julius' that 'Julius' refers to him.^^ Consider now:
(24) Julius was the inventor of the zip,
and suppose that Reagan invented the zip in W i, Bush invented the zip in W%, and Clinton 
invented the zip in W 3 . Suppose moreover that (S*) is made in each of W i, W2 , and W 3 . 
Then the matrix in fig. 4 depicts utterances of (24):
fig. 4 Wi W2 W 3 W4
Wi True False False True
W2 False True False False
W3 False False True False
W4 False False True False
Following Stalnaker [1999a, pp. 9-16, 80-4], we can define three propositions on the 
matrix. For each Wp in the vertical axis, i.e. qua actual, we can define a horizontal 
proposition as a function from a Wp in the horizontal axis, i.e. qua counterfactual, into a 
truth-value. For instance, if we take W% as actual, then the horizontal proposition is the 
function that yields the value true given W% as argument, the value false given W 2  as
16 In [1980, p. 59] Kripke complains that the Descriptivist uses 'sense' ambiguously between giving the 
meaning and fixing the reference o f an expression. If Evans' example is coherent, then (S*) performs both 
tasks! For a similar example, see Dummett's [1973, pp. 112-32] 'St. Anne' as short for 'the mother o f the 
virgin Mary', and his [1981, pp. 562-70] 'Deutero-Isaiah' as short for 'the author of prophecy embodied in 
chapters 40 to 55 o f the Book o f Isaiah'. Dummett held that all singular terms had descriptive content by 
means of which they picked out their referents, but due to the problems discussed in Section 3.6 about wide­
spread variation in associated descriptive content, he chose examples where the linguistic community 
possessed only a very limited amount o f identifying information. In the case of 'Julius', the name does simply 
not have a use prior to (S). The point o f the examples was merely to demonstrate that names could have 
descriptive content. As we saw, other difficulties arise when we consider less contrived, ordinary names like 
'Aristotle' or 'Bill Clinton'.
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argument, etc. In each Wp (24) is thus false-of some Wp which is to say that (24) expresses 
a contingent proposition in each Wp. This is recorded in fig. 4 by the fact that each 
horizontal proposition contains some falsehoods. A diagonal proposition is defined as a 
function from a set of Wp consisting of a Wp in the vertical axis and the same Wp in the 
horizontal axis into a t r u t h - v a l u e .  7^ ^  the proposition associated with a sentence which 
for any Wp is true-of a Wp iff it is true-in that Wp, i.e. the proposition that is true for any 
Wp iff the horizontal proposition expressed in that Wp is tme at that Wp. If we take W i/W \ 
as arguments, then we get the value truth, and likewise for W2 /W 2  and W 3 /W 3 . The 
significance of the fact that the diagonal proposition in fig. 4 contains nothing but tmths is 
that (24) expresses a true proposition in every Wp qua actual. So, someone who grasps the 
descriptive content of 'Julius' - knows of (S*) - will know that (24) could only be used to 
express truths. For each Wp in the horizontal axis, we can finally define a vertical 
proposition as a function from a Wp in the vertical axis into a truth-value. For instance, if 
we take W 1 as counterfactual, then the vertical proposition is the function that yields the 
value true given W i as argument, the value false given W 2  as argument, etc. This shows 
that the truth-value of (24) is sensitive to variations in Wp qua actual even if we hold Wp 
qua counterfactual constant: in W i (24) is tme-of W i, in W 2  (24) is false-of W i, etc. The 
reason for this is that, due to the hidden 'actuality' operator in 'Julius', the proposition 
expressed by (24) is itself sensitive to variations in Wp qua actual. We could thus define 
different horizontal propositions for each Wp qua actual.
Note that a sentence can be assigned more than one diagonal proposition given that there are multiple 
contexts o f utterance or acquisition within a single Wp - Twin Earth can be taken to be in Wa- That is why we 
really need as arguments, not Wp, but spatio-temporal locations witliin Wp; cf. fn. 12.
It is important to emphasise that for each sentence numerous diagonal, horizontal and vertical propositions 
can be defined on the matrix for that sentence. It is only for the sake o f convenience that I have confined the
matrices to contain a very limited number o f worlds. Note also how these three propositions elucidate the 
distinction between one- and two-dimensional operators. □  is a one-dimensional operator which takes
horizontal propositions into horizontal propositions: to evaluate P on e need only look at the values of P on
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There is, as I briefly mentioned in Sec. 4.2, another way of changing the proposition 
expressed, hence the truth-value of a sentence, and it is important not to confuse them. One 
can change the proposition expressed by (24) in a Wp just by changing the interpretation of 
'Julius'. Suppose we had introduced 'Julius' by a different reference-fixing stipulation:
(S**) Let 'Julius' refer to whoever got elected US President in 1992,
and that W4  is a Wp just like W i, except that in W4  (S**), and not (S*), is made. Then, as 
fig. 4 shows, (24) is not true-in W 4 , so the diagonal no longer contains just truths. In W4  
'Julius' refers to Clinton, but Reagan, and not Clinton, invented the zip in W4 . Does this 
mean that (24) is not true-in every Wp? No. It is true that 'Julius' might have been used 
differently from the way 'Julius' ex hypothesi happens to be used, just like we might have 
used T to denote the hearer, but such possibilities are semantically irrelevant. They tell us 
nothing about the language as we actually use and understand it. So, when we represent an 
expression by the matrix, we take it as having its standard community-wide interpretation 
in all the Wp in which it is used.
It is worth dwelling on what Evans took the semantic function of 'Julius' to be. 
'Julius' is supposed to be a descriptive name, i.e. a singular term used rigidly to refer to an 
individual except that it has associated descriptive content which (i) mediates its reference 
and (ii) constitutes grasping its prepositional content. This invites the thought that 'Julius' is 
just short for a rigidified definite description which encodes that content: 'the actual 
inventor of the zip'.^^ The plausibility of this identification derives from the fact that, given 
(i) and (ii), 'Julius' and 'the actual inventor of the zip' should be intersubstitutable salva 
veritate in both modal and intentional contexts. Evans [1996b, pp. 187-92] held that 'Julius'
the horizontal line. @ is a two-dimensional operator which take a whole matrix into another whole matrix: the 
matrix for @P is the one that projects the diagonal proposition for P onto the vertical. @ thus turns a 
contingent truth into a necessary truth and a contingent falsehood into a necessary falsehood.
We assume uniqueness. If more than one individual invented the zip in W^, then we must supplement the 
description with an acquaintance condition just like we did with 'water.
154
and 'the actual inventor of the zip' were not semantically equivalent since he was sceptical 
as to whether definite descriptions - rigidified or not - belonged to the class of referring 
expressions. But as Davies & Humberstone [1981a, pp. 11-13] pointed out, it is hard to see 
what semantic considerations could possibly distinguish them. Evans presumably thought 
that the tmth-value of a sentence containing an ordinary proper name like 'Aristotle' was 
not sensitive to variations in Wp qua actual.20 But if it is true, as Evans himself seemed to 
think, that the reference of 'Julius’ is sensitive to such variations, then so is 'the actual 
inventor of the zip'; the two expressions will thus invariably receive the same 
representations on the matrices.21
Is it nevertheless feasible to hold that 'Julius' is a rigid designator with descriptive 
content given by 'the inventor of the zip' yet deny that Julius' simply abbreviates 'the actual 
inventor of the zip'? It would seem that only if this combination of views is coherent, could 
the Descriptivist maintain that definite descriptions are not genuinely referring expressions. 
Bear in mind the two ways of responding to the Modal Argument from Sec. 2.5 and 2.6 
respectively. We have so fai* assumed that the Descriptivist concedes the Rigidity Principle 
(RP) and meets the Modal Argument by rigidification. But, as I argued, Descriptivism 
could equally well have blocked the Modal Argument by refusing to accept (RP) on which 
that Argument hangs. In that case, there would be no need for rigidification. 'Julius' and 'the 
inventor of the zip' will have the same descriptive content yet presumably differ in modal 
properties. It is one thing, however, to establish that 'Julius' has descriptive content, but
20 They are, in Evans' [1996b] terminology, deeply rigid  designators, where an expression is deeply rigid iff 
it refers to the same object in all Wp, i.e. at all Wp qua actual. To my knowledge, nobody has argued 
persuasively that there are deeply rigid designators in natural language nor indeed what would ensure that 
there could be such designators. However, see fn. 45.
21 At pp. 206-7, op. cit., he writes: "...to hold that the states o f affairs o f y's being the inventor o f  the zip and 
being F, for example, could serve to make the sentence 'Julius is F' true, would appear to commit one to the 
view that, had y invented the zip and been F, the sentence would have been true. But is this not inconsistent 
with the fact that the sentence 'Julius is F' is not true with respect to that situation? I accept the counterfactual 
claim, but there is no inconsistency in doing so."
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another thing to secure its modal rigidity in the absence of a rigidifier. The worry is how 
'Julius' could be modally rigid if its reference is mediated by a modally flexible description: 
if the reference of 'Julius' at counterfactual Wp is determined by whoever invented the zip 
in Wp, then 'Julius' will not be a rigid designator. What is called for is some restriction on 
the descriptive content such that all it does by way of determining reference is that it fixes 
the reference of 'Julius' in Wa - It is simply not a property of descriptive content to 
determine reference at counterfactual Wp. But this is exactly what rigidification does. It 
ensures that 'Julius' picks out an individual in counterfactual circumstances only if that 
individual is the actual inventor of the zip; regardless of whether that individual invented 
the zip in those circumstances. Without the aid of devices like 'actually', it is hard to see 
how the Descriptivist can avail herself of modal rigidity. How, for instance, could she get 
the Wp-truth-conditions for sentences like (24) correct when her pledge to descriptive 
content rules out appeal to singular tmth-conditions? On this background, I shall henceforth 
assume that any viable version of Descriptivism must embrace a form of rigidification 
strategy.
So, assume that a singular term like 'Julius' is simply short for 'the actual inventor of 
the zip'. Given that 'actually' is both a rigidifier and an indexical, it is cleai* that neither 
(DR) from Sec. 2.2 nor (RR) from Sec. 2.3. will do as a principle by which the reference of 
'Julius' is g o v e r n e d . 2 2  According to (DR), a singular term N is not modally rigid, and 
according to (RR) the reference of N is not sensitive to valuations in which Wp we consider 
as actual. In Sec. 2.2 and 2.3 I took it for granted that 'Wa' was fixed  world - the actual 
Wa as it were. But Two-Dimensionalism allows for the possibility of considering different 
Wp as actual, and so N may refer to different objects as we vary Wp qua actual. In Wi 
where Reagan invented the zip, 'Julius' refers to Reagan, but in W2  where Bush invented
2 2  To repeat, Descriptivist Reference (DR) reads: N  refers to o at Wp iff  o satisfies ^ at Wp, whereas 
Referentialist Reference (RR) reads: N refers to o at Wp iff o satisfies (j) at W^; where N  is a singular term, o 
an object and (j) some descriptive conditions.
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the zip, 'Julius' refers to Bush. So, when it comes to reference at counterfactual Wp, Two- 
Dimensionalism rules that the reference of N at counterfactual Wp is determined by 
satisfaction of a descriptive condition (}) at W a whichever Wp plays the role as Wa- We get 
Two-Dimensionalist Reference:
(TDR) N refers to o at Wp qua counterfactual iff o satisfies (j) at Wp qua actual.
In particular, 'Julius' refers to an individual i at a counterfactual Wp iff i satisfies 'the 
inventor of the zip' at Wa  whichever Wp turns out to be actual. Similarly, when it comes to 
reference at Wa , Two-Dimensionalism rules that:
(Wa"R*) N refers to o at Wp qua actual iff o satisfies (|) at Wp qua actual.
When I said in Sec. 2.3 that Descriptivism and Referentialism alike endorsed (Wa-R), I 
took it for granted that 'W a' was a fixed world. But just as in (TDR), we must now allow 
for the possibility that we consider a different Wp as a candidate for W a - S o , if a term like 
'Julius’ contains a hidden actuality-operator, then its reference will obviously be sensitive as 
to which Wp we consider as actual. To consider another Wp as actual, is to consider Wp as 
a possible context of utterance or acquisition. So, given that 'actually' is an indexical 
expression, the reference of 'Julius' will be sensitive to variations in Wp qua actual. But 
even if 'Julius' did not contain 'actually', its reference would still be sensitive to variation in 
which Wp is considered as actual given that such hypotheses involve considering our 
stipulation (S*) as made in those Wp. (S*) fixes the reference of 'Julius' to whoever 
invented the zip in W a, but had (S*) been made in a Wp in which someone else invented 
the zip, then 'Julius' would have referred to him. So, giving up on 'actually' need not rob 
'Julius' of its Two-Dimensional semantics.23
23 The point is thus that a term N  is two-dimensional iff it is possible that N refers to an object at a Wp qua 
actual but to a different object at the same Wp qua counterfactual. In other words, N is two-dimensional iff the 
truth-value o f a sentence containing N  has a double world-dependency: it depends on which Wp we take as
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4.4. Two Grades of Understanding
Suppose now that we model the semantic functioning of 'water' on 'Julius'. Our stipulation: 
(S) Let 'water' refer to whatever stuff has watery properties Pi, ? 2 , Ps-.Pn, 
both fixes the reference of 'water' to refer rigidly to the kind common to the watery 
exemplars of our acquaintance in Wp considered as actual, but also confers the descriptive 
content of 'the watery stuff of our acquaintance' on 'water'. Had (S) been carried out in a 
different Wp, 'water' would have been a rigid designator of the watery stuff of our 
acquaintance in that Wp, but given that (S) is performed in W a, 'water' rigidly picks out the 
watery stuff of our acquaintance in Wa- 'Water' can thus be seen as shorthand for 'the 
watery stuff of our actual acquaintance'. That way, 'water' has associated a cluster of 
descriptive content and yet is neither susceptible to the Twin Earth Argument nor to the 
Modal Argument since we have built into the cluster conditions of rigidity and causality.
actual and which Wp we take as counterfactual. The fact that singular terms are two-dimensional should be 
common ground between Descriptivism and Referentialism. Both camps could endorse (TDR) and (W^-R*). 
Note, for instance, that (TDR) and (W^-R*) simply amounts to (TDR*) N refers to o at Wp iff o satisfies (j) at 
Wp qua actual, which differ from (RR) only in that the latter uses a fixed notion o f W a'. There would, 
however, still be disagreement between them as to what makes it the case that N  is two-dimensional. The 
Descriptivist insists that it is in virtue o f  descriptive content that N  has this property, whereas the 
Referentialist maintains that N  has this property if  there is a reference-fixing description. E.g. Stalnaker's 
[1999a] propositional concept is two-dimensional since it is defined as a function from Wp qua actual into a 
proposition which in turn is a function from a Wp qua counterfactual into a truth-value. But Stalnaker's 
propositional concept is certainly not descriptive in the sense I use that notion. Unlike Kaplan's [1989] 
character which is a two-dimensional concept associated with an expression-type as its meaning, a 
propositional concept is a context-sensitive property o f expression-tokens; cf. also Lewis [1980]. What is 
important to bear in mind is that the fact that N  is two-dimensional, and thus can be represented by a matrix, 
is in itself no argument that N  has descriptive content. The contention is only that i /N  has descriptive content, 
then we can use the two-dimensional framework to represent its semantics.
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'Water' is thus a Two-Dimensional notion.24 Let Wi be Earth where H2 O is the watery stuff 
of our acquaintance and let W2  be Twin Earth where XYZ is the watery stuff of our 
acquaintance. We can then depict utterances of 'water' by the matrix in fig. 5:
fig. 5 Wi W2
Wi H 2 O H2 O
W 2 XYZ XYZ
The descriptive content of 'water' is what determines the reference of 'water' in a Wp, i.e. 
when we consider Wp as actual. Considering a Wp as actual involved in the case of 
indexicals considering Wp as a possible context o f utterance: if I speak, then T refers to 
me, but if you had spoken, then T would have referred to you, etc. But in the case of 
natural kind terms, a shift in context of utterance is clearly not enough to bring about a 
change in reference. The so-called switching arguments (cf. Sec. 1.4) emphasised that only 
after some time on Twin Earth would an Earthling acquire twin-water concepts. When we 
consider the possibility that another Wp is actual, we must thus take Wp to be a possible 
context o f acquisition. We can then represent the descriptive content of 'water' as a function 
from Wp qua context of acquisition into a referent in Wp, i.e. as a function that tells us, for 
each Wp, what 'water' refers to in Wp. But this is exactly what the diagonal proposition 
depicts: 'water' refers to H2 O in W i and 'water' refers to XYZ in W2 . The horizontal 
proposition, however, is a function from a Wp considered counterfactual into a referent o f 
that Wp. In W i 'water' refers to H2 O of W i and of W2 . Which kind of propositional content 
is represented by the horizontal proposition such that on Earth 'water' refers to H2 O of all 
Wp? Well, consider a sentence like:
(25) Water is wet,
24 Cf. also Davies & Humberstone [1981a, pp. 18-20], Chalmers [1996, p. 59], Jackson [1998a, pp. 212-4] 
and Byrne [2000a; 2000b].
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and suppose that there is a minor amount of non-watery H2 O on Twin Earth (W2 ) and a 
minor amount of non-watery XYZ on Earth (Wi). We can then represent utterances of (25) 
by fig. 6:
fig. 6 W i W2  
Wi Tme False 
W2  False True
Now ask: what are the tmth-conditions of (25)? It depends. In Sec. 2.6 I talked about Wa- 
truth-conditions, i.e. the conditions under which a sentence is true in W a - N o w  extend this 
notion to cover the conditions under which a sentence is true at Wp considered as actual. 
Then we can ask: what are the WA-truth-conditions of (25), i.e. the conditions under which 
(25) is true-in all Wp? The Descriptivist will then insist that the causally constrained 
descriptive content associated with 'water' yields perfectly adequate WA-truth-conditions: 
'water is wet' is true-in Wp iff the watery stuff of our acquaintance in Wp is wet in Wp. 
Causally constrained descriptive content gives the right tmth-conditions for all Wp 
considered as actual. (25) is tme-in W 1 iff the watery stuff of our acquaintance in W 1 is wet 
in W i, and (25) is true-in W2  iff the wateiy stuff of our acquaintance in W 2  is wet in W 2 .
(25) is associated with the same descriptive proposition in all Wp and this proposition gives 
the condition under which (25) is true-in all Wp. So, the claim is that descriptive tmth- 
conditions are what give WA-truth-conditions. Formally:
Descriptive tmth-conditions: 'N is F' is true-in Wp iff <j) in Wp is F in Wp,
where N is a singular term associated with descriptive content (j). Descriptive truth- 
conditions reflect the fact that even if N is modally rigid and (j) modally flexible, 'N is F' and 
'(]) is F' will have identical tmth-conditions not only at W a, but at every Wp when 
considered as actual; provided the descriptive content of N is given by (j). They say the 
same thing about how W a is no matter which Wp turns out to be actual, that is, they are
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made true by the same state of affairs in Wp qua actual. It is simply unintelligible that 
evidence in Wa  should bear differently on the truth-value of the two sentences. The only 
difference between them arises when we turn to counterfactual Wp, i.e. when they are 
prefixed with modal idioms.
However, as saw in Sec. 2.3, the Referentialist insists that utterances of sentences 
have nothing but singular truth-conditions. Whether we consider Wa or counterfactual Wp, 
she holds, in general:
Singular truth-conditions: 'N is F' is true at Wp iff o is F in Wp,
where o is the referent of N, fixed by unique satisfaction of some descriptive condition (j). 
As we saw, singular truth-conditions get things right with respect to W a and counterfactual 
Wp. But they fall short of accommodating WA-truth-conditions in the expanded sense of 
that notion. Singulai' truth-conditions do not say under what conditions an utterance of 'N is 
F' is true had another Wp been actual. What the Referentialist must do, it seems to me, is to 
come up with an explanation in terms of reference-fixing. Take (25) 'water is wet'. In Wi 
'water is wet' is tme iff H2 O is wet, but had W2  been actual, the reference of 'water' would 
have been fixed by (S) to pick out XYZ, and so 'water is wet' would have been true iff XYZ 
is wet. So, even if the Referentialist refuses to accept that stipulation (S) confers descriptive 
content on 'water', she must assign a significant role to (S) when accounting for WA-truth- 
conditions of sentences containing 'water'.
What about the conditions under which a sentence like (25) is true-of Wp, i.e. what 
I in Sec. 2.6 called Wp-truth-conditions"l I ai'gued that there were two equally adequate 
ways of giving the truth-conditions of a sentence with respect to counterfactual Wp. Given 
that the Referentialist endorses (Singular-Rigidity), she would insist that such sentences 
have singular tmth-conditions: on Earth, 'water is wet' is tme-of Wp iff H2 O is wet in Wp, 
and on Twin Earth, 'water is wet' is tme-of Wp iff XYZ is wet in Wp. Once we have fixed a 
Wp qua actual, the singular content of 'water' gives the conditions under which (25) is true-
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of every Wp, i.e. at every counterfactual Wp. Singulai' truth-conditions reflect the fact that 
'N is F' and '(|) is F' have different truth-conditions when it comes to counterfactual Wp, and 
so that (j) cannot exhaust the propositional content of N. The response, on behalf of 
Descriptivism, was to rigidify (j) such that we would get the correct truth-conditions even at 
counterfactual Wp: on Earth, 'water is wet' is true-of Wp iff the watery stuff of our 
acquaintance on Earth is wet in Wp, Formally:
Rigidified Descriptive tmth-conditions: 'N is F' is tme-of Wp iff @(j) is F in Wp.
Both singular and rigidified descriptive truth-conditions respect the fact that (25) is true-in 
W i, but is, in W i, false-of W2 , and that (25) is tme-in W 2 , but is, in W2 , false-of W i.
Now, in Sec. 2.6 I distinguished between two grades of understanding. I said that if 
a competent speaker grasps the descriptive truth-conditions of a sentence, then she knows 
the conditions under which the sentence is true in Wa- But it is now cleai' that if she knows 
the descriptive content of a sentence, then she knows not only the conditions under which 
the sentence is tme given the way W a has turned out, she also knows the conditions under 
which the sentence is true had another Wp turned out to be actual. We shall now say that a 
speaker who grasps the causally constrained descriptive truth-conditions o f a sentence has 
a grade-one understanding of it. To have a grade-one understanding is to have knowledge 
of WA-truth-conditions: it is to know under what conditions an utterance of a sentence is in 
fact true and under what conditions the utterance would have been true had a different Wp 
been Wa-^^ To have a grade-one understanding is thus to know the diagonal proposition. 
In the case of (25) 'water is wet', it is to know that (25) is tme-in W 1 iff the watery stuff of 
our acquaintance in W i is wet in W i; (25) is true-in W2  iff the watery stuff of our 
acquaintance in W 2  is wet in W2 . So, having a grade-one understanding enables one to 
determine how a set of singular truth-conditions depend on which Wp is considered as 
actual. If H2 O is the watery stuff of our acquaintance in W i, then (25) is true-in Wj iff H2 O
25 The same idea is explicit in Dummett [1981, p. 568].
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is wet in W i; if XYZ is the watery stuff of our acquaintance in W2 , then (25) is true-in W2  
iff XYZ is wet inW 2 .
Although a speaker who has a grade-one understanding of a sentence has a fairly 
extensive grasp of its assertoric use, her competence is essentially incomplete. She does not 
know how the sentence embeds inside the scope of a modal operator as she is ignorant of 
the modal properties of its component expressions. In order to fully understand a sentence, 
knowledge of its rigidified descriptive truth-conditions is mandated, e.g. whether it contains 
rigid designators. We shall say that a speaker who grasps the rigidified, causally 
constrained, descriptive truth-conditions o f a sentence has a grade-two understanding of it. 
To have a grade-two understanding of (25) is thus to know that (25) is true-of W 1 iff the 
actual watery stuff of our acquaintance is wet in Wp, (25) is true-of W2  iff the actual watery 
stuff of our acquaintance is wet in W2 . Here 'actual' refers to W a or a Wp if considered as 
actual. So, having a grade-two understanding enables one to determine how a set of 
singular truth-conditions depend on which Wp is considered as actual. If H2 O is the actual 
watery stuff of our acquaintance, then (25) is true-of Wp iff H2 O is wet in Wp; if XYZ is 
the actual watery stuff of our acquaintance, then (25) is tme-of Wp iff XYZ is wet in Wp. 
This highlights the fact that to have a grade-two understanding is not to know a horizontal 
proposition. To know a horizontal proposition requires that one affirms an antecedent in 
one of these conditionals, but one is not able to do that just by knowing the rigidified 
descriptive content of 'water'; one must also know the reference of 'water'. To know a 
horizontal proposition is to know a function from counterfactual Wp into truth-values, but 
given that such truth-values also depend on which Wp is considered as actual, one must 
first know the relevant empirical facts about that Wp. What does amount to knowledge of a 
horizontal proposition is knowledge of singular content. Only someone who knows the 
singular truth-conditions knows a horizontal proposition.^^
26 In Jackson [1998a] and Chalmers [1996], the WA-truth-conditions are identified with the diagonal 
proposition - what they call the A(ctual)-intension and the primary intension respectively, and the Wp-truth-
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Suppose S is an Earthling who has a grade-two understanding of (25), and is asked 
whether (25) is true-of Twin Earth. All S can say is that (25) is true-of Twin Earth iff the 
watery stuff of her acquaintance on Earth is wet on Twin Earth. What S knows is the 
conditional that if XYZ is the watery stuff of her acquaintance on Earth, then (25) is true-of 
Twin Earth; otherwise not. So, S does not know the horizontal proposition since she does 
not know the truth-values of (25) at various counterfactual Wp. But the Referentialist will 
now insist that to know how the singular proposition expressed by a sentence is dependent 
on which Wp is considered as actual is not to fully grasp what an utterance of the sentence 
expresses. To know that one must know the singular proposition expressed. Imagine 
another Earthling R who knows that H2 O is the watery stuff of our acquaintance on Earth. 
R is able to detach the antecedent in our conditional, and so knows that (25) is true-of Wp 
iff H2 O is wet in Wp. R thus has a much better grasp of the truth-conditions of (25) at 
counterfactual Wp. Unlike S, R knows the truth-values of (25) at various counterfactual 
Wp. So, the claim is that only knowledge of singular truth-conditions constitutes a full 
grasp of the truth-conditions of (25).
It is plain that R knows more about the world, e.g. about micro-physics, than S 
does, but the issue is whether R is best described as having a better linguistic understanding 
than S has. The Descriptivist will resist the temptation to describe R as having knowledge 
of propositional content that S lacks; what R has is knowledge of reference or truth. R 
knows that ’water' rigidly picks out H2 O on Earth, and so knows that an Earthly utterance 
of (25) is false-of Twin Earth where XYZ is wet. But, the Descriptivist's thought goes, one 
need not know the reference of 'water' in order to understand utterances of sentences
conditions are identified with the horizontal proposition - what they call the C(ounterfactuaI)-intension and 
the secondary intension respectively. Since I hold that propositions are structured  entities, and hence more 
fine-grained than sets o f worlds or functions from worlds into truth-values, descriptive and singular contents 
should not be identified with the diagonal and horizontal propositions respectively: the former determine the 
latter but not vice versa. The risk is that if, say, descriptive content is deflated in this way, then we waive any 
attempt to give a substantial account o f which properties constitute such content.
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containing 'water'. That is, one need not know that H 2 O is the watery stuff of our 
acquaintance in order to understand such utterances - a sufficiently comprehensive grasp of 
the associated descriptive properties will suffice. In the case of atomic sentences, all 
understanding takes is knowledge that 'water' picks out the watery stuff of our 
acquaintance, whatever that is, and in the case of modalized sentences, all understanding 
takes is knowledge that 'water' picks out the actual watery stuff of our acquaintance, 
whatever that is. To understand an atomic sentence is to know its WA-truth-conditions, and 
to understand a sentence containing modal idioms is to know its Wp-tmth-conditions. In 
neither case is knowledge of singular content mandated.
Here is a putative counterexample. Suppose Q says I have a headache'. S, who has a 
grade-one understanding, has a very poor grasp of what Q said. S neither knows who the 
speaker is nor that T is a rigid designator. So all S knows is that if Q uttered 'I have a 
headache', then 'I have a headache' is true-in Wp iff Q has a headache in Wp. In words, she 
knows that someone said that (s)he had a headache. Now consider R who has a grade-two 
understanding. R knows that T is a rigid designator, but is still unaware who the speaker is. 
So, R knows that if Q uttered 'I have a headache', then 'I have a headache' is true-of Wp iff 
Q has a headache in Wp. The claim is that S and R are in the same predicament: they do not 
understand what Q said because they do not know who spoke. In such cases where the non­
singular content is next to uninformative - a linguistic rule - and where the singular content 
is easily read off from the context of utterance - the speaker - we tend to demand that 
understanding proper be of singulai' content.
It is true that we commonly assign singular truth-conditions to utterances of 
sentences containing indexicals and demonstratives. But even in such cases do sentences 
have a kind of default descriptive truth-conditions. If one is unaware who the speaker is, 
then one still has a partial understanding of what was said: I have a headache' is true iff the 
speaker of the context has a headache. Moreover, what a speaker knows when she 
understands the sentence-type 'I have a headache' is such descriptive truth-conditions; it is
165
just that in the sense of fully understanding what is said by a token of that sentence, she 
must also know who T picks out in the context of utterance. In any case, the Descriptivist 
can insist that sentences containing indexicals and demonstratives are exceptional. There is 
no parallel to sentences containing natural kind terms where the descriptive content is very 
informative and where the singular content takes substantial empirical investigation. In 
such cases, knowledge of - rigidified - descriptive content is both necessary and sufficient.
The difference between a speaker R who knows rigidified descriptive truth- 
conditions, and a speaker T who knows singular truth-conditions, is thus that T has 
empirical knowledge about the context of utterance or acquisition that R lacks. T knows 
which Wp is actual such that, in the case of 'water', he knows which kind o f stuff 'water' 
refers to in Wa- T has De Re knowledge of reference that S lacks, that is, T knows of H2 O 
that 'water' refers to it. Such empirical knowledge enables T to determine reference or truth 
at various counterfactual Wp. Given that t  knows that the watery stuff on Twin Earth is 
XYZ, T knows that Earthly tokens of 'water' do not refer to XYZ on Twin Earth. T thus 
knows that Earthly tokens of (25) 'water is wet' are false-of Twin Earth. R, on the other 
hand, merely knows that such tokens are true-of Twin Earth iff the actual watery stuff of 
our acquaintance is wet on Twin Earth. In illustration:
(A) Knowledge of rigidified descriptive content + knowledge of Wp qua actual 
knowledge of singular content + knowledge of Wp qua counterfactual - 4  Knowledge of 
reference/truth-value.
What R has is thus knowledge of object-independent truth-conditions: (25) is true-of Wp iff 
the watery stuff of our actual acquaintance is wet in Wp. T, however, has knowledge of 
object-dependent truth-conditions: (25) is true-of Wp iff H2 O is wet in Wp. Or if we take 
Twin Earth as our context of acquisition, then (25) is true-of Wp iff XYZ is wet in Wp. 
This means that (25) expresses different singular propositions, but the same descriptive 
proposition, in different Wp qua actual. So, the Two-Dimensional analysis emphasises that
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according to Descriptivism (cf. Sec. 2.2), 'water' is constant in content across Wp qua 
actual: 'water' is associated with the propositional content <the watery stuff> both on Earth 
and on Twin Earth. According to Referentialism (cf. Sec. 2.3), however, 'water' is variant 
in content across Wp qua actual: on Earth tokens of 'water' express <H20>, and on Twin 
Earth tokens of 'water' express <XYZ>.27 Both Descriptivism and Referentialism agree 
about reference. 'Water' is world-relative in reference in the sense that the reference of 
'water' is sensitive to variation in contexts of acquisition: 'water' refers to H2 O on Earth qua 
actual, but 'water' refers to XYZ on Twin Earth qua actual. There is also a sense in which 
'water' is world-bound in reference: given that 'water' refers to H2 O on Earth, 'water' refers 
to H2 O of all Wp, and given that 'water' refers to XYZ on Twin Earth, 'water' refers to XYZ 
of all Wp. That is, both views can agree that 'water' is a rigid designator.
Let me finish this Section by returning to the Semantical Argument against 
Descriptivism, as promised in fn. 35, Sec. 2.5.28 Although the Semantical Argument is akin 
to the Modal Argument, it highlights an important difference. The Modal Argument, 
remember, aimed at showing that if the content of, say, 'Aristotle' is given by 'the teacher of 
Alexander', then Aristotle' refers to Plato at a counterfactual Wp in which Plato taught 
Alexander, but 'Aristotle* refers to Aristotle at all counterfactual Wp. The Semantical 
Argument, however, purports to show that if the content of 'Aristotle' is given by 'the 
teacher of Alexander', then if  Plato had taught Alexander, then 'Aristotle' would refer to 
Plato, but 'Aristotle' would refer to Aristotle were such counterfactual circumstances to 
obtain. So, the Modal Argument is concerned with what a term refers to at counterfactual
27 This is explicit in Burge [1982, p. 105]: "The fact that the Twin-Earthians apply 'water' to XYZ is not a 
reflection o f a shift in extension o f an indexical expression with a fixed linguistic (English) meaning, but o f a 
shift in meaning between one language, and linguistic community, and another. Any expression, indexical or 
not, can undergo such 'shifts', as a mere consequence of the conventionality o f language."
28 Versions o f the Semantical Argument can be found in Kripke [1980, pp. 83-92], Donnellan [1972, pp. 373- 
75] and Salmon [1982, pp. 29-31].
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Wp. The Semantical Argument is concerned with what a term would refer to had certain 
circumstances obtained.
In light of Two-Dimensionalism, it is not difficult to respond to this Argument. First 
of all, no contemporary Descriptivist holds that a singular term is simply an abbreviation of 
a single modally flexible definite description. According to Causal Rigidified 
Descriptivism, singular terms have associated with them clusters of descriptive as well as 
non-descriptive properties. Suppose one of the properties associated with 'Aristotle' is the 
property of being the individual who actually taught Alexander. What then if it is later 
discovered that in actual fact Plato taught Alexander? Then I could call upon other 
properties: the author of De Anima. But what if Plato also actually wrote De Animal Then I 
could appeal to other-dependent identifying information: the man called 'Aristotle' by my 
speech community. But what if they were all wrong? Then I must resort to the causal chain 
originating in my use of 'Aristotle': the man causally responsible for my use of 'Aristotle'. 
But what if Plato satisfies even that description? Well, then 'Aristotle' refers to Plato! If 
eveiything true of Aristotle were true of Plato, then 'Aristotle' would simply refer to Plato. 
Were such circumstances to obtain, unlikely as they are, then we would have to admit that 
we thought we referred to a certain individual by 'Aristotle' when all along we had been 
referring to someone else. What we are considering is thus what it would be true to say had 
another Wp been actual, i.e. were we to use 'Aristotle' under circumstances in which 
everything true of Aristotle is true of Plato, we would be referring to Plato. 9^
Compare with 'water'. Imagine circumstances in which the watery stuff that we 
actually and causally interact with turns out to have the micro-stmcture XYZ. The question 
is: were such circumstances to obtain, would 'water' refer to XYZ? The answer is yes. What 
we are considering is Twin Earth as a candidate for Wa , but if Twin Earth is considered as 
actual, i.e. as a possible context of acquisition, then our tokens of 'water' refer to XYZ.
^9 What must be shown to sustain the Semantical Argument is that singular terms are what Evans called 
'deeply rigid', i.e. that they refer to the same object not only of all Wp, but also in all Wp; cf. fn. 20.
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Although highly improbable, it is not unimaginable that physical science one day discovers 
that we have made a huge mistake in believing that the watery stuff that surrounds us has 
the micro-structure H2 O. To be clear, what is conceivable are circumstances under which 
an utterance of 'water is XYZ' would have been true. That, however, is not to conceive of 
circumstances under which water is XYZ: if water is H2 O, then it is necessary that water is
H2O.30
4.5. The Contingent A priori
The foregoing Two-Dimensional analysis suggests that the two propositions that can be 
expressed by an utterance of a simple sentence have different epistemic status. To know the 
singular proposition expressed is to know an object-dependent truth-condition, e.g. it is to 
know that, on Earth, (25) 'water is wet' is true-of Twin Earth iff H2 O is wet on Twin Earth. 
To know the singular proposition expressed is thus to have relevant knowledge about the 
context of utterance or acquisition that no amount of semantic introspection could result in. 
In the case of 'water', it is to have relevant knowledge of micro-physics that one could only 
acquire by adequate empirical means. To know the singular proposition expressed is thus to 
have a posteriori knowledge about the Wp that is in fact actual, i.e. Wa- By contrast, one 
can know the descriptive proposition associated with (25) without knowing the relevant 
micro-physical facts. Descriptive propositions are object-independent since they do not 
depend on the nature of the Wa- To know the descriptive proposition of (25) is to know the 
tmth-conditions of (25) at every Wp qua actual, and so does not depend on which Wp is in 
fact actual. This is what the diagonal proposition reflects. To know the descriptive
30 This means that there are really three ways o f  taking Twin Earth: (i) Twin Eai th as a remote planet in W a; 
(ii) Twin Earth as a counterfactual Wp; (iii) Twin Earth as a way W a  might have turned out; cf. also Jackson 
[1998b, pp. 212-14; 2000, pp. 330-1]. See also Sec. 4.6.
169
proposition is thus to have knowledge of truth-conditions which is independent of empirical 
knowledge of W a, and so is to have a priori knowledge.
As we saw in Sec. 4.4, the claim that there is an a priori and an a posteriori aspect to 
understanding is most plausible when it comes to indexicals. Suppose S says in the 
presence of R: 'I am here'. What they both know a priori are certain linguistic rules that take 
'I' and 'here' to the utterer and the place of the context. S wishes to convey the proposition 
that he is at place p, and he uses rules governing T and 'here' which he assumes R is 
familiar with. If R is to grasp the singular proposition expressed, then R need not only be 
aware of these rules, R must also acquire the relevant perceptual knowledge that S is the 
contextually salient speaker located at p.
The reason we think that R must know the singular proposition expressed in order 
to fully understand what S said, is that the descriptive content associated with indexicals is 
very poor and the singular content is easy to get at. But when it comes to non-indexical 
singular terms where the descriptive content is rich and the singular content harder to get at, 
there is no reason to think that full understanding must require knowledge of singular 
content. In the latter cases, there would therefore not seem to be the same epistemic 
bifurcation of understanding; or so Descriptivism has it. This is what the Epistemological 
Argument takes issue with. It goes like this: take 'Aristotle'. If 'Aristotle' were simply a 
shorthand for 'the teacher of Alexander', then the sentence:
(26) If Aristotle exists, then Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander,
would express an a priori knowable proposition since semantically equivalent to:
(27) If the teacher of Alexander exists, then the teacher of Alexander is the teacher of 
Alexander,
which expresses an a priori knowable proposition. But (26) does not express an a priori 
knowable proposition since it was an empirical discovery who taught Alexander. So, 
'Aristotle' cannot be short for 'the teacher of Alexander'.31
31 Cf. Soames [1998, p. 1]. See also Salmon [1982, pp. 27-9] and Block & Stalnaker [1999].
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As stated, the Argument looks sound. It is, to be sure, a version of the CP-Aigument 
as explained in Sec. 2.4 which assumes that we can use Leibniz Law to show that a 
difference in epistemic properties entails a difference in prepositional content. But such an 
assumption would not seem to beg the question against Descriptivism according to which 
prepositional content is individuated by its cognitive properties. So, is there any other way 
to fault the Argument? Well, one lesson to be learned so far is that no Referentialist 
argument will caiTy conviction if it relies on an implausible version of Descriptivism. Thus 
no present-day Descriptivist holds this single-description view when it comes to ordinary 
proper names and natural kind terms. Only the artificiality of ’Julius' makes an exception. 
This name has no use prior to the stipulation (S*) which essentially introduces a modally 
rigid referring name for the inventor of the zip. Henceforth, full competence with 'Julius' 
must include knowledge of (S*). So, it would seem to be a priori knowable that if Julius 
exists, then Julius is the inventor of the zip. But the same is presumably not true of 
'Aristotle'. According to Descriptivism, 'Aristotle' has associated with it a cluster of 
properties: the actual teacher of Alexander, the actual author of De Anima, the causal 
source of our use of 'Aristotle', the individual refened to by the experts' use of 'Aristotle', 
etc. We have seen cases where it is indispensable that some of these properties involve 
causality and rigidity. But we can also imagine cases where 'Aristotle' succeeds in referring 
despite the fact that no single individual satisfies all and only the associated properties. If it 
turns out that Plato taught Alexander, then 'Aristotle' will still refer to Aristotle in W a 
provided he has all the other properties. We should not think of the cluster properties as 
necessary and sufficient conditions for being picked out by 'Aristotle'. What Descriptivism 
claims is merely that it is (i) a priori that 'Aristotle' refers to whoever has (ii) sufficiently 
many of the associated properties (iii) in Wa > We know that when we consider 
counterfactual and Twin Earth cases, modal and causal properties carry great weight. Given 
that 'Aristotle' is a rigid designator, we can allow for counterfactual Wp in which Aristotle 
has - next to - none of the properties he has in Wa- What is a priori is not that the referent
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of 'Aristotle' has the descriptive properties in counterfactual Wp, but that he has enough of 
them in W a - H ow  many that is and which have the greater weight in the vote is somewhat 
indeterminate and probably settled by the linguistic community from case to case. What if 
it turns out that half of what we thought we knew about Aristotle was actually true of 
Plato? Well, if that is how W a is, then presumably 'Aristotle' is empty. Or, maybe after 
having balanced the properties, 'Aristotle' still refers to Aristotle. In any case, the point is 
that although, for each descriptive property, it is possible that Aristotle lacks that property 
in W a and yet is still the referent of 'Aristotle', it is not possible that Aristotle lacks all 
descriptive properties in W a and yet is the referent of 'Aristotle'.32 And the reason we know 
that a priori is, as the Semantical Argument emphasised, that we can engage in a priori 
reflection on what 'Aristotle' would refer to had various circumstances obtained: had Plato 
been the teacher of Alexander, then 'Aristotle' would still refer to Aristotle, but had 
everything actually true of Aristotle been true of Plato, then 'Aristotle' would refer to Plato. 
Knowledge of what 'Aristotle' would refer to had the way W a is been different in various 
ways is a priori since it is independent of the way W a in fact is.
Similarly in the case of 'water'. The stipulation (S) tells us that 'water' is set up as a 
rigid designator of whatever stuff has sufficiently many of the watery properties in W A- We 
can undoubtedly imagine something being water in W a  without having all the purely 
descriptive properties, and something having some of those characteristic properties in W a  
without being water. As Putnam [1970] reminded us of, there are non-striped, non-yellow 
tigers and striped, yellow non-tigers even in W a. There may be vagueness or elasticity in 
how many of the watery properties something must have in order to be water, and it is also 
possible that the list of watery properties is open-ended. What seems impossible is merely 
that something is water in W a  and yet lacks every characteristic of water, or that something
32 Formally, there is no move from VF(Pa 9 -Pa) to OVP(Pa -Pa).
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has all the watery indicators in W a  and yet is not water.33 in this respect 'water' is not like 
'Julius': it is chronologically incorrect to say that (S) introduces 'water' into the language 
with a fixed descriptive content. What (S) reflects is the kind of role 'water' plays in our 
community and to spell out that role is to register a set of core, stereotypical beliefs about 
water which prevail in the community; that water is the predominant potable liquid that fills 
the oceans, falls from the sky, etc.; in short the watery stuff.34 The sense in which 'water' is 
akin to 'Julius' is that there will be community-wide consensus on the range of properties 
that make up its a priori knowable descriptive content. Consider the sentence:
(28) If water exists, then water is watery.
The descriptive content of 'water' is encapsulated by 'the watery stuff which records our 
stereotypical beliefs about water. This means that (28) is a priori in the sense that 
understanding (28) suffices for knowing that it is true. Someone who fully grasps the 
prepositional contents in (28) can come to know its truth-value just by reflection, which of 
course is not to say that she can come to grasp those contents just by reflection; concept- 
acquisition standardly requires experiential information gathered from observation or
33 Let me stress that I have no firm intuitions about how to describe various possible cases. In Sec. 1.2 I said 
that water could not have turned out to be like jade. What I meant was that if the extension o f 'water’ on Earth 
is H 2 O, then my use o f 'water' would not pick out XYZ on a remote planet in Wa- But what if  Earth turns out 
to have a 50/50 mix o f H 2 O and XYZ? Then probably tlie extension o f 'water' would comprise both. So, what 
i f  Earth turns out to have a 95/5 mix of H2 O and XYZ? Then probably 'water' would refer only to H2 O; cf. 
also Chalmers [1996, p. 58]. We can think o f this cluster  o f watery properties as "...a disjunction o f all 
conjunctions o f m ost o f  them", as Lewis [1991, p. 208] has put it in a different context; cf. also Jackson 
[1998a, p. 35].
34 Lewis [1999b] and Jackson [1998a] have argued that conceptual analysis shows that theoretical terms like 
'water' are cluster o r  functional role concepts. That is, conceptual analysis shows that water is the kind of 
stuff that typically occupies the water-role. Spelling out the water-role is a matter o f saying what a competent 
speaker knows when she understands 'water'-sentences. This type o f conceptual analysis should be 
distinguished from the traditional project o f pinning down sufficient and necessary conditions for something 
to be water. In spelling out 'the water-role' one must draw on - implicit and explicit - com m on-sense 
knowledge about the stereotypical characteristics associated with water.
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passed on via testimony. We know that no matter how W a turns out, nothing can be water 
in it unless it has sufficiently many of the watery properties, and we know this a priori since 
it is arrived at just by reflection on what we would say had various Wp been actual and is 
thus knowledge which is not dependent on the way W a in fact is. (28) can be pictured by 
fig. 6 and its diagonal proposition contains nothing but truths. It thus records the fact that
(28) is true at eveiy Wp considered as actual and so can be known to be true at W a without 
knowing which Wp that is. What is a priori is what is true no matter how Wa turns outA^
Now, when the Epistemological Argument is advanced, it is frequently supposed 
that the reason a sentence like (28) cannot express an a priori knowable proposition is that 
it is not necessary that water is watery.36 The line of reasoning is this: if it is a priori that if 
water exists, then water is the watery stuff, then it must be analytic that if water exists, then 
water is the watery stuff. But analytic truths are necessary, so it must be necessary that if 
water exists, then water is the watery stuff. Yet it is clearly possible that water, i.e. H^O, 
exists, but is not the watery stuff. After all, 'water' and 'the watery stuff have distinct modal 
properties. So, it cannot be a priori that if water exists, then water is the watery stuff.
I think the objection confuses a priority with necessity. (28) is an example of an a 
priori contingency, but it is obviously worth dwelling on how this is supposed to work. I 
suspect there are two explanations of how such statements are possible. Here is the first. 
Take an utterance by S of I am here now'. S is at place p at time t, and so expresses the 
singular proposition that S is at p at t. This singular proposition is contingent since S might 
have been somewhere else than where he is when that token occurs, and only a posteriori 
knowable since it requires empirical knowledge of relevant features of the context. The 
sentence 'I am here now' is, however, also associated with the descriptive proposition that 
the speaker of the context is at the place and time of the context. And that proposition is
35 When I said that fig. 4 represented (24) and fig. 6 represented (25) I assumed that 'Julius’ and 'water' had a 
referent in each Wp. We need the proviso on existence in (28) since it is not a priori knowable that 'water' is 
not empty.
36 This is explicit in Salmon [1982] and Block & Stalnaker [1999].
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both necessary and a priori knowable. There is no possibility of reference-failure and no 
need to check the speaker, time, and place of the context to assure oneself that the speaker 
is at the time and place of the context; whoever, whenever, or wherever that is. It follows 
from the linguistic meaning of the indexicals that the speaker is whoever utters a certain 
sentence when located at the place and time of the context. What this means is that the 
diagonal proposition for I am here now' consists solely of truths: its descriptive content is 
such that it cannot be used to express a false singular proposition.3? But its horizontal 
proposition consists of both truths and falsehoods: it expresses a contingent singular 
proposition in each context of utterance. 'I am here now' is thus true-in every Wp, but is, at 
each Wp qua actual, false-of some Wp. So, in the case of 'I am here now' no single 
proposition is both contingent and a priori. Yet we may think of the sentence-token as an 
example of an a priori contingency. The same analysis applies to (28). That sentence is 
associated with the descriptive proposition:
(29) If the watery stuff exists, then the watery stuff is watery,
which is both necessary and a priori knowable. (29) is what someone knows when she 
understands (28). She knows the diagonal proposition, i.e. that (28) is true no matter how 
W a turns out. (28) cannot be used to make a false assertion. But it is a familiar point that to 
know (a priori) that a sentence expresses a truth is not to know (a priori) the truth o f what 
it e x p r e s s e s And what someone knows when she understands (28) is merely that its 
descriptive content is such that (28) expresses a truth in every Wp qua actual, that is, its 
diagonal proposition contains nothing but truths. In order to know the truth of what (28) 
expresses on Earth, she would have to know the singular proposition:
37 There are tricky counterexamples. Suppose I am unaware that I am lost in the Scottish Highlands. While 
pointing at my map, I express a falsehood by I am here now'. Or suppose I call from work to leave a - true - 
m essage on my answering-machine at home; I am not here right now...'. In such cases, the context o f  
utterance - where I am on the hill or where I am at work - and the circumstance of evaluation - where I point 
to on the map or where I am at home - come apart in the very act o f uttering the sentences.
38 Cf. Donnellan [1979], Schiffer [1978] and Salmon [1986].
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(30) If H2 O exists, then H2 O is wateiy,
but she can only know that proposition once the appropriate micro-physical knowledge is 
in. However, (30) is contingent: there is a counterfactual Wp in which H2 O does not have 
the watery properties. This records the fact that (28) has horizontal propositions which 
consist of both truths and falsehoods: (28) is true-in every Wp, but is, at each Wp qua 
actual, false-of some Wp. So, there is no single proposition associated with, or expressed 
by, (28) which is both contingent and a priori.
Now, the Descriptivist may feel slightly uneasy about invoking singular content to 
account for the contingent a priori. So, here is a second explanation. What someone knows 
when she understands (28) is not only that it expresses a truth at every Wp when considered 
as actual, she also knows the tmth of what it expresses. But the truth of what (28) expresses 
is not a singular proposition; it is the rigidified descriptive proposition:
(29*) If the watery stuff exists in Wa , then the actual wateiy stuff is watery.
Note first that the only difference between the two propositions in (29) and (29*) is that 
(29*) is rigidified. This means that whereas the proposition in (29) is trivially true at every 
counterfactual Wp, the proposition in (29*) is false at some counterfactual Wp. There are 
Wp in which the watery stuff in W a, i.e. H2 O, is not watery. So, unlike (29), (29*) is a 
contingency. Nevertheless, (29*) is a priori knowable for much the same reason that (29) is. 
Being such that if the watery stuff exists, then the watery stuff is watery, is a property that 
every Wp has trivially. One can thus know a priori that the proposition in (29) is true at 
every Wp no matter how it is considered. Not so for (29*). One can only know whether the 
proposition in (29*) is true at a counterfactual Wp if one knows the relevant empirical facts 
about W a- One cannot know whether the actual watery stuff is watery in a given 
counterfactual Wp unless one knows whether the watery stuff in Wp is identical to the 
watery stuff in Wa- But the point is that one can know a priori that the proposition in (29*) 
is true at Wa- Being such that if the watery stuff exists in W a, then the actual wateiy stuff 
is watery, is a property that W a has trivially; the rigidified proposition in (29*) will thus be
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true at Wa  no matter how it turns out. So, one can know just by conceptual reflection that 
the proposition in (29*) is tme at Wa -
So, on this account, (28) can be assigned a single proposition which is both 
contingent and a priori. To know this proposition a priori, is however not to know any 
interesting empirical fact about Wa- The reason for this is, as Evans pointed out, that it is a 
harmless or a superficial sense of contingency. (29*) is not contingent in the deep sense of 
there being:
"... some state of affairs of which we can say both that had it not existed the 
statement would not have been tme, and that it might not have existed."39
Contrast (29*) with (30). (30) is a deep contingency: there is some state of affairs - the fact 
that H 2 O is watery - which is such that had it not existed, (30) would not have been true, 
and that it might not have existed. Had H2 O not been watery, (30) would not have been 
true; e.g. (30) would not have been true had XYZ been watery. Moreover, it is true that 
H 2 O might not have been watery, that is, there aie counterfactual Wp in which it is not. But 
(29*) is not like (30). (29*) is not about any particular state of affairs. All it says is that the 
watery stuff in W a, whatever it is, is watery. That of course is contingent in the sense that
39 cf. [1996, p. 212]. Evans' notion o f superficial necessity corresponds to the ordinaiy dense o f necessity,
and his notion o f  deep necessity corresponds to the ©-sense o f necessity from fn. 13. So, we can say that 
(28) is superficially contingent since '□ (28)' is false, i.e. (28) is fa lse-of somep^^But (28) is deeply
necessary since 'JF@(28)' is true, i.e. (28) is true-in every Wp. We can thus call j f  @ an a priori truth operator: 
a sentence is a priori iff it expresses a truth at every Wp qua actual. Note two things: (i) It will in general be 
true that anything o f the form @s s is an a priori contingency. Suppose not, i.e. suppose that I(l@s s) is 
true. Then ® s n s  is true by the K-axionO(p —X[) (Op -» Oq), and so, Ds is true by the T- 
axiom  p —> p. But @s may be true, while Os false. It follows that @sf^ s is not a theorem in S5@. But 
(@s <-> s) is a priori since Jf@ (@ s <-> s) is true: (@s o  s) is true-in every Wp. (ii) It is an interesting issue 
whether all deeply necessary truths are a priori. If one thinks, what I do not, that ordinary proper names are 
deeply rigid, i.e. that their reference is insensitive to variation in which W p plays the role as actual, (cf. fn. 20, 
29), then a sentence like "Superman = Clark Kent' is both superficially necessary and deeply necessary, but 
clearly not a priori. For discussion see Soames [1989, pp. 148-50], Davies & Humberstone [1981a, pp. 7-13].
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there are counterfactual Wp in which the watery stuff in W a is not watery. But (29*) is not 
contingent in the sense that its truth in W a depends on some particulai*, contingent feature 
of W a. It is the fact that H2 O is watery in W a which makes (29*) true at W a, but some 
other state of affairs could have made it true at W a ; had XYZ been the watery stuff in W a , 
then (29*) would have been true at Wa- In short, the sentence 'if H 2 O exists, then H 2 O is 
watery' is not tme-in eveiy Wp, but 'if the wateiy stuff exists in W a , then the actual watery 
stuff is watery' is. So, to know (29*) a priori is not to know anything informative about 
empirical reality.40
4.6. The Necessary A Posteriori
We have seen in the last Section how the Two-Dimensional framework offers a neat 
explanation of the contingent a priori; we shall now see how the necessary a posteriori is 
equally well handled. But before I get to that, it is worth going back to the Intentional 
Ai'gument against Referentialism. That Argument, remember, aimed at showing that the 
prepositional content of a singular term could not be exhausted by its referent due to failure 
of substitutivity in belief contexts. The question is whether we can run a parallel argument 
in knowledge contexts by substituting co-referring terms occurring inside the scope of an 
epistemic operator. I think so. We saw that Referentialism is committed to the 
Substitutivity Principle (PS) in belief contexts, so let us now define Strict Referentialism as 
the view that (PS) holds across the board: the sole semantic function of a singular term is to 
refer to an object such that no descriptive condition can enter into the prepositional content 
of a sentence containing that term even if that sentence contains epistemic operators. Now, 
if we bear in mind the Superman legend, it would seem that:
(31) Lois Lane knows that Superman is Superman, 
is ti'ue, while:
40 For more discussion of the contingent a priori see Salmon [1988] and Kallestrup [2000].
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(32) Lois Lane knows that Superman is Clark Kent,
is false. We can now argue as follows. If (31) and (32) differ in truth-value, then, by 
Leibniz Law, they should also express different propositions, since we agreed that 
prepositional content is individuated by its truth-conditions. Yet the only difference 
between (31) and (32) is that the former contains 'Superman' where the latter contains 
'Clark Kent'. So, given (Compositionality of Content), the prepositional contents of 
'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' must be different. But this contradicts Strict Referentialism.
This is no doubt too quick. The Strict Referentialist can invoke conversational 
implicatures to explain away the prevailing, but nevertheless misguided, intuition that (31) 
and (32) differ in truth-value. To simply build the falsity of (32) into the story is to beg the 
question against the Strict Referentialist. Now, maybe knowledge ascriptions resemble 
belief ascriptions in that both occasionally generate false implicatures. Anyway, it is 
obvious how to circumvent this move and strengthen the argument. It seems indisputable 
that:
(33) Lois Lane knows a priori that Superman is Superman, 
is true, while:
(34) Lois Lane knows a priori that Superman is Clark Kent,
is false. That is, if there is a sense in which Lois Lane knows the identity, then that 
knowledge is clearly not reflectively accessible to her; after all she is disposed to dissent 
from 'Superman is Clark Kent'. In any case, no one should deny that true identity 
statements can be informative in a way that a priori knowable statements can not. So, we 
can restate the argument to show that 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' must differ in 
prepositional content in contexts involving a priori knowledge. Whence, Strict 
Referentialism is false.41
41 This argument clearly applies to ordinary proper names which are paradigm purely Referential terms. The 
question is whether it applies to natural kind terms. In Sec. 3.1, fn. 1 ,1  said that Kripke took natural kind 
terms to function in much the same way as proper names. This led Tichy [1981] to argue, on similar grounds, 
that the sentence 'water is H 2 O', which states a true theoretical identification, should equally be a priori
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What the Referentialist must provide us with, if he is not to deny that propositional 
content is compositional or truth-conditional, is thus an account of why (PS) fails in some 
but not all epistemic contexts. It is instructive to make a comparison. In Naming and 
Necessity Kripke advanced a cluster of arguments in support of Referentialism, but he 
never outright endorsed Stiict Referentialism.42 He admitted that were Strict Referentialism 
true, (PS) would have to hold in all intentional contexts, but due to the kind of problem just 
rehearsed, he was reluctant to embrace the antecedent. Kripke also famously argued that 
true identity statements between e.g. distinct proper names were necessary a posteriori.43 
But as my argument makes clear, were he to accept the unrestricted use of (PS), necessarily 
true identity statements would come out a priori. So, the Referentialist owes us an account 
of why (PS) fails in contexts involving a priori knowledge such that we can block the 
argument and allow for the possibility of a posteriori necessities. I shall not go into any 
details here as to how this might go. Kripke's own idea was that the mode of fixing the 
reference of a singular term could somehow enter into the propositional content of a 
sentence containing an epistemic operator. What is important for present purposes is that 
Strict Referentialism is untenable: even the Referentialist must allow for the possibility that 
descriptive information is truth-conditionally relevant.44
knowable. His argument rests, however, on the assumption - not spoken to by Kripke - that chemical natural 
kind terms like 'H2 O' are also purely Referential. If H2 O' is short for a de facto  rigid definite description like 
'the stuff that for every oxygen-atom has to hydrogen-atoms', then the argument is blocked since (PS) fails to 
apply. But the argument would presumably hold for identities between manifest natural kind terms like 'furze' 
and 'gorse'; cf. also Kripke [1994, p. 378].
42 Kripke's reservations can be found in [1980, pp. 20-1, 127-8, 134-5] and [1994, p. 353, fn. 10].
43 Cf. [1980, pp. 100-5]. The necessity of the statement a = b stems from the fact that all purely Referential 
terms a and b are rigid designators and true identities between non-empty rigid designators are necessary: a = 
b -»  □  a = b.
44 N ote that it is potentially unstable to endorse the applicability o f (PS) in all belief contexts but in no 
knowledge contexts. Suppose S knows that a is F. (i) If S knows that a is F, then S believes that a is F. We 
tend to think that belief is necessary for knowledge. But if  S believes that a is F, then, by (PS), S also believes
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If, on the other hand, we assume that singular terms have descriptive content as 
spelled out by Descriptivism, then we can deny the step from (33) to (34) on the grounds 
that applicability of (PS) in intentional contexts requires preservation of descriptive 
content. The fact that Lois Lane associates different descriptive properties with 'Superman' 
and 'Clark Kent' explains the falsity of (34): she does not believe, hence does not know, 
that the masked super-hero is the shy journalist. Or consider the sentence:
(35) Water is H2 O,
and suppose again that W i is Earth and W2  is Twin Earth. Suppose also that 'H2 O' is 
shorthand for the de facto  rigid definite description 'the stuff that for every oxygen-atom 
has two hydrogen-atoms'.45 Then we can represent (35) as follows:
fig. 7 Wi W2
Wi True True
W2 False False
As is familial’ from Ki’ipke [1980], (35) is an example of an a posteriori necessity. At some 
point in history, physical science discovered the micro-structure of water, but what it
that b is F. (ii) If S knows that a is F, then a is F. Knowledge is factive. But if  a = b, then b is F if a is F. No 
one disputes that (PS) applies in purely extensional contexts: if  a = b, then 'a is F' is true iff 'b is F' is true, (iii) 
If S has a warrant for believing that a is F, then S also has a warrant for believing that b is F. Maybe S has a 
kind o f  internalist justification for believing that a is F that does not carry over to her belief that b is F, but it 
seems that whatever externalist warrant S has for the former will also be a warrant for the latter. Thus if  S's 
belief that a is F is counterfactually sensitive in the sense that S believes that a is F in the closest Wp in which 
a is F, and does not believe that a is F in the closest Wp in which a is not F, then so will be S's belief that b is 
F, if  a = b. If (PS) really applies throughout all belief contexts, then it is hard to see how there could be any 
near-by Wp in which the one belief had a sensitivity the other lacked. Whenever S believes that a is F, S also 
believes that b is F, and whenever S fails to believe that a is F, S also fails to believe that b is F. So, if  S 
knows that a is F, then S has a warranted true belief that b is F; so S knows that b is F.
45 W e moreover suppose that 'H2 O' is deeply rigid (cf. fn. 20, 29): no matter which Wp we consider as actual, 
'H2 O' refers to H 2 O. Maybe it is conceivable, or even physically possible, that different 'kinds' o f sub-atomic 
stuff can have two hydrogen-atoms for every oxygen-atom, but it seems to me that they will all be H2 O.
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discovered was a necessity: there are no counterfactual Wp in which water is not H2 O. 
Both 'water' and 'H2 O' are rigid designators, and true identities between rigid designators 
are necessaiy. The question is how to explain this. First of all, what can the Referentialist 
say? On his account, (35) expresses the singular proposition <H20; H2 O; the identity 
relation> provided we take W j as actual, i.e. as our context of acquisition. This proposition 
is necessary since there is no Wp in which H2 O is not H2 O, and is displayed in fig. 7 by the 
fact that the first horizontal proposition consists of nothing but truths. In our notation, the 
sentence 'water is H2 O' is true-in W i, and is, in W i, true-of W2 . But how can (35) come out 
a posteriori on the Referentialist's account? An a posteriori knowable proposition is such 
that one can fully understand it without knowing that it is true. So, it must be possible to 
fully grasp <H20; H2 O; the identity relation> without knowing that it is true. But how can 
that be if, as the Referentialist has it, 'water' lacks associated descriptive content? 
Presumably, the Referentialist will invoke semantically irrelevant modes of presentation: if 
one is presented with water, not as H2 O, but as the watery stuff, then one can understand
(35) without knowing its truth-value. However, the worry lingers on. Compare with:
(36) Water is water,
which in W i expresses the same necessarily true singular proposition and yet is clearly a 
priori knowable. Here the Referentialist must say that it is not possible to fully grasp <H20; 
H2 O; the identity-relation> without knowing that it is true. But why the difference in 
epistemic access to the very same proposition when (35) and (36) have no associated 
descriptive content?
In any case, we can offer a satisfactory Two-Dimensional analysis if we avail 
ourselves of descriptive content. What someone knows when she understands (35) is the 
descriptive proposition that the watery stuff is H2 O, and one can clearly understand this 
proposition without knowing that it is true. So, in order to know the singular proposition 
expressed by (35) in W i, one must know which kind of stuff is the watery stuff in W i, and 
that takes empirical investigation. What one knows when one understands (35) is the
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diagonal proposition but, as pictured in fig. 7, this proposition consists of both truths and 
falsehoods. So, in order to know whether (35) is true, one must know which Wp plays the 
role as actual, i.e. whether one is in W i where the watery stuff is H 2 O or in W2  where the 
watery stuff is XYZ, and obviously one can only know that a posteriori. Both (35) and (36) 
expresses in W i the same necessarily true singular proposition. The difference lies in our 
epistemic access to that proposition due to the different descriptive contents that the two 
sentences have associated. Someone who grasps the descriptive proposition associated with
(36) knows that it expresses a necessarily true singular proposition no matter which Wp is 
considered as actual. She therefore knows a priori that (36) is necessarily true. But in the 
case of (35), grasp of the descriptive content falls short of knowing its tmth-value since it is 
dependent on which Wp is actual.46
How is the a posteriori necessity of (35) accounted for by the Descriptivist when no 
appeal is made to singular content? Well, what someone knows when she understands (35) 
is the rigidified descriptive proposition that the actual watery stuff is H2 O. Obviously, 
someone can fully grasp this proposition without knowing that it is true: being H2 O was 
precisely not one of the watery properties. In order to know the truth-value of (35), one 
must know which kind of stuff is the watery stuff in W a, but one can know that only after 
having carried out a substantial empirical enquiry. Nevertheless, when the sentence 'the 
actual watery stuff is H 2 O' is uttered in W i, the proposition it is associated with is 
necessarily true. A true identity between two rigid designators is necessary. So, it would 
seem that the very same rigidified descriptive proposition can be both necessaiy yet only a 
posteriori knowable as true. In other words, we ai'rive at theoretical identifications in two 
stages. First of all, by hypothesising about how to describe vaiious possible cases, we come 
to know a priori that (if water exists, then) water is the actual watery stuff of our
46 L ew is [1999b, pp. 296-7] and Jackson [1998a, pp. 84-6] both think it is distinctive o f  Two- 
Dimensionalism that no proposition is both necessary and a posteriori; what qualifies as an a posteriori 
necessity is the interpreted sentence (35).
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acquaintance. This involved three kinds of thought experiments about what to say when 
Twin Earth is taken as: a candidate for W a, a remote place in W a, a counterfactual Wp. 
Secondly, by empirical discovery, we come to know a posteriori that H2 O is the watery 
stuff of our acquaintance in Wa- Given these two pieces of knowledge, it is not a further 
empirical question whether water is H2 O. We can simply infer by transitivity of identity, 
and hence come to know the a posteriori necessity that water is H 2 O .47
Let me sum up. I have argued that we should settle for Causal Rigidified 
Descriptivism according to which a term like 'water' is best seen as short for 'the actual 
wateiy stuff of our acquaintance'. This view handles the Modal Argument, it accounts for 
Twin Earth in its various guises, and it blocks the Intentional Argument. Understanding 
sentences containing 'water' is to know the conditions under which such sentences are true- 
in Wp, and to know the conditions under which they are tme-of Wp. Grasp of descriptive 
truth-conditions suffices to know WA-truth-conditions, and grasp of rigidified descriptive 
truth-conditions is sufficient to know Wp-truth-conditions. The Two-Dimensional analysis 
highlights that knowledge of - rigidified - descriptive content is a priori, whereas 
knowledge of singular content is a posteriori. Descriptive content yields truth-conditions 
for all Wp qua actual, and so is knowable independently of which Wp is in fact actual. This 
is what our diagonal proposition records: 'water is watery' is true-in Wp iff the watery stuff 
in Wp is watery in Wp. Moreover, rigidified descriptive content yields truth-conditions for 
all counterfactual Wp independently of which Wp is actual: 'water is watery' is true-of Wp
47 In general, anything o f the form @s will be necessary a posteriori. Take s to be 'the watery stuff is H 2 O', 
@s thus entails @s, since on Earth 'the actual watery stuff is H2 O' is true-of every Wp. But @s does not
entail j f  @ (© s) since 'the actual watery stuff is H2 O' is not true-in every Wp; it is false-in Twin Earth. In 
Evans' terminology, 'the actual watery stuff is H2 O' is a superficial necessity, but a deep contingency. These 
two notions o f necessity accommodate Kripke's argument in [1980] that it is metaphysically impossible, 
hence inconceivable, that water is not H2 O if  water is H2 O. What is conceivable, hence epistemically 
possible, is that an epistemic counterpart o f water - a watery stuff - is not H2 O. But this is just the distinction 
between the necessity o f what 'water is H2 O' actually expresses and what 'water is H2 O' would express had 
another Wp been actual; cf. also Yablo [2000].
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iff the watery stuff in W a is watery in Wp. But one cannot know the singular content of 
'water' a priori since it is dependent on which Wp is in fact actual. If we take Earth as 
actual, then the singular content of 'water' is <H20>, but if we take Twin Earth as actual, 
then the singular content of 'water' is <XYZ>. This is what our horizontal propositions 
depict. Only after the empirical facts are in, can we pin down singular truth-conditions for 
all counterfactual Wp: 'water is watery' is true-of Wp iff H2 O is watery in Wp. This 
difference in epistemic properties between descriptive and singular content will prove 
important when we now return to our problem about Incompatibilism from Chapter 1.
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Chapter 5. Beyond Incompatibilism
5.1. Three Kinds of External Dependence
We have seen in Sec. 4.4 that an utterance of a simple sentence 'N is F' can be assigned two 
distinct sets of tmth-conditions corresponding to the two ways 'N is F' can be tme at a Wp. 
If we think of Wp as actual, i.e. as a possible context of utterance or acquisition, we can 
give WA-tmth-conditions, and if we think of Wp as counterfactual, i.e. as a circumstance of 
evaluation, we can give Wp-truth-conditions. According to Descriptivism, what it 
standardly takes for a competent speaker S to understand an utterance of 'N is F' is 
knowledge of WA-tmth-conditions, and to know them is to know:
Descriptive truth-conditions: 'N is F' is true-in Wp iff (j) in Wp is F in Wp,
which gives the conditions under which 'N is F' is true at all Wp considered as actual. S's 
grasp of descriptive truth-conditions gives her a fairly comprehensive mastery of the 
assertoric use of 'N is F', but if she does not know how 'N is F' embeds inside the scope of 
modal operators, her understanding is essentially incomplete. What S must also know is 
that N is a rigid designator, i.e. that (j) must be rigidified such that the referent of N at a 
counterfactual Wp is whoever satisfies (j) in Wa (whichever Wp we consider as actual). S's 
understanding must also encompass knowledge of:
Rigidified Descriptive tmth-conditions: 'N is F' is tme-of Wp iff @(j) is F in Wp,
which ensures knowledge of a set of conditionals: if o satisfies 0 in W a, then 'N is F' is 
tme-of Wp iff o is F in Wp; if o* satisfies 0 in W a, then 'N is F' is true-of Wp iff o* is F in 
Wp; etc. To know the rigidified descriptive truth-conditions is to know Wp-tmth- 
conditions, and is, following Descriptivism, all understanding takes. According to 
Referentialism, however, understanding 'a is F' requires knowledge of:
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Singular truth-conditions: 'N is F' is true at Wp iff o is F in Wp,
which gives the conditions under which 'N is F' is true-in Wa and true-of Wp, i.e. at 
various counterfactual Wp. On this account, there is no significant distinction between 
knowledge of WA-tmth-conditions and knowledge of Wp-truth-conditions; in both cases, 
understanding requires knowledge of singular content. Someone who knows the singular 
truth-conditions has relevant empirical inforaiation such that she is able to detach the 
consequents of our conditionals. She knows which object satisfies 0 in Wa , and so knows 
which object N refers to. According to Referentialism, understanding requires knowledge 
of reference. But this is exactly what Descriptivism disputes. A speaker who knows which 
object N picks out in Wa is able to advance from knowledge of rigidified descriptive truth- 
conditions to knowledge of singular truth-conditions, but this is not a speaker who has a 
better understanding than someone who does not know the reference of N. This is a speaker 
who knows more truths, and not a speaker who has a better grasp of truth-conditions. To 
know the reference of N is an a posteriori matter which at least in a wide range of cases is 
an over-demanding constraint on competence with N to impose on speakers.
Bear in mind the different ways in which descriptive and singular content is 
individuated on the two views. We have seen in Sec. 3.2 that according to Descriptivism, 
propositional content is individuated intentionally:
(DCA) If 'P' and Q' have the same propositional content, then a fully competent speaker S 
believes that P iff S believes that Q.
On this view, propositional content is essentially cognitive in nature such that singular 
terms have the same descriptive content iff they are intersubstitutable in intentional 
contexts salva veritate. Take 'water' and 'the watery stuff of our acquaintance' which 
arguably have the same descriptive content: S believes that water is wet iff S believes that 
the watery stuff of her acquaintance is wet. After all 'water is wet' and 'the watery stuff of
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our acquaintance is wet' have the same WA-truth-conditions, and so it would seem that S 
believes the same thing about how W a is. Or consider 'Julius' and 'the inventor of the zip'. 
Someone who is competent with 'Julius' believes that Julius was ingenious iff she believes 
that the zip-inventor was ingenious. So, it would seem that singular terms coincide in 
descriptive content iff they are intersubstitutable in intentional contexts salva veritate. 
There are, however, two difficulties.
The first arises in mixed contexts. Suppose S sincerely and on reflection assents to 
'water might not have been watery'. It is true that water might not have been watery since 
there is a Wp in which H2 O is not watery. By Disquotation (D) we infer that S believes that 
water might not have been watery. But substituting 'water' for 'the watery stuff fails to 
preserve tmth-value. It is false that the watery stuff might not have been watery since there 
is no Wp in which the watery stuff is not watery. One way to remedy such troublesome 
cases is to place a constraint on the belief ascribing sentences such that singulai* terms 
coincide in descriptive content iff they are intersubstitutable in non-modal intentional 
contexts salva veritate. Another way is to insist on rigidification such that the descriptive 
content of 'water' is given by 'the actual watery stuff. That way, supplanting one for the 
other in intentional contexts will not issue in different truth-values even if the embedded 
sentences contain modal vocabulary. The point is that if S fully understands 'water might 
not have been watery', then she will know that a rigid designator cannot be substituted for a 
flexible designator in modal contexts without change in truth-value.
The second difficulty arises in cases where S sincerely and on reflection assents to a 
sentence like 'water is XYZ'. The question is whether we can reasonably use (D) to infer 
that S believes that water is XYZ. We are inclined to think that although our beliefs are 
often mistaken, nevertheless, they could have been right. To believe something is to 
represent a way things might be and to believe that things are that way. But what is it S 
purports to represent when S assents to 'water is XYZ'? If there is no Wp in which water is 
XYZ, then what is the possible object of belief that 'water is XYZ' refers to - the empty
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proposition? The worry is that if we ascribe to S the belief that water is XYZ, then S would 
seem to believe a necessary falsehood, but if we do not, then we are unfaithful to S's 
linguistic behaviour. That is, we should aim to ascribe beliefs such as to make most sense 
of our fellow speakers without having an error-theory of their assertions. I suspect there are 
two plausible things S might believe. We rightly describe S as believing that water is XYZ, 
since what this means, according to Descriptivism, is that S believes that the watery stuff of 
her acquaintance is XYZ. Although this ascription is false, it could have been true. The 
watery stuff around here is H2 O, but it might have been XYZ. Or maybe what S believes is 
not the necessary falsehood of what 'water is XYZ' expresses on Earth, but the necessary 
tmth of what 'water is XYZ' might have expressed had S been on Twin Earth. That is, S has 
the false but possibly true belief that S is in a Wp in which 'water is XYZ' expresses a 
tmth.i
The singular content of a term is, however, clearly not individuated by its behaviour 
in intentional contexts. Although 'water' and 'H2 O' coincide in singular content in W a, we 
have argued that substituting one for the other can easily result in different belief 
ascriptions. It is not the case that S believes that water is wet iff S believes that H2 O is wet. 
Singular content is not individuated intentionally but by the identity conditions of its 
singular constituents: two singular terms have the same singular content iff their referents 
are numerically identical. Referentialism is the view that all there is to the content of a
1  We know that i f  water is H2 O, then it is necessary that water is H2 O. But surely we think we can conceive 
of a possible scenario in which water is not H2 O, but say XYZ. There is, as Kripke [1980] argued, an illusion 
o f  contingency which must be explained away. The foregoing suggests that what is conceivable is that there is 
a stuff which has all and only the watery properties H 2 O actually has but is not H2 O. So, the apparent 
possibility that water is not H 2 O is accounted for by the genuine possibility that the watery stuff is not H2 O. 
Cf. also Stalnaker [1999a, pp. 123-7] who argues that sometimes what a speaker believes is not the horizontal 
but the diagonal proposition, e.g. when someone asserts that Hesperus is Mars, we intuitively ascribe to him 
the belief that the solar system is arranged such that Mars appears in the evening at the same place where 
Venus in fact appears. That is, sentences like 'Hesperus is Mars' and 'water is XYZ' have 'contingent' diagonal 
propositions. See also Yablo [2000], and Sec. 5,3.
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singular term is its bearer. On this view, propositional content is individuated modally such 
that two singular terms N and 0 have the same propositional content iff they are 
intersubstitutable in modal contexts salva veritate:
(RCA) If N and 0 have the same propositional content, then 'N is 0' expresses a necessary 
truth.
Singular content sustains (RCA). If two singular terms coincide in singular content then 
they refer to the same object at every counterfactual Wp, and so are interchangeable in 
modal contexts salva veritate. In W a 'water' and 'H2 O' both express the singular content 
<H20>. This corresponds to the fact that both are rigid designators with respect to H2 O, 
hence that 'water is H 2 O' expresses the necessary singular proposition <H2 0 ; H2 O; 
identity-relation>. Or take 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent'. Both are modally rigid with respect 
to Superman, hence 'Superman is Clark Kent' expresses the necessary singulai' proposition 
<Superman; Superman; identity-relation>. So, singular terms coincide in singular content 
ijfthey are intersubstitutable in modal contexts salva veritate.
According to Referentialism, propositional content is thus individuated by its modal 
properties independently of how we conceptualise it: singular content is simply a matter of 
how the world is regardless of its modes of presentation. E.g. water and H2 O are the same 
kind of stuff but thought of in different ways. What S believes when S believes that P is 
essentially a function of how the world is such that if one changes how the world is, one 
changes the content of S's belief, and hence the belief state that S is in. Thus the Twin Earth 
Argument aimed to show that one could change the content of beliefs about the world by 
changing the way the world is while fixing the way the world appears. According to 
Descriptivism, however, propositional content is individuated by its cognitive properties: 
descriptive content captures certain modes of presentation of the world and it is possible 
that different aspects of the world be presented under one and the same mode of 
presentation. E.g. water and twin-water are different kinds of stuff but are thought of in the
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same way. What S believes when S believes that P is essentially a function of how the 
world appears to S from the inside, as it were, such that if one changes how the world 
appears, one changes the content of S's belief and hence the belief state that S is in. Thus 
the Intentional Argument aimed to show that one could change the content of beliefs about 
the world by changing the way the world appears while fixing the way the world is.
This strongly suggests that we should think of the descriptive aspect of mental 
content as narrow and of the singular aspect of mental content as wide. We saw in Sec. 2.2 
that Semantic Internalism relied on Descriptivism. Descriptive content is nairow in that it is 
common to intrinsic duplicates despite their different environmental embeddings. My 
doppelganger on Twin Earth and I both believe that the watery stuff is wet since water and 
twin-water have the watery properties in common. In Sec. 2.3, however, we saw that 
Semantic Externalism relied on Referentialism. Singular content is wide in that it is not 
shared amongst intrinsic duplicates. Due to the fact that water and twin-water have distinct 
micro-structures, my doppelgünger on Twin Earth believes that twin-water is wet, whereas 
I believe that water is wet. We can thus characterise the difference between descriptive and 
singular content by saying that the latter is dependent on the external environment in a way 
that the former is not. So far this relation of dependence has been spelled out in terms of 
object-dependence in the sense that had the referent of a singular term N not existed, the 
content of N would not have existed. Singular content is object-dependent: my tokens of 
'water' express the singular content <H2 0 >, but had water not existed, they could not have 
expressed just that content. Descriptive content, on the other hand, is object-independent: 
my tokens of 'water' express the descriptive content <the wateiy stuff> whether water exists 
or not. Object-dependence involves a strong external constraint on concept possession: one 
can only entertain an object-dependent thought if one, or one's fellow speakers, have had 
causal encounters with the particular objects on which one's thought is dependent. So, 
intrinsic duplicates may easily fail to share object-dependent thoughts. Now, as we saw in 
Sec. 1.6, there is clearly space for a weaker relation of external dependence. That is, our
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definition of wide content as content intrinsic duplicates may fail to have in common does 
not require that wide content be object-dependent. Our problem was how content could be 
wide, but not object-dependent, if Referentialism were true. Considerations about Dry 
Earth cases seemed to show that there could be no merely weak form of Semantic 
Externalism. But now that we have reason not to hold out much hope for Referentialism, 
the question arises whether there could be a notion of object-independent wide content. I 
think so. We have learned from Twin Earth that the descriptive content of 'water' must be 
causally constrained: <the watery stuff of our acquaintance>. One of the cluster properties 
associated with 'water', as used by my speech community, is the property of being the kind 
of stuff that I, or my fellow speakers, causally interact with. Now take my doppelganger on 
a remote Twin Earth in Wa- He has also learned from thought experiments that descriptive 
content must be causally constrained, but he does not associate with 'water', as used in his 
speech community, the property of being the kind of stuff that I, or my fellow speakers, 
causally interact with. What he associates with 'water' is the property of being the kind of 
stuff that he, or his fellow speakers, causally interact with. This is precisely why he cannot 
have water beliefs: he is not acquainted with the watery stuff I am acquainted with, and 
why I cannot have twin-water beliefs: I am not acquainted with the watery stuff he is 
acquainted with. In other words, my utterance of 'water is wet' is true iff the watery stuff of 
my acquaintance is wet, whereas his utterance of 'water is wet' is true iff the watery stuff of 
his acquaintance is wet. So, causally constrained descriptive content is wide in the sense 
that it is not invariably shared by intrinsic duplicates within Wa- To have a belief with such 
content is to have a mental property that fails to supervene on purely intrinsic properties. 
We shall call such content context-dependent in that it varies with shifts in contexts of 
acquisition - Earth or Twin Earth - within Wa- Crucially, causally constrained descriptive 
content is not object-dependent: had I been on Dry Earth, I could still have believed that the 
watery stuff of my acquaintance is wet; it is just that nothing would make that belief true. 
So, object-dependence entails context-dependence - my doppelganger on a remote Twin
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Earth in Wa cannot believe that water is wet - but context-dependence does not entail 
object-dependence. Once Semantic Bxternalism is separated from Referentialism, there is 
hope for a notion of object-independent wide content.
Note finally that purely descriptive content is both object- and context-independent. 
If I believe that the watery stuff is wet, then so does my doppelganger on Twin Earth, and 
so would I had I been on Dry Earth. To have a belief with purely descriptive content is to 
have a mental property that supervenes on intrinsic properties. But, as I shall now argue, 
although such content is shared by intrinsic duplicates within W a, it is not necessarily 
shared by intrinsic duplicates across all Wp. Even purely descriptive content is world- 
dependent. So, we arrive at a threefold distinction between object-, context- and world- 
dependent content. What I shall do in the following is to mai'k out these distinctions, and in 
particular buttress the claim that some mental content is narrow. I shall first say something 
about what narrow content could plausibly consist in and then discuss some objections that 
have been advanced against narrow content.
5.2. W hat is Narrow Content?
We have stipulated narrow content to be a mental property that supervenes on intrinsic, 
physical properties of individuals; i.e. a property necessarily shared by doppelgangers such 
that, in every Wp, two intrinsic physical duplicates aie narrow content duplicates.^ In order 
to get clear on what kind of supervenience is in play, consider three examples of kinds of 
properties:
(i) The property of being square is a property that supervenes on internal structure. 
Necessarily, an object is square iff its surface is shaped by four equally long straight lines at
2 As I said in Sec. 1.1, fn. 1, there is an issue about which properties constitute the supervenience base. It is 
standard to include physical, and at times functional, properties. Nothing I say should hang on whether other 
kinds o f properties can go into the base. The important point is that my doppelganger is someone who is just 
like me from the skin in.
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right angles. Thus if an object is square then, necessarily, any internal duplicate of it will 
also be square. No change in relational properties can make it true that a doppelganger of a 
square object is not square. Moreover, for an object to be squaie just is for it to have a 
certain set of intrinsic, geometrical properties - having a shape with four equally long, 
straight lines and right angles - and to understand what it is for an object to be square is just 
to know that it has all these properties.
(ii) The property of being water-soluble is also a property that supervenes on internal 
stmcture. Necessarily, an object is soluble iff under normal conditions it would dissolve if 
immersed in water. There is some internal physical state of the object which is causally 
responsible for the behaviour such that any internal duplicate of it is normally itself water- 
soluble. Hence, for an object to be water-soluble is not just to be in a certain internal state 
in the sense that if all you know is confined to that internal state, you do not know whether 
it is water-soluble; you have to know something about the causal connections between 
being in that state and behaving in a certain way on being put in water.
(iii) The property of being a footprint is a property that fails to supervene on internal 
structure. Necessarily, something is a footprint iff it has a normally foot-shaped imprint and 
is caused by a normal foot. An intrinsic duplicate of a footprint is not a footprint if not 
caused by a normal foot. A foot-shaped imprint caused, say, by the way the waves happen 
to fall on the sand is not a footprint. Again, if all you know is confined to the intrinsic 
properties of a particular imprint, you do not know whether it is a footprint; you have to 
know something about the causal connections between being a footprint and being caused 
by the impact of a foot.^
3 The examples are modelled on Jackson & Pettit [1993, pp. 271-2] and Stalnaker [1999a, pp. 171-4]. See 
also Davidson [1996, pp. 335-8] who argues that the property of being sunburned presupposes certain causal 
relations between the sun and the sunburned skin. Skin may be qualitatively indistinguishable from sunburned 
skin and yet not sunburned if  it does not have the right causal history. Such skin may share a narrow condition 
o f sunburned skin: sunnishburn is just like sunburn except no particular causal connections need be sustained.
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With this background, we may say that being square globally supervenes on internal 
structure. Global supervenience is a relation between Wp such that if two Wp are exactly 
alike in which objects are shaped by four equally long, straight lines at right angles, then 
they are exactly alike in which objects are square; regardless of how they may otherwise 
differ. Alternatively, we can put roughly the same claim locally as a relation between 
individuals in Wp:
S strongly supervenes on B iff for any individuals x and y and for any Wp 
and Wp*, if x in Wp is B-indiscernible from y in Wp*, then x in Wp is S- 
indiscernible from y in Wp*;
where the supervenience-property S is being square and the base-property B is having 
certain geometrical properties.^ That is, the property of being square is cross-world narrow, 
where a property P of x is cross-world narrow iff in every Wp any doppelganger of x has P. 
Being water-soluble, however, does not strongly supervene on internal structure. An object 
may be intrinsically similar to a soluble object and yet not dissolve in water if some 
anomalous environmental conditions obtain. We can imagine a Wp with relevantly deviant 
laws of nature in which a doppelganger of a soluble object in W a does not dissolve if put in 
water. What is needed is:
S weakly supervenes on B iff for any individuals x and y and for any Wp, if 
X and y are B-indiscernible in Wp, then x and y are S-indiscernible in Wp;
where S is being water-soluble and B is a certain internal physical structure. That is, the 
property of being water-soluble is intra-world narrow, where a property P of x is intra­
world narrow iff in every Wp where x has P any doppelganger of x has P. Within Wp 
internal duplicates are duplicates with respect to whether or not they are soluble, and so to 
find an object which is internally exactly like a water-soluble object without being water-
4 Cf. Kim [1994, pp. 577-9].
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soluble, you must go to a different Wp. Intra-world narrow properties are only shared by 
doppelgangers across nomologically identical Wp, i.e. Wp consistent with the actual laws 
of nature. Lastly, being a footprint is not even intra-world narrow since there are Wp within 
which a doppelganger of a footprint fails to be a footprint. Does this make being a footprint 
a pure  relational property? No. Not everything caused by the impression of a foot is a 
footprint. What makes an imprint in the sand a footprint is not just its aetiology, but also its 
foot-shapeness, i.e. a certain internal distribution of grains of sand in the imprint. It follows 
that from the wide property of being a footprint, we cm  factor out the narrow property of 
being ^foot-shaped imprint. This property is intra-world narrow: a doppelganger in a Wp 
of a foot-shaped imprint x is itself a foot-shaped imprint only i f  x  is also a foot-shaped 
imprint in Wp, despite any difference in causal histories. Where footprints owe their 
identity to particular causes, foot-shaped imprints aie independent of any such. Something 
is a foot-print only if caused by a foot; something is a foot-shaped imprint if caused by a 
foot, the waves or what not. An imprint which is intrinsically indistinguishable from a foot­
print is a foot-shaped imprint, but is a footprint only if caused by a foot. The property of 
being a foot-shaped imprint is, however, still dependent on general facts extrinsic to the 
sand. In a counterfactual Wp where feet have abnormal shapes, hence where the standard 
for being a foot is different, the imprint in the sand is not even a foot-shaped imprint. That 
is why we need the condition that x be a foot-shaped imprint in Wp. To form the narrow 
property out of the property of being a footprint, we must qualify the imprints to include 
only the normal shapes that feet make under normal conditions (and thus assume that 
human footprints have common characteristics). So, the property of being a foot-shaped 
imprint is not cross-world narrow.^
5 This suggests that it is physically  necessary that something is a footprint iff it has a normally foot-shaped 
imprint and is caused by a normal foot. If, however, we rigidity on 'normally'/'normal', then there is a case for 
saying that the bi-conditional is also conceptually necessary since it is arguably what someone knows who 
understands what 'footprint' means. The same goes mutatis mutandis for water-solubility.
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Now, which of these are mental properties akin to? Distinguish again between the 
content of an attitude and the property of having an attitude with that content. It is clear that 
the former is not an intrinsic property. The representational character of content tells us that 
content is, at least partially, individuated by its truth-conditions, but truth-conditions 
specify how the world must be in order for what is thought or said to be true or false. The 
truth-conditions of most of the declarative sentences in our language can only be stated in 
terms not internal to any particular individual. But if content is not intrinsic in the sense 
that it can be understood in purely internal terms as the property of being squaie can, then 
neither is the property of having an attitude with that content. That is, if mental properties 
were like being square, then not only would they supervene on an individual's intrinsic 
properties, but it would also be possible to determine which thoughts an individual is 
apprehending by investigating only what is in her head, not her language community nor 
her physical surroundings. Someone who knew all of an individual's intrinsic properties 
would thereby also know the individual's mental properties. But mental properties are not 
wholly internal in this sense. Content-bearing mental properties are no doubt states located 
within individuals, but they can only be understood relationally, i.e. by describing how we 
actually or counterfactually interact with external objects.^ The point is that although 
mental properties cannot be explained entirely in terms internal to an individual, they can 
nevertheless supervene on an individual's intrinsic properties - if carefully cashed out. It is 
clear that the Semantic Internalist should not model supposedly narrow content on 
properties like being square. Unlike being square, narrow content does not strongly 
supervene on internal structure, but is a function of internal structure plus laws of nature 
and linguistic practice. In Wp with abnormal laws of nature or deviant linguistic practices, 
there are doppelgangers of us that do not share our narrow contents. Narrow content is not
 ^Similarly, a footprint is a property o f the sand, but one can only understand what a footprint is if  one knows 
how it is typically caused. E.g. the traces made in the sand by a crawling ant o f a recognisable caricature of 
Churchill do not depict Churchill. In Putnam's [1981, p. 5] words. "Thought words and mental pictures do not 
intrinsically represent what they are about." Cf. also Jackson & Pettit [1993, pp. 271-2].
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independent of any causal interactions with the environment, like squareness is, but only of 
which interactions are actual and which possible. Narrow content is more like being water- 
soluble in that the intrinsic properties, shared by doppelgangers, govern interactions with 
actual and possible environments. A sugar-cube that never actually gets dissolved, because 
never placed in water, does not thereby lose its solubility as long as it would dissolve were 
it placed in water.
Take a mental property like having the thought that the stuff that goes under the 
name 'water' is wet. My intrinsic properties govern which actual and possible state of 
affairs makes the thought true. On Earth H2 O makes the thought tme, but had I been on a 
Twin Earth in W a, XYZ would have made the thought true. Having a narrow content 
thought is thus independent of which particular environment one inhabits, but governs 
what one's thought would be about given actual and possible environments. Contrast with 
the property of having the thought that water is wet. Unlike a narrow content thought, this 
wide content thought has a particular external dependency. On Earth where I interact with 
water, I can entertain this thought, but had I been on Twin Earth I would not have 
interacted with water, and so could not have entertained this thought. What narrow content 
thoughts have is a general external dependency in that it is not shared by doppelgangers 
across all Wp. Just as we can imagine a doppelganger in a far-fetched Wp of a sugar-cube 
in W a which fails to dissolve if put in water due to peculiar physical laws in Wp, we can 
imagine a doppelganger of mine in a far-fetched Wp, who does not share my narrow 
contents, if in Wp the language is very different or the laws of nature are different in a way 
that affects the causal roles of those of my brain-states upon which my narrow content 
beliefs depend. So, narrow content mental states are context-independent properties of 
individuals in that they are necessarily shared by doppelgangers in different contexts of
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acquisition within the same Wp; such states are not world-independent as they are not 
necessarily shared by doppelgangers across Wp7
The mental property of having the thought that water is wet is more akin to the 
property of being a footprint. In light of the Twin Eaith Argument, we must say that since 
at least part of the content of that thought is wide, i.e. not even intra-world narrow, the 
property of having a thought with that content does not supervene on the individual's 
intrinsic properties. Earthlings can think that water is thirst-quenching, but their 
doppelgangers on Twin Earth cannot since they do not sustain the requisite causal 
connections that their Earthly doppelgangers do. Nevertheless, the abstraction-process that 
we used to factor out the narrow property of being a foot-shaped imprint from the wide 
property of being a foot-print, can also be deployed to factor out the narrow content of the 
wide content thought that water is wet. One starts off with two intra-world doppelgangers 
who differ in wide content. Then one abstracts from their particular context-dependency 
until one finds out which mental properties they have in common. Since these will weakly 
supervene on their intrinsic properties, they will be narrow. Narrow content is what 
remains constant under counterfactual variation in wide contentf On Earth I believe that 
water is wet, but had I been on Twin Earth, I would have believed that twin-water is wet. 
On Twin Eaith my doppelganger believes that twin-water is wet, but had he been on Earth,
7 The foregoing owes much to Jackson & Pettit [1993, pp. 271-3] and Lewis [1999b, p. 315] who have argued 
that some content is in this sense intra-world narrow. Note a special difficulty about egocentric  content. 
Suppose my worldmate doppelganger and 1 both utter I have a sore tooth'. Due to the mere fact that we are 
distinct individuals, our respective utterances have different truth-conditions. So, given our definition o f  
narrow content, the content o f my belief that 1 have a sore tooth is wide, but wide content was supposed to be 
individuated by reference to external circumstances. Maybe, as Lewis [1979] has suggested, such D e Se 
attitudes are self-ascriptions o f properties, e.g. my doppelgânger and 1 have in common the property o f having 
a sore tooth. See also Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson [1996, pp. 216-9], and Sec. 5.6.
8 Strictly speaking, all the abstraction-process warrants is the claim that intra-world doppelgangers share 
certain mental properties, namely whatever properties map contexts o f acquisition onto wide contents. 1 shall 
argue in Sec. 5.3 that those common properties are indeed truth-conditional, content-bearing mental states; cf. 
also fn. 10.
199
he would have believed that water is wet. That is, our shared internal nature governs the 
same interactions with actual and possible environments. We both associate an 
acquaintance condition with 'water' such that if we interact with different kinds of stuff, we 
believe different things. But we can factor out a narrow condition, namely the property of 
being acquainted with a watery stuff. Narrow content is the part of our belief contents that 
stays fixed in such counterfactual circumstances.
Let me finally say a few words about the motivation behind the invocation of 
narrow content. So far we have focused on the representational properties of the contents of 
our attitudes, but it is clear that those contents also have causal-explanatory properties: we 
tend to behave in ways that satisfy our desires were our beliefs true. Consider an example. 
My doppelganger and I are both thirsty. I am confronted with a glassi of water and my 
doppelganger with a different but subjectively indistinguishable glass2  of twin-water. We 
both utter the sentence 'that glass contains water' and reach out to satisfy our thirst. What 
are the conditions under which our respective utterances are true? Again, we are faced with 
a choice. If we go for singular truth-conditions, then my utterance is true iff glassi contains 
water, whereas my doppelganger's utterance is true iff glass2  contains twin-water. 
Consequently, I express my belief that glass i contains water, whereas my doppelganger 
expresses his belief that glass2  contains twin-water. But if we go for purely descriptive 
truth-conditions, then both our utterances are true iff the demonstratively identified glass 
having descriptive properties F, G, etc. contains a watery stuff. In such a case where 
distinct objects have superficially indistinguishable appearances, it is natural to think that 
grasp of the descriptive, narrow content is sufficient to understand our utterances; it is 
certainly not mandated that one be able to distinguish glass i from glass2  or water from 
twin-water. Why do we think that? Well, one consideration concerns phenomenology. My 
doppelganger and I share a certain psychological perspective: from an internal point of 
view, the world seems the same to us. There is a glassi in front of me containing water, but 
for all I could tell, there might have been a glass2  containing twin-water in front of me.
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Likewise for my doppelganger. He is confronted with glass2  containing twin-water, but for 
all he knows, he might have been confronted with glass i containing water. Narrow content 
is what captures this common way things seem to us. But why is this qualitative aspect 
important? Because it seems to suffice for psychological explanation. I reach out for glass i 
to quench my thirst, and my doppelganger reaches out for glass2  to quench his thirst. Had I 
been confronted with glass2  containing twin-water, I would have reached out for glass2 , 
and had he been confronted with glass i containing water, he would have reached out for 
glass 1 . Same narrow content belief, but different wide content beliefs, implies same 
behaviour. The difference in wide content is explanatorily redundant.^ Or let us modify the 
example such that I am confronted with a glass of water, and we both know that only my 
(approximate) doppelganger is thirsty. He has a belief he would express by saying T am 
thirsty', whereas I have a belief I would express by saying 'he is thirsty'. Our beliefs have 
the same singular, but different descriptive, contents. Yet we behave in different ways: I 
reach out for the glass in order to pass it on to my doppelganger who drinks the water. So, 
different narrow content beliefs, but same wide content beliefs, implies different behaviour. 
So, wide content beliefs seem too coarse-grained for all psychological explanation.
9 Friends o f wide content object that folk-psychological explanations are concerned with behaviour under 
relational, and not physical, descriptions, and that behaviour thus understood can only be explained by wide 
content mental states. Thus I reach out for glassi since I believe that glass i contains water, whereas my 
doppelganger reaches out for glass2  since he believes that glass2  contains twin-water. The question is thus 
how fine-grained behaviour should be individuated. Our behaviour can be given the same non-relational 
descriptions and that may suffice for the purposes o f psychological explanation. To go into details here would 
take me to far a field. The crucial point is that what the narrow content theorist should claim is not that wide 
content beliefs are explanatorily idle, but merely that narrow content beliefs play an irreducible role in 
explanation of ordinary belief-desire psychology.
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5.3. Some Objections against Narrow Content.
So much by way of characterisation and motivation of narrow content. It is time to face 
some objections. Despite its intuitive appeal, many philosophers have found the notion of 
narrow content hard to make sense of. The scepticism has been led by Block [1991, 1999] 
and Stalnaker [1999a]. In order to get clear on the dialectic of their main point, it is helpful 
to ask the question: is the distinction between narrow and wide content a distinction 
between predicates such that some predicates are narrow and some wide or is it a 
distinction within predicates such that every predicate has a narrow and a wide component? 
The problem is this. We started off assuming that 'being water' should be analysed as the 
narrow predicate 'being the watery stuff. The Twin Earth Argument proved us wrong. 
Being water' is not even intra-world narrow since doppelgangers within the same Wp fail 
to share water-beliefs. The response was to add a causality constraint to the cluster of 
watery properties. That way, my tokens of 'water' do not pick out XYZ on a Putnam-type 
Twin Earth since XYZ is not the watery stuff of my (or our) acquaintance. So, Twin Earth 
taught us that 'being water' is a predicate that expresses the property of being the watery 
stuff of my acquaintance. On Twin Earth, my intra-world doppelganger will also associate 
with 'water' the property expressed by 'the watery stuff of our acquaintance', but given that 
he and I are acquainted with distinct kinds of stuff, H2 O and XYZ, his tokens of 'water' will 
express the property of being the watery stuff of his acquaintance. My doppelganger 
cannot entertain water-thoughts since he is not acquainted with the watery stuff of my 
acquaintance, and so 'being water' is a wide predicate. Yet we both associate with 'water' 
the common property of being a watery stuff, or even the property of being acquainted with 
a watery stuff. So, we can also learn from Twin Eaith that narrow conceptual components 
can be cut out from 'being water'. But what is to stop the Semantic Externalist from running 
Twin Eaith Arguments on the supposedly naitow, watery predicates. The worry is that if all 
predicates are susceptible to Twin Earth Arguments, then all one can do by way of
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explicating naiTOw content is allude to functional definitions: narrow content is whatever 
takes one from a context of acquisition to wide content, e.g. whatever property determines 
that if I am on Earth, then I have water-thoughts, and if I am on Twin Earth, then I have 
twin-water t h o u g h t s . Presumably, the Semantic Internalist would insist that just as we 
could factor out the supposedly narrow predicate 'being liquid’ from 'being water', so we 
could make up a narrow predicate 'being liquidish' from 'being liquid'. Let alone the 
artificiality of such contrived predicates, if any spelling out of the content of 'liquidish' is 
bound to issue in yet another set of predicates which are equally hostage to a Twin Earth 
Argument, then Semantic Intemalism begins to look futile. Narrow content should not be 
ineffable! So, to make good the claim that some content is nanow, there ought to be a range 
of genuinely narrow predicates which fill in the details of 'the watery stuff, and so the 
scope of the Twin Earth Argument must be limited. Luckily, I think there is. Consider how 
it goes in Block & Stalnaker [1999, pp. 30-1]:^^
"...we are not guaranteed a priori that water is the - or even an - odourless drinkable 
liquid in rivers and lakes that we have been calling 'water', since it is not even 
guaranteed a priori that water is a liquid. There is a Twin Earth in which the stuff 
that they call 'water' is H2 O, as here, but the stuff that they call 'liquid' is virtually 
all a slippeiy granular solid [...]. According to this story, water is an exception, one 
that the residents of Twin Earth would not call 'a liquid' if they knew the scientific 
facts. (Imagine that on Twin Earth water is rare). Because [...] the counterfactual 
situation in which this story is true is a twin of ours, an utterance is actually a priori 
only if the counterpart utterance in that situation is a priori there. Since the 
counterpart of "water is a liquid" is false there, it cannot be a priori true."
I take it the point here is not that 'water is a liquid' cannot be a priori true because there is a 
counterfactual Twin Earth on which water, i.e. H2 O, is not a liquid. That would be to
1 0  For an example o f a narrow content theorist who sticks to functional definitions of narrow content, see 
White [1982] who uses Kaplan's notion o f character, and Block [1991] for criticism.
For a similar line of thought see White [1982, p. 355], Burge [1982], and Block [1991, p. 50].
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confuse a priority with necessity. The point is rather that if 'water is a liquid' were a priori 
true, then it would express a truth in every Wp qua actual. But an utterance on this Twin 
Earth of 'water is a liquid' is false, so the sentence cannot be a priori in the sense of 
expressing a truth in every Wp. This is better but still not good. Why is 'water is a liquid' 
false on Twin Earth? Because 'liquid' applies to slippery granular solids, and water, i.e. 
H 2 O, is a liquid, and not a solid, on Twin E a r t h . S o ,  the ai'gument makes the prima facie 
plausible assumption that 'liquid' functions much like 'water': 'liquid' is a rigid designator of 
the liquidish stuff. On Earth 'liquid' rigidly picks out liquids like water, but on this Twin 
Earth 'liquid' rigidly picks out subjectively indistinguishable granular solids. So, just like 
'water', 'liquid' presumably has a fixed descriptive content on Earth and Twin Earth, but 
sentences containing 'liquid' have different truth-conditions. The claim is thus that not only 
'water', but also the watery predicates have a natural kind use: a predicate like 'being liquid' 
serves as a rigid designator of the physical kind common to the liquidish samples of our 
acquaintance. Given that 'liquid' refers to whatever physical kind liquids are on Earth, 
'liquid' does not refer to solids on Twin Earth even if they are subjectively indistinguishable 
from liquids.
But why should we accept the analogy between water and liquid? We have 
previously emphasised that the way the world seems to us, as opposed to the way the world 
is, plays an important role when we individuate intentional states and explain behaviour. 
We must thus have at our disposal sufficient linguistic means to facilitate the expression of
Suppose instead that 'water is a liquid' expresses a falsehood on Twin-Earth due to the fact that water, i.e. 
H2 O, is not a liquid there. Would that imply that 'water is a liquid’ is not a priori? Well, we might say different 
things. If we hold that nothing is water in W^ unless it is a liquid, then there simply is no coherent description 
o f a Wp qua actual in which water is not a liquid, which is not to say that there is no counterfactual Wp in 
which water is not a liquid. This seems to be very plausible. Or consider the property of being a physical 
stuff; do we have conceptual space for the possibility that ectoplasm could have turned out to satisfy the 
watery properties in Wa? Alternatively, one might respond as we did to the Epistemological Argument, that 
water is whatever stuff has sufficiently many o f the watery properties in Wa, and that perhaps being a liquid 
is not an indispensable property in this respect.
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these, as it were, modes of presentation of the world. One such helpful device would be 
modally flexible expressions. Let me give an example. Suppose I am in severe pain, and 
suppose that our concept of pain is the concept of the state that occupies a certain causal 
role (being caused by tissue damage and resulting in escape behaviour). Science has 
discovered that what actually fills the pain role (in humans) is the physical state of having 
C-fibres firing, and so I am in this physical state. Now suppose I were in a qualitatively 
identical epistemic situation in which it is the physical state of having D-fibres firing that 
fills the pain role (in humans). So, if 'pain' is a rigid designator with respect to the physical 
'filler' state, then I am not in pain in this counterfactual situation, and if I am not in pain, 
then surely I am aware that I am not in pain. In the normal run of things, my pains are 
transparent to me. But I am not awai'e I am not in pain in this situation; indeed it seems to 
me as if I am in pain. So, 'pain' is not modally rigid: what is pain in W a is not pain in 
counterfactual Wp.^^
So, maybe 'liquid' is better modelled on 'pain'. What counts for something to be a 
liquid is that there is an occupier of the liquid role, and not which physical state that is. So, 
if, as in the example, liquids fill the liquid role on Earth, then 'liquid' refers to liquids on 
Earth. But had the liquid role been filled by slippery granular solids, then 'liquid' would 
refer to those solids; after all the two substances are qualitatively indistinguishable. What 
the Semantic Externalist must argue, and not just presuppose, is that a predicate like 'being
13 Cf. Lewis [1983, 1999b]. Kripke [1980, pp. 147-55] famously denied the premise that the reference o f  
'pain' is fixed by the accidental property o f playing the pain role. On his view, the reference of 'pain' is fixed 
by the essential property o f being painful, and so 'pain' is a rigid designator of states with this property. 
Kripke needed rigidity in his argument against physicalism: if  pain is C-fiber stimulation, then pain is 
necessarily C-fiber stimulation. But pain is contingently C-fiber stimulation since any counterfactual 
epistemic counterpart o f pain is pain: "To be in the same epistemic situation that would obtain if  one had a 
pain is to have a pain...". So, by Modus Tollens, pain is not C-fiber stimulation. I shall not embark upon this 
argument here. It suffices to point out that neither Lewis nor Kiipke thought that mind-brain identities were 
necessary; mental states are defined by their functional or phenomenal properties, and not their physical 
properties.
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liquid' does not have a superficial use in which 'liquid' flexib ly  picks out all and only 
liquidish substances. Anyway, suppose the Semantic Internalist concedes the point - after 
all physical science rapidly progresses and even if 'liquid' used to have a superficial use, 
maybe it has now a natural kind use. It will still be true that secondary predicates like 
'colourless', 'tasteless' and 'thirst-quenching' have superficial uses. Any substance, no matter 
what its micro-stmcture, which has the effect of quenching thirst upon being consumed by 
individuals is thirst-quenching. All that counts for something to be thirst-quenching is that 
it elicits a certain behaviour, e.g. ingested by individuals after physical exercise, and maybe 
prompts certain phenomenological feels  - specific sensory qualities - and not how the 
underlying micro-physics is.^^
The Semantic Externalist may try a different tack. Take this Burge-style [1979] 
Argument:
(A) Suppose that, in an actual situation, I have many true beliefs about arthiitis, but also 
assent to 'I have arthritis in my thigh'. However, since arthritis is necessarily an ailment of 
the joints only, I  falsely believe that I  have arthritis in my thigh;
(B) Now suppose there is a counterfactual situation entirely identical to the actual except 
that 'arthritis' applies not only to arthritis, but also to rheumatoid ailments outside the joints, 
including the one in my thigh. In this situation I am also disposed to assent to I have 
arthritis in my thigh'.
(C) In (B) I cannot believe that I have arthritis in my thigh, indeed no belief-ascription 
containing 'arthritis' in opaque position is true of me. Instead I truly believe that I  have 
twin-arthritis in my thigh, since this is what the sentence I have arthiitis in my thigh' mean.
It is probable that functional predicates will have such superficial uses. Consider 'being a heart', 'being a 
clutch' or 'being a supermarket', etc, A heart is whatever fills the functional role that hearts have: pumping 
blood with a certain frequency, etc. In most o f us heaits are carbon-based, but pacemakers are hearts if  they 
perform the role hearts do in most of us. Or take theoretical terms like 'vitamin' or 'anaesthetics' whose 
functional roles are also filled by different kinds o f stuff within W^. For disagreement, see Putnam [1996, pp. 
25-8] who believes that 'pencil' works just like 'water'.
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Let us call (A)-(C) the Arthritis Argument. It has some intuitively plausible 
premises, (i) It is wrong to interpret (A) as a situation in which I truly believe that I have 
twin-arthritis in my thigh (ü) The prepositional content of 'aithritis' in (A) is not identical 
to the prepositional content of 'arthritis' in (B) since the terms are extensionally non­
equivalent. (iii) Beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are individuated by the truth- 
conditions of their content-clauses.
According to Burge [1979, 1982], the Arthritis Argument establishes a kind of 
Social Bxternalism: mental content is individuated by social facts about linguistic use in 
one's speech community. In (B) I have all and only the intrinsic properties I have in (A), 
but, given (ii), the contents of my beliefs are different, and so, given (iii), I am in different 
belief-states. It follows that the mental property of having a belief with a certain content 
does not supervene on intrinsic properties of individuals. Where the Twin Eaith Argument 
moved from subjectively indistinguishable differences in the physical environment to 
differences in semantic and mental content, the Arthritis Argument goes from subjectively 
indistinguishable differences in the social environment to differences in semantic and 
mental content. But, if good, the Arthritis Argument will apply right across the language, 
and the upshot would be a kind of Rampant Semantic Bxternalism. Consider this variant of 
(A)-(C):
(A) Suppose that, in an actual situation, I have many true beliefs about thirst-quenching 
such as that water is thirst-quenching, but also assent to 'rye bread is thirst-quenching'. 
However, since thirst-quenching is necessarily a property of liquids only, !  falsely believe 
that rye bread is thirst-quenching.
15 I think Burge is right in denying that full understanding o f a content is a necessary condition for believing 
that content. Had I understood 'arthritis' correctly, I would have had the same belief I have when having 
incomplete understanding of'arthritis'.
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(B’) Now suppose there is a counterfactual situation entirely identical to the actual except 
that 'thirst-quenching' applies not only to thirst-quenching, but also to hunger-satisfying 
substances. In this situation I am also disposed to assent to 'rye bread is thirst-quenching'.
(C) In (B') I cannot believe that rye bread is thirst-quenching; indeed no belief-ascription 
containing 'thirst-quenching' in opaque position is true of me. Instead I truly believe that 
rye bread is twin-thirst-quenching, since this is what the sentence 'rye bread is thirst- 
quenching' means.
It is easy to construe similar arguments for the rest of the watery properties, and so 
it seems to follow that the supposedly narrow content of 'water' is inexpressible, The 
Semantic Internalist should, however, not be carried away by this. First of all. Semantic 
Intemalism is not the claim that every speaker knows everything about every concept. Nor 
is it the claim that the knowledge a speaker has of a concept always suffices to determine 
the application-conditions for that concept. That is why we all agree on (i). So, why are 
(A)-(C) and (A')-(C') not just cases in which a speaker has an incomplete grasp of the 
relevant concepts? Because this point is merely a premise in the arguments: what it shows 
is that if understanding is incomplete, then understanding is not as the Semantic Internalist 
says it is. The real question is why we should concede that the content, hence the truth- 
value, of my belief changes when the language changes. When we ascribe cognitive 
attitudes, we should always strive to make our fellow speakers as rational as possible. But 
why should I all of a sudden be right about the world just because a linguistic convention
16 Burge h imself mentions 'brisket', 'mortgage', 'red', and 'sofa'. Lewis [1999b, p. 314], however, disavows 
Rampant Semantic Bxternalism: "we should not jump to the conclusion that just any belief sentence is 
susceptible to Twin Earth examples. Oscar thinks that square pegs don't fit round holes; I don't think you can 
tell an even halfway convincing story of how Twoscar, just by being differently acquainted, fails to think so 
too." But what is to stop us from setting up an Arthritis Argument on mathematical terms like 'square'? In an 
actual situation, I have the true belief that square pegs don't f i t  round holes, but in a counterfactual situation 
in wliich 'square' applies to round as well as square objects, I would have the fa lse  belief that twin-square 
pegs don't f i t  round holes - even if  I remained intrinsically identical. The premise about partial understanding 
thus seems inessential to the Argument.
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has changed behind my back? Thus maybe more sense can be made of my behaviour if, 
say, in both (A) and (B) I am ascribed the true belief that I  have a rheumatoid ailment in 
my thigh. This ascription involves no change in use of language and 'arthritis' is not used in 
opaque position. To my knowledge, Burge has not argued why this possibility can safely be 
ignored. The response would no doubt be to run the Arthritis Argument once again on 
rheumatoid ailment'. In addition, the Semantic Externalist could via appeal to Disquotation
(D) insist that we should remain faithful to my - sincere and reflective - assent to 'I have 
arthritis in my thigh'.
Compare with Twin Earth. One could consistently maintain that what I truly believe 
when I assent to 'water is wet' is that the watery stuff is wet, whether I am on Earth or on 
Twin Earth. But in this case, it is more plausible that my belief would change, had I been 
on Twin Earth, since after all the world is different on Twin Earth. What should be born in 
mind is that, to repeat, what we learn from Twin Earth is not that reference cannot go via 
associated properties. On the contrary, we learn which properties mediate reference: water 
is the watery stuff of my acquaintance. The same is true of the Arthritis Argument. In 
general, I am unaware that a referring term F applies to objects o only, and not to objects 
o*. I actually have the false belief that o* is F, but, for all I know, I might have had the true 
belief that o* is twin-F, had F applied to both o and o*. Since the use-facts which actually 
and counterfactually govern F are external to me, they may change while I remain 
intrinsically the same. But if the use-facts change, then the content of my belief changes, 
and so the property of having a belief with that content fails to supervene on my intrinsic 
properties. Nevertheless, some expert-speakers do know the relevant use-facts: F applies to 
o only, 'arthritis' applies to ailments of the joints only, 'thirst-quenching' applies to liquids 
only, etc. We can therefore insist that the corresponding descriptions are part of the cluster 
associated with those terms: by 'arthritis' I associate the property that goes under the name
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'arthritis' in my language community, etc. '^  ^ So, when I use 'arthritis' in (A), I refer to what 
my speech community refers to in the actual situation, namely ailments of the joints only. 
But when I use 'arthritis' in (B), I refer to what my speech community refers to in the 
counterfactual situation, namely ailments of the joints as well as outside the joints. But 
given that I remain intrinsically the same in the two contexts of acquisition (A) and (B), the 
predicate 'being arthritis' is wide in that its content is context-dependent. What the Arthritis 
Argument shows is that associated with a term F is the other-dependent description 'being 
referred to as F by my speech community'. What happens when a speaker's understanding is 
imprecise is that she relies upon those expert speakers who do know the relevant 
description 'F applies to o only'. It can thus happen that a speaker associates inaccurate 
descriptive information with F, and yet succeeds in using F to pick out its referent. 
Similarly, it may be that a speaker does not associate enough descriptive information with 
F to identify its referent uniquely, and yet is able to use F to pick out its referent. E.g. 
Putnam's [1996] alleged inability to distinguish elms from beeches does not prevent him 
from using 'elm' to refer uniquely to elm-trees. Of course Putnam knows how to disquote, 
and so he knows that only elms are called 'elm' in his language, but that will not put him in 
a position to discriminate between elms and beeches. In this case, Putnam must defer to his 
fellow speakers who do possess sufficient and accurate information.^® So, just as we have
The two cases mentioned should be distinguished. In the case o f 'aithritis' the speaker has an imperfect 
grasp o f certain technical application conditions and must thus consults the experts, e.g. her doctor. Here we 
have a genuine case o f what Putnam [1996] called the division o f  linguistic labour. Since such conditions 
cannot be expected to be known by ordinary competent speakers, they do not enter into the cluster o f  
associated descriptions. In such cases, my competence is parasitic on the experts' competence. In the case of 
'thirst-quenching', however, the speaker has a paitial understanding of non-technical application conditions, 
and so merely defer to what every non-expert competent speaker knows. It is therefore more plausible in this 
case that the condition is part o f the cluster, i.e. is part o f what someone knows who has full competence with 
'thirst-quenching'.
1® It is often argued against Descriptivism that such cases demonstrate that identifying knowledge is neither 
necessary nor sufficient in order to be competent with a singular term. It seems to me, however, that
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seen that causal descriptions - 'the watery stuff of our acquaintance' - involve wide content, 
so will buck-passing descriptions - 'the ailment referred to as 'arthritis' by our speech 
community'. Consequently, just as we could factor out the narrow property of being 
acquainted with a watery stuff, we can factor out the narrow property of having an ailment 
called 'arthritis' by a speech community.
It is obvious that a satisfactory defence of narrow content would demand more 
substantial argument than I have canvassed here. Also there are other objections that I have 
not dealt with.i^ But at least the foregoing is suggestive of how the defence might go. In the 
last three Sections of this Chapter I shall return to the problem about Incompatibilism as 
presented in Chapter 1. But first we must go back to Diy Earth.
5.4. The Empty Case Revisited
According to Referentialism, an utterance of a simple sentence is assigned singular truth- 
conditions which specify the conditions under which the sentence is true-in Wa  and true-of 
all Wp. According to Descriptivism, however, an utterance of a simple sentence is assigned 
rigidified descriptive truth-conditions which specify the conditions under which the 
sentence is true-in all Wp and true-of all Wp. I have argued that rigidified descriptive tmth- 
conditions are a priori knowable since they do not depend on which Wp is in fact actual and
understanding comes in levels, and that there is an expert level at which Putnam is incompetent with 'elm', 
hence that he lacks/m// understanding of 'elm'. The reason Putnam can lack unique identifying knowledge and 
still pick out all and only elms by 'elm' is that he relies on the experts who do attach properties to 'elm' that 
inter alia  discriminate between elms and beeches. See also Stanley [1999b].
19 Another worry put forward by Stalnaker [1999a, pp. 177-8, 199-200] and Block [91, p. 40] is that narrow  
content is too narrow. W e want nanow content to be shared by real people and not just intrinsic duplicates. 
But it is difficult to see how our definition should be relaxed, and in particular, how talk o f near duplicates 
would resolve in the appropriate thickening o f the notion o f narrow content. I do not have a worked-out 
proposal as to how it might go. Suffice it to say that spelling out nairow content in terms o f a supervenience- 
relation allows for the possibility that two individuals who share narrow content differ in intrinsic properties.
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so can be known independently of any particular empirical facts about Wa- Descriptive 
content is independent of any particular context of utterance or acquisition. Singular 
content, however, is a posteriori knowable since it is dependent on which Wp is in fact 
actual, and so can only be known once the relevant empirical facts are in. Moreover, in Sec. 
5.1 I introduced a threefold distinction between object-dependence, context-dependence 
and world-dependence. I Sec. 5.3 I argued that no content is world-independent; I believe 
that the watery stuff is wet, but my doppelganger in a far-fetched Wp may fail to believe 
just that. Yet I argued that such purely descriptive content is context-independent: I believe 
that the wateiy stuff is wet and so does my doppelganger on a Twin Earth in Wa- Purely 
descriptive content is shared by doppelgangers within the same Wp. I have also introduced 
the idea that some content is context-dependent yet object-independent. I shall try to 
develop this idea in a short while. But for now Ï wish to focus on the object-dependence of 
singular content. We saw in Sec. 1.6 that all the Twin Earth Argument shows, if good, is 
that content is not individuated individualistically: if doppelgangers are embedded in 
different physical environments, then the contents of their beliefs differ. That is, not all 
content-bearing mental properties are shared by intra-world doppelgangers. But the Twin 
Earth Argument does not speak to the empty case. Could my doppelganger share my 
beliefs were he embedded in an environment where the relevant external facts go missing? 
In other words, it is one thing to say that which mental contents I entertain depend on 
which external objects I interact with; it is another thing to say that the very existence of 
those contents depend on the existence of those objects. In Sec. 1.6 I called the former 
Weak Semantic Externalism and the latter Strong Semantic Externalism, and I followed 
Boghossian [1997, 1998] in arguing that Weak Semantic Externalism was an unstable 
position liable to collapse into its stronger counterpart. The question we should now 
address is whether one can hold merely Weak Semantic Externalism with respect to 
singular content. I think it is easy to see that this question should be answered negatively. 
Consider again Dry Earth which is like Earth in every respect except that we are all deluded
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into thinking that there is a stuff which has all and only the wateiy properties.^o Despite all 
appearances, nothing actually fills the oceans, lakes, rivers, etc. Incredibly enough, all 
tokens of 'water' are simply empty. The question is: what are the singular truth-conditions 
of Dry Earthly tokens of sentences containing 'water'? On Earth utterances of sentences 
containing 'water' have truth-conditions which are singular with respect to H2 O, and on 
Twin Earth they have truth-conditions which are singular with respect to XYZ. But with 
respect to which kind of stuff do utterances on Dry Earth of sentences containing 'water' 
have singulai* truth-conditions? An utterance of 'water is wet' is true iff ? is wet. It is clear 
that there is no answer since there is no watery stuff on Dry Earth with respect to which 
they could be singular. As used on Dry Earth 'water' does not pick out any kind of stuff that 
could feature on the right-hand side of the bi-conditional. So, not only are all 'water'- 
sentences false, or lack truth-values, on Dry Earth, there are even no conditions under 
which they would have been true. So, it seems that singular content is not only not 
individuated individualistically, i.e. context-dependent, it is also object-dependent.
This result poses an immediate threat to Referentialism according to which the sole 
propositional content of a sentence containing 'water' is a singular proposition. The 
Referentialist cannot simultaneously subscribe to these three tenets: (i) Strong Semantic 
Externalism; (ii) We would understand utterances of 'water'-sentences were we to find 
ourselves on Dry Earth; (iii) Linguistic understanding is of semantic, i.e. tmth-conditionally 
relevant, content. Here is why. Were I to find myself on Dry Earth, I would still understand 
'water'-sentences, hence have knowledge of their propositional content. According to 
Strong Semantic Externalism that means I have knowledge of the singular propositions 
expressed. But ex hypothesi no such singular propositions are expressed on Dry Earth. So, 
either (i), (ii) or (iii) must go. Which one? Well, we have just aigued that (i) must hold 
given Weak Semantic Externalism which the Referentialist no doubt is happy to endorse.
26 It does not matter for present purposes whether we take Dry Earth as a remote planet in or as a Wp qua
actual. What is important is that Dry Earth is considered as a possible context o f acquisition.
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So, maybe we do not really understand 'water'-sentences on Dry Earth because there is 
nothing to understand. On Dry Earth no singular truth-conditions can be pinned down, so if 
understanding is of truth-conditional content, then no understanding is forthcoming! That, 
however, seems incredible. Consider this example. Suppose my doppelganger on Dry Earth 
is thirsty and utters 'that glass contains water'. He reaches out for the glass but in vain. 
Clearly his utterance has significance in that it explains his behaviour. Given his desire to 
quench his thirst, his behaviour makes sense if we can understand him to be expressing a 
belief with 'that glass contains water'. But if Dry Earthians suffer from a grand illusion of 
content, then my doppelganger fails to express a belief with singular content by his 
utterance, and so there can be no belief which in conjunction with his desire is causally 
responsible for his behaviour.21 Or just consider mundane cases of reference failure. Not 
knowing that I suffer from an illusion of content, I point to a bush while saying 'that man is 
drunk'. Since there is no one there, my utterance has no singular truth-conditions. But 
clearly my companion understood what I said, namely that I had the false, but causally 
efficacious, belief that there was a drunk man in the bush - 1 went to have a look in the 
bush.
So, we are left with (iii). Is it possible that understanding is not truth-conditional? 
Putnam advocated this view in e.g. [19781 where he subscribed to a two-component theoiy 
of natural kind concepts. On the one hand there is the contribution from the environment: 
the reference of 'water' is fixed by certain in principle defeasible criteria used by experts.
21 Illusions o f content provide additional support for the existence o f narrow content. Suppose my 
doppelganger and I are both thirsty and that we both have a belief we would express with 'that glass contains 
water'. The only difference between us is that my doppelganger suffers from an illusion o f content. We 
perfonn the same bodily movement of reaching out for what we think is a glass o f what we call 'water', but 
only I succeed. My doppelganger is not irrational, so presumably something explains his behaviour. But 
what? Not the wide content belief that the glass contains water since he has no such belief. So perhaps the 
naiTow content belief that the glass contains a watery stuff explains his behaviour. But if  the narrow content 
belief suffices to explain his behaviour, then it also suffices to explain my behaviour - on the plausible 
assumption that no content is available to him that is not available to me.
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On the other hand there is the stereotype: standardised set of idealised beliefs commonly 
associated with 'water' to facilitate communication. Putnam was keen to separate out a 
theory of meaning for 'water' which pertains to the classificatory extension of 'water', and a 
theory of understanding for 'water' which concerns communal beliefs and interaction. What 
is required to be competent in the use of 'water' is grasp of certain descriptive stereotypes, 
but what determines the meaning of 'water' are facts about which kind of physical stuff 
'water' picks out. He thus eschewed the Dummettian dictum that meaning and 
understanding are correlative notions. The semantics is all provided by the theory of 
meaning since the stereotypical beliefs are unfit to get the reference of 'water' right in 
various actual and counterfactual circumstances.
Now, I have argued that we should endorse a theory of singular terms which only 
acknowledges descriptive content. Purely descriptive content determines truth-conditions 
for all Wp qua actual, and rigidified descriptive content determines truth-conditions for all 
Wp qua counterfactual. In light of those arguments, I think we are better off upholding 
Dummett's dictum: knowledge of purely descriptive content yields a grade-one 
understanding and knowledge of rigidified descriptive content yields a grade-two 
understanding. Let us therefore see how Descriptivism handles empty cases. We have seen 
that singular thoughts are relational in the sense of owing their existence to the existence of 
the objects they essentially are about. Descriptive thoughts, however, are not relational 
since they are not essentially about any particular objects. On Earth, my utterance of 'water 
is wet' is true on Earth iff the watery stuff is wet. But the same utterance would have been 
true under the same conditions had it taken place on Twin Earth or on Dry Earth. On Twin 
Earth, the sentence would have been true due the fact that XYZ is wet, and on Dry Earth, 
the sentence would have been false due to the fact that, as it turns out, nothing has enough 
of the watery properties to deserve the name 'water'. One can lay down descriptive truth- 
conditions independently of whether one is embedded on Earth, Twin Earth or Dry Earth. 
This reflects the fact that descriptive thoughts are satisfactional in the sense of being about
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if anything, then whatever satisfies enough of certain associated conditions. They do 
therefore not have the particular object-dependency that singular thoughts have. So, 
according to Descriptivism, understanding is truth-conditional even on Dry Earth. 
Moreover, given that we are not conceptually confused in the way the Referentialist thinks 
we are, it is easy to account for the causal power of mental properties on Dry Earth. The 
reason my doppelganger reaches out for a glass to quench his thirst is that he (falsely) 
believes it contains a watery stuff. Or take the man in the bush. Since there is nobody there, 
no singular truth-conditions can be pinned down for my utterance. In this case, we can fall 
back on descriptive truth-conditions: 'that man is drunk' is true iff the demonstratively 
identified male is drunk. The reason I inspect the bush is thus that I (falsely) believe there is 
a male person in it who is drunk (and I desire to help drunks or whatever) . 22
5.5. A Response to the MC-form
We are now in a position to diagnose and respond to the Incompatibilist Argument from 
Sec. 1.5. Incompatibilism, remember, was the claim that Semantic Externalism  and 
Privileged Access are incompatible doctrines. It is easy to see a prima facie tension: how 
can we have introspective access to the contents of our occurrent mental states if those 
contents depend for their individuation, indeed for their existence, on external facts that we 
have no introspective access to? I argued in Sec. 1.4 that the Semantic Externalist has 
offered no satisfactory account of why we should not think that this prima facie tension 
goes much deeper. In particular, Burge's model of self-verifying thoughts would at most
2 2  This is a general point about reference failure. I used to believe that my dad was stronger than Superman. 
In quarrels with my mates I would say: 'my dad can beat Superman!'. But if  Referentialism is true, why did 
my mates care to disagree? There should be nothing I believed except falsely that 'my dad can beat Supemian' 
expressed a proposition. Things look different, however, if  what I falsely believe is that there is a masked 
super-hero who flies around and chases criminals and who is such that my dad can beat him.
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show that in a very limited number of cases, Semantic Externalism and Privileged Access 
are consistent doctrines. But fully-fledged compatibility is another matter and, to my 
knowledge, no Semantic Externalist has as yet ventured to address this task. We can now 
see why. Wide content in its singular guise is simply not subject to Privileged Access. Bear 
in mind that Privileged Access is the thesis that a competent speaker can have a priori 
knowledge of the contents of his occurrent mental states, where by 'a priori' we mean that 
those contents are reflectively accessible to S - independently of any empirical 
investigation of his external environment. But we have seen that speakers do not have a 
priori knowledge of the singular contents of their wide content mental states. Singular 
content is knowable only after the relevant empirical information about the context of 
utterance or acquisition is in. I have spent some time arguing for this in the case of natural 
kind terms but the point is general. Suppose I leave a note on my office door saying 'back 
in five minutes'. Mary does not know 'its' singular truth-conditions unless she knows when 
I wrote it. What she knows a priori is a set of conditionals of the form: if I wrote the note at 
3, then 'back in five minutes' is true iff I am back at 3.05, etc. Or suppose Mary is in the 
bush. I do not know the singulai* ti*uth-conditions of the utterance 'she is in the bush' unless 
I know that Mary is in the bush. What I know a priori is that if Mary is the person in the 
bush, then 'she is in the bush' is true iff Mary is in the bush, etc. Such conditionals can be 
pinned down if one has knowledge of descriptive or linguistic content since it determines 
how actual and possible contexts determine which singular contents are expressed. So, 
what one knows a priori is the descriptive content associated with expressions since it 
remains constant across actual and possible contexts of utterance or acquisition.
Let us now return to the Incompatibilist Argument from Sec. 1.5. That Argument 
was a reductio of the conjunction of Strong Semantic Externalism - the claim that mental 
content is object-dependent - and Privileged Access:
(1)1 have mental property M,
(2) If I have mental property M, then I meet condition C,
217
(3) So, I meet condition C.
This MC-form is deductively valid. Moreover, the first premise is a priori knowable by 
Privileged Access; the second premise is a conceptual truth, hence a priori knowable, 
according to Strong Semantic Externalism; hence the conclusion should be a priori 
knowable. But it is manifestly not a priori knowable. Take M to be the mental property of 
having the belief that water is wet and take the external condition C to be that water exists. 
Plug these ingredients into our recipe and we get:
(1*)I believe that water is wet,
(2*) If I believe that water is wet, then water exists,
(3*) So, water exists.
Privileged Access tells me that I can know a priori that I occurrently believe that water is 
wet. Strong Semantic Externalism tells me from the armchair, as it were, that if I believe 
that water is wet, then water exists. To set up thought experiments concerning the 
possession conditions for such beliefs on Earth, Twin Earth or Dry Earth is not to carry out 
an empirical inquiry. But I do clearly not know a priori that water exists since I do not 
know a priori that I am not on Twin Earth or on Dry Earth. Bear in mind what actually 
happened in the case of caloric or phlogiston.
Should this Argument carry conviction against the Referentialist who, remember, 
holds that the content of my belief that water is wet is singular? Well, we have seen in Sec. 
5.4 that singular content is object-dependent, and so (2*) is indeed a priori knowable. We 
know from a thought-experiment that had I been on Dry Earth, I could not have had the 
singular content belief that water is wet. Earthly tokens of 'water is wet' express the 
singular proposition that H2 O is wet, and so not a proposition Dry Earthlings can express: 
'water is wet' is tme iff ?-stuff is wet. But ( l* ) is  clearly not a priori knowable. Singular 
content is at most a posteriori knowable: I cannot know a priori that I believe that water is 
wet if the content of that belief is singular. Grasp of singular content requires knowledge of 
the micro-physics of W a, i.e. knowledge of which underlying chemical kind actually
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instantiates the watery properties. One can know a priori that if H2 O is the watery stuff, 
then 'water is wet' is true iff H2 O is wet, but there is no a priori way of affirming the 
antecedent. So, according to Referentialism, there is no a priori warrant for the first 
premise that can be transmitted across the a priori knowable conditional in the second 
premise to the conclusion.
How does it look on the Descriptivist's account? Well, we have argued that 
knowledge of descriptive content is a priori knowable. I know a priori that if water exists, 
then water is the watery stuff. So, if by 'water is wet' in (1*) we mean the descriptive 
proposition associated, then indeed (1*) is a priori knowable. But if thus taken, (2*) is 
simply false. Descriptive propositions are not object-dependent. Dry Earthly tokens of 
'water is wet' are true iff the watery stuff is wet. (2*) is only tme if by 'water' we understand 
the singular content expressed. So, according to Descriptivism, there is indeed an a priori 
warrant for the first premise; it is just that there is no a priori warranted conditional across 
which it could be transmitted. To be sure, the conditional in the second premise is not even 
a posteriori knowable; it is false.
So, here is a dilemma for the Incompatibilist. If one staits off making the first 
premise a priori knowable, then the second premise comes out false, but if one starts off 
making the second premise true, then the first premise comes out at most a posteriori 
knowable. So, it would seem that if ambiguity is to be avoided, then there is no way both 
premises can simultaneously be rendered true a priori. So, the MC-foim is blocked: there is 
no non-equivocal way of reaching the conclusion that we have a priori knowledge of the 
external condition C.
The Incompatibilist may object to the foregoing response that it simply misses the 
point. The MC-form was set up as a reductio of Compatibilism which is the claim that we 
can attain Privileged Access to the kind of wide content that Strong Semantic Externalism 
subscribes to. The Referentialist account has not vindicated Compatibilism. On the 
contrary, it seems to concede the Incompatibilist contention that no Privileged Access to
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wide content mental states is forthcoming. What we have shown is that the first premise is 
true of descriptive content, whereas the second premise is true of singulai* content, but the 
Incompatibilist need not demur to this. Moreover, it seems the MC-form still stands. 
Suppose we set out to render the second premise true, i.e. take the mental property M to be 
singular content mental properties. Then it is still true that were we to have Privileged 
Access to our singular content mental properties, then we would be able to have a priori 
knowledge of the external condition E. This counterfactual claim has not been contested 
but, the thought goes, it is what the Compatibilist claims to be true in actual fact. So, 
according to the Compatibilist, nothing should stop us from achieving armchair knowledge 
of ordinary, empirical state of affairs that we would otherwise only have knowledge of 
were we to engage in some successful empirical investigation.
This of course is all to the point. In light of the foregoing, it is more than hard to see 
how Strong Semantic Externalism could possibly be reconciled with Privileged Access. 
Presented with the MC-form, the friend of Strong Semantic Externalism has no choice but 
to deny that we have Privileged Access to object-dependent content. So, the Incompatibilist 
is clearly right that one cannot at the same time subscribe to both tenets. And the 
significance of this fact is that if one holds, as the Referentialist does, that mental content is 
singular, then one better explain why it is perfectly harmless to surrender the a priority of 
our knowledge of our own occurrent mental states. In any case, the Descriptivist is not 
doomed to stmggle with Incompatibilist arguments. On his account, the second premise in 
the MC-form is simply false. What we shall now finally see is that Descriptivism paves the 
way for a kind of Neo-Compatibilism according to which some wide content is subject to 
Privileged Access without the threat of paradox.
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5.6. Beyond Incompatibility
Semantic Externalists and Semantic Internalists alike have accepted the conditional claim 
that i f  Incompatibilism is true, then Semantic Externalism is false . The Semantic 
Internalists have therefore invested much energy arguing why the antecedent is true and the 
Semantic Externalists have spent equally much energy trying to rebut the Semantic 
Internalists' arguments.23 The reason for this is obviously that Privileged Access is a 
forceful principle: in the normal run of things I know the contents of my occurrent thoughts 
just by introspective reflection. Now, if Semantic Externalism goes hand-in-hand with 
Referentialism, then indeed I suspect much energy has been wasted trying to prove 
Incompatibilism wrong. But we have learned from the Twin Earth Argument and the 
Arthritis Argument that there is space for a weaker notion of wide content than the kind of 
object-dependent content which is entailed by Referentialism.
Consider first the Twin Earth Argument. We started off with the assumption that 
the content of 'water' was purely descriptive: water is the watery stuff. The watery stuff on 
Twin Earth, however, is not stuff we would describe as 'water' since it is not identical to the 
watery stuff around here, as Putnam put in. So, what we learned was that the cluster of 
watery properties associated with 'water' must include causal properties: water is the 
watery stuff of our acquaintance. The consequence was that certain mental properties like 
water-beliefs fail to supervene on intrinsic properties. My utterance of 'water fills the 
oceans' is true iff the watery stuff of our acquaintance fills the oceans. But this is not the 
condition under which my doppelganger's utterance of the same sentence is true on a 
remote Twin Earth in Wa- His utterance is true iff the watery stuff of their acquaintance 
fills the o c e a n s . 2 4  My doppelganger and his fellow speakers have had no causal encounters
23 See for instance Burge [1996], Davidson [1996], Brueckner [1998] and McLaughlin & Tye [1998].
24 The reason I use 'our acquaintance' instead of 'my acquaintance' is that it need not be me who is acquainted 
with water but other members in my speech community. The important point is not to read 'our' as referring to 
both me and my doppelganger. He is not acquainted with the watery stuff o f our acquaintance - H2 O - since
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with the watery stuff I and my fellow speakers interact with. So, my belief that water fills 
the oceans is context-dependent in that my doppelganger in a different context of 
acquisition - Twin Earth - fails to share my belief. But the content of my belief is not 
object-dependent. On Dry Earth, my utterance of 'water fills the oceans' still express the 
causally constrained descriptive proposition that the watery stuff of our acquaintance fills 
the oceans. Since there is no watery stuff that I interact with on Dry Earth, there is nothing 
that makes that belief true, but there are still determinate conditions under which it would 
have been true. Adding a causal property to the cluster term 'water' does not make its 
associated content object-dependent since it is just another way of constraining its 
reference without saying which kind of stuff it picks out. Although my belief that water 
fills the oceans is thus individuated by reference to facts in my physical environment, it is 
nevertheless a belief whose content I have Privileged Access to. I can know a priori that if 
water exists, then water is the watery stuff. All that takes is reflection on how to describe 
various Wp were they actual. But if I can know that, I can also know a priori that if water 
exists, then water is the watery stuff of our acquaintance. All that takes is reflection of how 
to describe Twin Earth. The same is true of my doppelganger. He will also associate a 
causal property with 'water' which he will express by 'the watery stuff of our acquaintance'. 
But given that he inhabits a different physical environment, 'water' will in his mouth pick 
out a different kind of stuff. So, we can both have the property of being acquainted with a 
watery stuff, but only I can have the property of being acquainted with the watery stuff of 
our acquaintance. So, the upshot is that causally constrained descriptive content is wide in 
the sense of being merely context-dependent yet is subject to Privileged Access.
The same is true of the Arthritis Argument. What we learned from that Argument 
was that we must include other-dependent properties as pait of the cluster associated with a
he belongs to a speech community whose members are acquainted with a different watery stuff - XYZ. 
Alternatively, the same point can be brought out by deploying a distinction between the indexicals around 
here!around there.
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singular term. What I refer to by, say, 'water', and hence what I mean, is not only a function 
of the properties I associate with 'water', it is also dependent on which properties my 
speech community attach to 'water'. In my use of 'water', I must defer to my fellow 
speakers' use of 'water': water is the watery stuff that is called 'water' by my speech 
community. This means that if my doppelganger inhabits a different speech community, 
then he will associate a different property with 'water', namely the property of being called 
'water' by his speech community. His use of 'water' does not answer to the way 'water' is 
used in my community. He will of course use the same sentence 'water is the stuff that goes 
under the name 'water' in my speech community', but given that he is in a different context 
of acquisition, 'water' will pick out a different kind of stuff.25 So, the truth-conditions of 
our respective utterances of sentences containing 'water' will be different, and so my belief 
that water fills the oceans fails to supervene on my intrinsic properties. Although the 
content of this belief is thus individuated by reference to facts in my social environment, it 
is a belief whose content is subject to Privileged Access. All it takes to realise that we must 
associate other-dependent properties with singular terms is reflection on how to describe 
circumstances in which my doppelganger and I are embedded in different speech 
communities. So, the upshot is that other-dependent descriptive content is wide in the sense 
of being context-dependent yet is subject to Privileged Access.
There is thus a striking analogy between the Twin Ear th Argument and the Arthritis 
Argument in that both emphasise the need for indexical properties as part of the cluster 
associated with singular terms. Consequently, the contents of sentences containing such 
terms will be sensitive to the context in which they are uttered. The content of my belief 
that water is fun to swim in is dependent on the context in which I acquired that belief due 
to the fact that with 'water' is assigned the property of being the stuff around here that my 
speech community calls 'water".
25 Again we could factor out a property my doppelganger and I both associate with 'water', namely the 
property o f being referred to as 'water' by a speech community.
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It may be objected that indexical properties entail differences in content, not only 
when we want them, but also when we do not want them. Suppose Perfect Twin Earth is, 
not a near duplicate of Earth like Twin Earth, but an exact duplicate of Earth. Perfect Twin 
Earth is a place located on the other side of the galaxy where the watery stuff is H2 O. Now, 
just as on Twin Earth, when my Perfect Twin Earth doppelganger and I both utter the 
sentence 'water is fun to swim in', what we say have different truth-conditions due to the 
context-sensitivity of 'here', 'my', etc. But the intuition is that since we are intrinsically 
identical, speak the same language and inhabit identical physical environments, he believes 
just what I believe when I announce 'water is fun to swim in'. Moreover, if my use of, say, 
'around here' excludes Twin Earth, then it would be ad hoc to think it includes Perfect 
Twin Earth; suppose the latter is more remote than the former. Therefore, the thought goes, 
our concept of water cannot involve covert reference to my environment. 26
I think there are two distinct questions. One is whether the stuff on Perfect Twin 
Earth is water; another is whether my doppelganger believes what I believe. Given that the 
stuff called 'water' on Perfect Twin Earth is both watery and H2 O, it is intuitively also stuff 
we would call 'water'. But how can that be if our tokens of 'water' pick out the watery stuff 
around herel Well, bear in mind that, according to Descriptivism, 'water' refers to 
whatever stuff satisfies sufficiently many of the properties that make up the cluster 
associated with 'water'. We have seen that 'water' may refer to actual samples of H2 O even 
if they lack one or more of the purely descriptive properties. I think Perfect Twin Earth 
highlights the possibility that we may use 'water' to refer to actual samples of H2 O even if 
they lack certain indexical properties such as being the prevalent liquid around here. We 
should allow for the discovery of samples of water in W a which we have had no causal 
encounters with. The cluster is not a list of necessaiy and sufficient conditions, and there is 
no reason to regard any single property as sacrosanct. What is more, we are willing to call 
those samples 'water' only in virtue of the fact that they are of the same kind - H2 O - as the
26 This objection can be found in Pryor [2000, pp. 108-22].
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stuff to which we do bear certain causal relations and which does have those watery 
properties. We would not have labelled the watery stuff on Perfect Twin Earth 'water' had it 
not been of the same kind as the watery stuff of our acquaintance on Earth. So, my 
doppelganger clearly believes o f water that it is fun to swim in. But I suspect that even if 
there is a sense in which we share De Dicto beliefs, e.g. the belief that the watery stuff is 
fun to swim in, the difference in location will force a distinction in what we believe. Given 
that he has no beliefs about Earth, the belief he expresses by 'water is fun to swim in' 
should concern only Perfect Twin Earth samples of water; after all, those are the samples 
he, or his community, has interacted with. Similarly, if his grasp of 'water' is somewhat 
distorted, he does not defer to speech communities located on far-off planets even if they 
share his language; he answers to the experts in his own c o m m u n i t y .2^
Let me sum up. The good news is that once Semantic Externalism is divorced from 
Referentialism, there is hope for a kind of Neo-Compatibilism. We learn from the various 
arguments against Descriptivism and Semantic Internalism which properties must be 
associated with singular terms, and although some of them will issue in wide content 
mental states, they will all be reflectively accessible properties. Nevertheless, we can still 
hope to factor out narrow components. I have tried to argue that the prospects for a 
thorough-going Semantic Externalism look rather gloomy. It is not to be expected that the 
argumentative strategy which, say, the Twin Earth Argument deploys - change the world 
while fixing the way it appears - is going to give us wide content across the board. For a 
wide range of phenomenal and functional concepts, there will be no relevant distinction
22 The same is mutatis mutandis true of 'actually'. Thus Fitch [1981] and Soames [1998] have argued that, 
say, 'water' cannot be short for the actual watery stuff because I have doppelgangers in counterfactual Wp 
who have beliefs about water yet no beliefs about W^. I think they are wrong. The reason why the watery 
stuff in such Wp is truly described by us as 'water' is that it is o f the same kind - H2 O - as the watery stuff in 
It is only in virtue of indexicals like 'around here' or 'actual' that we describe speakers who have no 
beliefs about our vicinity as having beliefs about water or whatever.
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between the way the world is and the way the world appears, that is, they will not be 
referentially sensitive to variations in the underlying physics of the world.
Bear in mind Putnam's dictum that meaning just ain't in the head. What I am 
proposing is that it be taken at face value when it comes to singular content: once meaning 
has been expelled from the mind, as it were, there is no prospect of attributing to meaning 
all the intentional properties it would have had, had it been firmly entrenched in the mind. 
When it comes to descriptive content, however, the dictum is false. I have argued that no 
convincing case has been made that singular terms cannot have associated descriptive 
content. The conjunction of the Modal Argument, the Semantical Argument and the 
Epistemological Argument falls short of a knock-down refutation of Descriptivism. On the 
contrary, considerations about the behaviour of singular terms in intentional contexts 
strongly suggest that they better have semantically relevant descriptive contents. Moreover, 
neither the Twin Earth Argument nor the Arthritis Argument shows that no mental content 
can be narrow in the sense of being context-independent though we should not expect it to 
be world-independent. What we learn is that some mental content will be wide in the sense 
of being merely context-dependent. No compelling case has been made that we must also 
take on board the stronger notion of object-dependent content. Both context-independent 
and context-dependent content are, however, firmly in the mind if that means subject to 
Privileged Access. This, I propose, is what it is to have meaning in mind.
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